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**CHIANG KAI-SHEK**



One of Madame Chiang Kai-shek's latest photographs.

# CHIANG KAI-SHEK

SOLDIER AND STATESMAN

AUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY  
BY  
HOLLINGTON K. TONG  
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## CHAPTER XX

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DURING the summer of the year 1931, the situation became more serious. Moscow welcomed the Canton movement, in the expectation that it would provide a diversion of which the Communists in Central China could take full advantage. While the Nanking Government and the Canton faction were “destroying one another,” as one Soviet commentator pointed out, the Chinese Red Army could obtain a breathing space to consolidate its forces and extend its territorial bases, thus removing all chance of destruction to itself.

Relations by this time had become so strained as to preclude any reasonable hope of reconciliation, and Chen Chi-tang began to organize a punitive expedition from Canton against Nanking. Chiang himself kept an eye on developments, but meanwhile he occupied himself chiefly with a campaign against the Communist forces then entrenched in Kiangsi Province. Nanking made a last effort to effect a settlement by sending two representatives, Chang Chi and Wu Te-chen, to Canton to discuss the dispute, but the Canton leaders continued to insist that the only possible settlement was the resignation of Chiang.

Events now moved rapidly toward a crisis. On the last day of July, another attempt was made to assassinate Chiang Kai-shek at Nanchang, his headquarters in Kiangsi during the anti-Communist campaign. Three men concealed by the roadside fired at him as he passed in his car, but their aim was bad, and they were captured within a short time. They confessed that they had been sent from Canton for the express purpose of killing the Generalissimo.

During the first week in August, the vanguard of the Kwangsi troops, who had allied themselves with the malcontents at Canton, entered southern Hunan, crossing the border without opposition. This open move was seen as the end to all efforts at a peaceful settlement. Civil war was imminent. Chiang gave the order for mobilization of Nanking troops against the Southern invaders, and he resigned himself to another period of internecine strife on a grand scale.

Canton, however, was having its own difficulties. From the beginning there had been a serious shortage of funds. In addition, one of the Kwangtung regiments revolted and went over to Nanking. A bitter quarrel arose over the Chairmanship of Kwangtung. After a great deal of bickering, extremely disillusioning to Canton leaders not devoid of all principle, Chen Chi-tang assumed full control in the South. Wang Ching-wei and Sun Fo found themselves used merely for "window dressing." The crushing defeat of Shih Yu-san in the North earlier, and the set-backs experienced by the Red forces in Kiangsi as the result of a determined Nanking drive, had not been reassuring to the Southerners. When Chiang shifted two crack divisions from the Communist front in Kiangsi to the front against the rebels in southern Hunan, Canton morale was seriously shaken. In desperation some of the Southern leaders began making bids for aid from Japan, appointed a Japanese adviser and sent Eugene Chen off to Tokyo to obtain support for the Canton cause.

An actual major clash between the Canton and Nanking Armies which were massing against one another, however, never occurred. It was averted by the Japanese invasion of the

**Three Eastern Provinces.** On September 18, a section of railway track in the Manchurian plain, far to the north, was blown up. The Japanese Army in Manchuria had decided that the time was ripe to take advantage of the turmoil in China and of the fact that the whole of Chang Hsueh-liang's Army had been withdrawn from Manchuria to garrison North China from the Great Wall to the Yellow River. The Japanese chose that moment to start upon their march toward the conquest of the Three Eastern Provinces and to implement their programme of aggression in eastern Asia. Significantly, this day was the anniversary of the day when Chang Hsueh-liang, in defiance of Japanese threats, threw Manchuria into the Nanking fold. Mukden was occupied. All important centres in Liaoning were taken over. Electrified, the world watched and China, split into two armies drawn up in a battle line ready to come to grips once again, paused.

Nanking was not slow to take this as a sign and omen. Realizing the significance of the events rapidly transpiring in Manchuria, the Government asked Canton to take cognizance of the great danger to the country from Japanese aggression, and to call off the dogs of war. Kuomintang members were urged to unite. Conciliation was demanded; national unity was a prime requisite. The Southerners began to waver.

Japan's rapid moves in Manchuria had suddenly ruined Canton's hopes of aid from the Island Empire. They began to realize that the rebellion was foredoomed to failure. And then from all parts of China there arose an ever-increasing demand that the Kuomintang split be healed and a common front formed.

An hour of unprecedented gravity had struck for the Chinese nation. Without warning, and contrary to all practices of the civilized world and all covenants freely contracted, the Japanese Army had invaded Chinese territory, killed Chinese citizens and inflicted indignities on Chinese civil and military authorities. Japanese militarists were in the saddle and they defied their own Government besides the world generally.

The challenge thrown to China was a challenge also to all nations. The League of Nations was established to prevent war and bring collective action into play to prevent aggression. China immediately informed the League of Japanese aggression and asked it to procure the immediate withdrawal of the invaders as a preliminary. The Council of the League took the matter under consideration. Nanking had asked the Council to help to find a peaceful solution of the conflict. China was at that time confident that impartial inquiry would give her the fullest justice and compensation. The League had not then shown its spinelessness and impotence.

As China had entrusted her case to the League, the Chinese Army received instructions to avoid all possibility of a clash with the Japanese. Nanking exhorted the nation to maintain a dignified calm. Civilian authorities were ordered to take the strictest measures to protect Japanese citizens on Chinese soil.

Generalissimo Chiang, as Chairman of the National Government, issued a message to the nation four days after the Mukden outrage in which he declared that all internal dissension must cease. He called on everybody, men and women, and upon every political group without exception, to rally to the National Government. There was but one China and one national representation, he said. No provocation must be allowed to disturb the attitude of calm and determined expectancy, which the nation must impose upon itself.

The National Government was watching events. It had taken the people of the country into its confidence and would publicly render account of the developments in the situation from time to time. Heated differences between North and South that had threatened a few days before to flame into war were cooling now. The chances of an armed clash were fading, but reconciliation was still a long way off. The Southerners had immediately realized that any sign of a pro-Japanese attitude on their part would be fatal to their cause, and consequently they became vociferous in their denunciation of Japan. Early in October, further efforts were made to

bring about a settlement, Hu Han-min negotiating with the Southerners on behalf of Nanking. He urged that bygones should be bygones, saying that for the blunders no one could disclaim responsibility.

Chiang sent envoys to Canton again to express his willingness to come to terms in order to establish peace and present a united front against foreign aggression. The Southerners, however, had not abandoned their personal opposition to the Generalissimo. Finally, they agreed to a "peace conference" in Shanghai. Accordingly, toward the end of October, the Southern leaders including Wang Ching-wei, Sun Fo, C. C. Wu and Eugene Chen arrived in the Yangtze metropolis. They were certain of themselves, for they had read into Chiang's conciliatory suggestions a sign of weakness.

Generalissimo Chiang arrived in Shanghai from Nanking by air shortly afterwards. With Hu Han-min, Tsai Yuan-pei, Chang Ching-kiang, Chen Ming-shu and other Nanking delegates, he met the Canton leaders in the home of Sun Fo.

Chiang wasted no time. He was business-like. As a result of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, he pointed out, the position of China had become extremely precarious. All must immediately unite to face the national crisis. As for past complications, whatever may have been the rights or wrongs, they must be laid aside for the present.

The Southerners, however, refused to accede to this plea for reconciliation. Instead, they formulated a series of demands in which they reiterated that Chiang must resign his position, in return for which they would dissolve the newly-formed "government" at Canton. With certain reservations, Chiang accepted in principle the suggestions made, for he was determined that at all costs the conference must heal the Party split. He was conciliatory to an extraordinary degree for one who had been branded dictator, while in contrast the anti-dictators only knew how to formulate demands.

Nanking's attitude at first resulted in signs of reasonableness on the part of Canton, but it was not long before the Southern delegates grew uncompromising again and pro-

ceeded to work out even more demands. These amounted to a notice to quit to the entire Nanking regime and its substitution by the Canton "government." The Southerners apparently imagined that the Nanking Government intended to negotiate with them for the extinction of the National Government itself.

This futile conference proceeding in Shanghai soon exhausted the patience of Chiang, a man of action. He returned to Nanking where, early in November, he denounced the Canton delegates in no uncertain terms, accusing them of giving aid to Japan during the Chinese national crisis and expressing the hope that the League of Nations would not be influenced by this display of Southern temperament. Indignantly, he declared that he intended to support the National Government, the Kuomintang and the Provisional Constitution. He might suffer for it, but he could not agree to the proposals of a few men that he should turn against the Party and the Constitution. "I swear before the portrait of Dr. Sun Yat-sen," he said grimly, "and before the people and the country, that I will adhere to the *yo-fa* (the Provisional Constitution) if I must die for it!"

This was the first open indication of a changed policy that the Generalissimo had made since the opening of the peace negotiations at Shanghai. He declared that Hu Han-min, who was attending the conference in an advisory capacity, had suggested that Chiang be exiled from China and never permitted to return. He had formerly been willing to retire, but since the Southerners had created nation-wide chaos, undermining all national foundations, he had no alternative but to continue in office to repair the damage they had done. "I will assume the responsibility for this," he said. "I would not have been in Nanking to-day, I would not have defeated the Communists, had I not had the determination to overcome Soviet coercion and imperialist intrigue." He expressed the fear that the Canton "government" was creating more chaos, such as might last for another 20 years.

Chiang's downright statement might have been intended

as a spur and a warning to the delegates pursuing their peace discussion in Shanghai rather than as a deliberate rejection of the compromise. However that might be, it could not be denied that his obvious impatience reflected the opinion even of those who were outside the circle of his supporters. Chinese who felt that the Japanese move in Manchuria had raised a national issue of insistent importance, were naturally surprised at the readiness of the peace delegates to argue about conditions and provisos at such a time. When the emissaries from Canton had reached Shanghai where Hu Han-min, from Nanking, had arrived to greet them, it was plainly expected that there would be a business-like discussion of the points of policy on which Canton differed from Nanking, a practical reconciliation, the consideration of the necessary proposals for adjusting the personnel of the Government to ensure the restoration of Canton influence, and then there could be a definite formulation of policy on national lines. It was felt that this required only one quality for achievement—sincerity which, of course, implied absence of personal prejudice. How idle now seemed those expectations on which so much reliance had been placed! As the days slipped by, no word of a definite agreement had come from the delegates. Instead there had been tales of recrimination, refusal to work with each other and a general atmosphere of hopeless pique. Although reports had been busy with certain names it was held better to discuss the stagnation without specifically referring to any individual. The wisdom of this course was the greater because it would seem that the dislikes of one day were the positive infatuations of the next. One day the personality of A was anathema to the group from X; next day A would be the only tolerable figure to the X group, amid a flock of perfectly impossible creatures. The result was that there was a painful attitude of marking time, of waiting to see what would turn up and that, of course, meant looking for the opportunity which, as likely as not, would be pregnant with mischief rather than with constructive possibilities.

Undoubtedly the violation of treaties by the Japanese

militarists had aided the cause of unity in China. The danger was that inactivity might rob China of that favourable position. Chiang Kai-shek was not unmindful of that. He was on sound ground in stressing the importance of giving the Government the fullest support in the crisis then pending. It was assumed that the main object of the peace negotiations was to put the Government—whether reconstructed or strengthened—in that position. The delegates seemed, however, to be expending their energy in dwelling on imponderables. The call from Chiang Kai-shek was for them to put an end to dilly-dallying and to get down to business.

A thick atmosphere of gloom settled over the conference. The Southerners protested their sincerity, but they protested too much. They denied that they wished to exile Chiang. Suddenly they ceased to exhibit themselves as dictators with long lists of demands. Questions were now being raised as to whom they really represented. It was known that Chen Chitang was in complete control in Canton and that he was not sharing his responsibilities, or usurpations, with the Southern political leaders. After waiting a short time to give the Canton peace delegates a chance "to meditate on their sins," word came out of Nanking that a solution had been found to the knotty problem of the Fourth Kuomintang Congress. It was a face-saving device and consisted of allowing the Congress to assemble in two divisions, one in Nanking and one in Canton.

The peace conference came to an end early in November. It had been essentially a victory for the Government although Chiang Kai-shek, as part of the price of peace and national unity, had agreed to resign his posts as soon as the reorganization of the Nanking Government could be effected. The results of the session had increased Chiang's prestige through his quality of leadership, but his prospective resignation cast an atmosphere of gloom over the Capital that even the promise of national unity was unable to dispel.

A few days after the close of this Shanghai peace session, two congresses opened in China, one in Nanking and the other

in Canton. A Kuomintang Congress met in the Capital about mid-November; a similar session convened in the Southern city.

There was at this time fighting proceeding in the North between Japanese and Chinese, and China was in turmoil. In opening the Nanking Congress, Chiang Kai-shek again emphasized the crying necessity of national unity to meet aggression with a united front. The task of the delegates to this Congress was to take measures in conformity with the Constitution of the Party and to consolidate the Chinese forces. It was obvious that if the Party failed, the Japanese would push on into China and the Chinese race would face a very grave crisis. The First National Congress which years before was called by Dr. Sun Yat-sen had the important mission of reorganizing the Kuomintang and reconstructing China; the Fourth Congress, however, had a far more important task on its hands. The Northern situation was uppermost in all minds.

The Southern Congress delayed its opening for several days, nevertheless, in the hope that Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min would attend. They failed to turn up, and it finally was convened by Sun Fo. The Southerners immediately began to squabble over the results of the Shanghai peace conference, and a sensational resolution was finally adopted repudiating the agreements signed by their own delegates and insisting upon the resignation of Chiang. This was simply going from bad to worse, and many Southern leaders, including Sun Fo and Eugene Chen, were so offended that they withdrew to Hongkong. Eventually a number of them went back to Shanghai, where they held a congress of their own (making three in progress) and elected their own members for Government posts.

Seeking once more to bring the Canton leaders to a sense of their responsibilities, Chiang reiterated that the crisis then confronting the country could only be solved through unification of the Party. The Kuomintang session at Nanking, realizing the need for unity, had been prevailed upon by

Chiang to accept the new government reorganization plan. This work had been accelerated at Nanking, and it was to be deplored that the Southerners had, after a lapse of weeks, been unable to settle their differences and arrive at a satisfactory agreement. Realization of national unity had been retarded, when speed was the most pressing need. Chiang did not hesitate to call attention to the dangers which might result from such procrastination and dilatoriness at that particular time.

The Generalissimo was then planning tentatively to go north to deal directly with the increasing tension there, this having been agreed upon at the Nanking Congress. It was first necessary, however, that the Central Authorities should decide on a programme and a plan of campaign, otherwise serious obstacles would arise. They must decide upon various important issues without delay.

These pleas, however, continued to fall upon deaf ears in South China. Chiang had asked Wang Ching-wei to use his influence to bring Southern members to Nanking. Tsai Yuan-pei and other Nanking loyalists had been backing up this appeal with personal representations. Such overtures, unhappily, had little effect except upon Wang Ching-wei himself and Sun Fo, who went north. The others continued to insist that they would have nothing to do with Nanking unless Chiang Kai-shek resigned.

Chiang Kai-shek did not wait long. The situation was one that required immediate action, and since there was none forthcoming from the South, he took it upon himself. He resigned all his posts in the National Government on December 15, 1931. For over three years since his appointment as head of the Government in 1928, he had exerted himself to the utmost for the realization of the desires of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Time and again, he had been frustrated in his efforts. Following in the wake of repeated domestic calamities, the aggression of the powerful Japanese Armies had become daily more serious. Chiang felt very anxious, but it would not have been justifiable for him to shirk his responsibility at that

critical juncture. He felt that as national unity was essential for the concerted resistance against foreign aggression, the fratricidal strife within the nation must end. That could only be accomplished by his withdrawal.

He, therefore, petitioned the Central Party authorities to accept his resignation as Chairman of the National Government and from his other posts and to appoint other men in his place to tide over the emergency. He had pledged himself to the cause of the National Revolution and had endeavoured to base his movements upon the interests of the Party and the State. After his resignation, he intended to continue to exert himself as a citizen of the Republic and aid in the attainment of a solution to the crisis. Many weighty issues of State still remained to be decided—but now Chiang was out of it.

It was a foregone conclusion that the resignation would be immediately accepted. Lin Sen was appointed Acting Chairman of the National Government of China and Chen Ming-shu as Acting President of the Executive Yuan. Chiang's resignation was followed by resignations of office-holders all round. Among these were Chang Hsueh-liang, Vice-Commander-in-Chief of the National Army; V. K. Wellington Koo, Minister of Foreign Affairs; T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance; General Ho Ying-chin, Minister of War; Admiral Yang Shu-chuang, Minister of Navy; Dr. H. H. Kung, Minister of Industries; Li Shu-hua, Minister of Education; Lien Sheng-hai, Minister of Railways; and Wang Po-chun, Minister of Communications. Simultaneously with Chiang's resignation also came those of Tai Chi-tao, President of the Examination Yuan; Yu Yu-jen, President of the Control Yuan; and Shao Yuan-chung, Vice-President of the Legislative Yuan. The resignations of all these men, except those of Tai Chi-tao and T. V. Soong, however, were rejected.

On the day following Chiang's resignation, the Canton delegates arrived at Nanking. From the standpoint of practical politics the resignation of Chiang Kai-shek and other members of the Government came at an opportune moment.

The situation, both foreign and domestic, was such that no leader could possibly hope to accomplish results that would not lay him open to criticism.

It was during all these political troubles that the Student Movement, which had been more or less dormant for several years, again became active in China, manifesting itself on an even larger scale than it had done in the early 1920's and in the days of the Northern Expedition.

The invasion of Manchuria by the Japanese in September had been the signal for the rebirth of this movement, in a form the like of which had never before been seen during all the millenniums of China's chequered history. The greater number of the youthful patriots was composed of schoolboys ranging in age from 12 to 16 years. Undeterred by their youth and lack of knowledge of practical politics, these youngsters attacked the policies of the nation, demanding an immediate declaration of war against Japan and an expedition to oust the invaders.

Everywhere the students resorted to the most extreme measures to enforce their demands. Only ten days after the outbreak of hostilities in Mukden, they attacked Dr. C. T. Wang, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, and nearly succeeded in murdering him. Chiang, however, had sought to restrain these students. Addressing himself to the student body of the Central University, he said: "With unity even 1,500 students of this university can defeat Japanese imperialism. But without unity even 400,000,000 people would be unable to present a strong front."

At the end of November, some 12,000 students marched into Nanking, and took up a determined vigil outside the Government buildings, demanding to see the head of the Government. Chiang allowed them to wait for 24 hours in the bitterly cold weather to cool off. He then spoke to them directly, condemning their action and describing their demands upon the Government as unreasonable and insulting. He advised them to return to their schools and leave their

Government to deal with the Japanese by such measures as it deemed appropriate. The students returned home.

These disorders continued, however, and, early in December, students had clashed with the police in the Capital and a large number was arrested. Another large body of Hankow students marched into Nanking immediately afterward. Chiang denounced them, warning them that they were now being made unconscious tools of the nation's enemies.

The young Chinese were not to be daunted. About the middle of December, an army of no less than 70,000 invaded Nanking from all parts of the country, demanding action. The trouble came to a climax when a group of youths from Peiping attacked both the Foreign Ministry and the Central Party Headquarters. Another group attacked the printing plant of the "Central Daily News," a vernacular paper, and destroyed almost the entire plant and building. The situation by then had become so serious that the Government finally resorted to calling out local garrison troops, who laid siege to the students, then quartered for the most part in the buildings of the Central University. Rounded up, they were forced to leave the Capital in batches under military escort. Thus this chapter in the history of national turmoil came to an end for the time being.

Disorders inherent in a period of transition are necessarily no light matter. Outgoing office-holders of the Government smiled a little to themselves as they made way for the incoming zealots from the South. The members of the newly-organized Central Executive Committee and Supervisory Committee met for the First Plenary Session late in December. In a short time, the personnel of the new Government was officially announced. It included Sun Fo as President of the Executive Yuan and Eugene Chen as Minister of Foreign Affairs. The three outstanding members of the Party, Chiang Kai-shek, Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-wei, held no posts in the Government, although each was a member of the Standing Committee.

On the day of the opening of this first session in Nanking,

the Generalissimo, accompanied by Madame Chiang, left Nanking by plane for an unannounced destination. He simply left a letter for Yu Yu-jen, stating that he had no desire to influence these new members. As a matter of fact, he had gone to his native village in the Chekiang hills. Thus he allowed the aspirants to his office full scope for the display of their capacity to administer the Central Government.

Consternation began to spread through the Capital when it was learned that Chiang Kai-shek had left Nanking. Inexperienced politicians quickly realized their incapability. They became dimly conscious of the fact that they were at the mercy of the militarists, who feared Chiang but not the men who succeeded him. Rumours soon spread that the provincial war-lords were plotting to overthrow the newly-organized regime.

The absence of supreme authority at the Capital was acutely felt in political circles. Alarmed, the members of the Central Political Council called an emergency meeting on January 2, 1932, at which it was decided that Lin Sen, then Chairman of the Government, and Sun Fo, Executive Yuan President, should petition Chiang Kai-shek to come out of retirement and return at once to Nanking.

This sudden desire for Chiang's return was not confined to political circles. Even the students were abruptly fired with a wish to bring him back to the Capital. They also wanted to gather Wang Ching-wei, still ill in Shanghai, into the fold. For once, the students were not far wrong. The National Government at Nanking had come practically to a standstill. Failing to induce Chiang to return at once to the Capital, a general cry was raised for all Kuomintang leaders to rally round Nanking.

Meanwhile, Chiang was peacefully rambling about in the quiet hills of the Yentangshan, far from the madding crowd. When news reached him in his retreat of a desire in Nanking for his return, he expressed indifference. Politicians in the Capital became more nervous. They began bombarding Chiang, Wang and Hu with telegrams asking them what their attitude was toward a "new policy toward Japan."

Finally, Wang Ching-wei left his Shanghai sick-bed and journeyed to Hangchow. In the West Lake city he met Chiang, who had come down out of his mountain home. There had finally been a distinct improvement in the relations between the two. After a few days in Hangchow, it was announced that they would go to the Capital, where affairs were obviously heading for rapid ruin. They started for Nanking, and, on January 25, Sun Fo resigned his post, as did Eugene Chen. Wang Ching-wei was made President of the Executive Yuan. Thus the breach between Wang Ching-wei and Chiang Kai-shek had been closed after a period of four years.

## CHAPTER XXI

The "Shanghai War" Of 1932—Baseless Charges Against Generalissimo—Gallantry Of Fifth Army—The Truth Revealed—Series Of Little Wars—Feng Yu-hsiang Again Active—Revolt Quickly Suppressed—Rebellion In Fukien—Nineteenth Route Army's Treachery—Chiang Takes Prompt Action—Revolt Suppressed In Fortnight—Madame Chiang's Signal Services—Trouble Makers In The South—Rights Of Central And Provincial Governments

ALTHOUGH the breach in the Kuomintang had been, apparently, healed when Wang Ching-wei became head of the Executive Yuan at Nanking, Chiang Kai-shek himself, except as a member of various committees, did not take any active part in the Government officially. He was, however, too loyal to the Party and too patriotic to the country to be simply an unconcerned onlooker when the Japanese marines attacked Chapei, the northern suburb of Shanghai, on the evening of January 28, 1932, without any provocation.

Both in China and abroad during those chaotic days when Japanese and Chinese struggled grimly for the possession of shell-scarred Chapei, the Nineteenth Route Army had held the limelight for its gallant defence against the invading islanders. This Army, because of its proximity to the International Settlement at the start of the fighting, almost entirely overshadowed the role played by other Chinese troops in that unforgettable conflict, a role that was far less spectacular than it was significant.

After the conclusion of hostilities, Chiang Kai-shek persistently refused to reveal the part played by himself and

by the Government during those days, as he was unwilling to disclose anything that might lessen the glory of the Nineteenth Route Army. It was not until late in 1934 that he consented to the disclosure of the part he had played behind the scenes. What were the circumstances in which his friends succeeded in overcoming his reluctance in this regard?

General Tsai Ting-kai, acclaimed as the "hero of Shanghai" for his command of the Nineteenth Route Army during the fighting, had subsequently allied himself with the Fukien insurrectionists and, following their defeat by Nanking, he had gone abroad. In America, Tsai accused Generalissimo Chiang of a series of machinations to destroy his Army as the spearhead of Chinese resistance to Japan, and he declared that the Nanking Government had not sent a single soldier to reinforce his troops and had in addition stopped necessary supplies.

Under such provocation, Chiang for the first time in two years, allowed the actual facts to be placed on record and thus another side to the picture became known to the public. During the defence of Shanghai it was not the Nineteenth Route Army alone that held back the Japanese. The troops which had been personally trained by the Generalissimo, the 87th and the 88th divisions—his crack troops known as the Fifth Army—really bore the brunt of the fighting, and the result was that one-third of them were killed.

During that hectic time, Chiang was in daily touch with Chiang Kuang-nai and Tsai Ting-kai, the commanders of the Chinese troops opposing the Japanese in Chapei, in spite of the fact that his resignation had been forced and accepted late in December, 1931, and that he had even responded to pressure brought upon him to leave the country by getting his passports. He was out of office, bereft of power and without any authority to issue orders to Government troops. All he could do was to use his personal influence, but, recognizing the terrible nature of the crisis, he endeavoured time and again to place his military experience and his knowledge of the troops at the disposal of the country, only to have it clearly intimated to

him that he was merely one of the members of the Military Council. Despite the rebuff, he pleaded with the Government and the generals of the Nineteenth Route Army to allow him to go and stay at the front, saying that unless he went there personally, it would be difficult for China to hold out for any length of time. The Opposition leaders, prompted either by jealousy of the Generalissimo or by fear that he would become politically stronger, curtly refused to comply with his urgent wish.

Persisting in his desire to go to the front, the Generalissimo was told that his presence there would not be welcomed, and should he insist, the Nineteenth Route Army might come into open conflict with the Fifth Army. This, notwithstanding that the officers of the Fifth Army had been emphatically instructed by the Generalissimo to give the fullest support to the Nineteenth Route Army. "No sacrifice is too great to make," he said in one telegram, "in giving them support," adding, "the glory of the Nineteenth Route Army is the glory of China."

The Generalissimo, therefore, had to content himself with telegraphic advice to Chiang Kuang-nai and Tsai Ting-kai. The telegrams which had been exchanged between the Generalissimo and these two commanders revealed; firstly, that the Generalissimo gave advice not to take the offensive till a certain date when, he stated, reinforcements would arrive in Shanghai; secondly, that he urgently emphasized that the line of defence was weak because at Liuho, on the Yangtze, not a single soldier was stationed to prevent a possible landing by Japanese troops, and he strongly advised that at least two regiments be placed there, and, thirdly, that in one telegram jointly signed by Chiang Kuang-nai and Tsai Ting-kai, those generals agreed to abide by the advice of the Generalissimo.

Despite this telegraphic acceptance of his advice, they did not station any troops at Liuho, so that when Japanese troops appeared there, as foreseen by the Generalissimo, they were able to land without opposition. Immediately, Chiang Kuang-nai and Tsai Ting-kai, without permission from the Government, and entirely on their own responsibility, ordered

the Nineteenth Route Army to retreat and their original position was abandoned. Most unfortunate of all, when they did retire, they did not inform the Fifth Army of their move, and that force, being completely ignorant of what was happening during those fateful hours, continued fighting with their flank exposed all through the night, the result being that great numbers of them were killed.

During this critical period, condemnatory telegrams and letters rained upon the Generalissimo from various quarters, asking why he did not send reinforcements, the senders having apparently forgotten that, as he had been forced out of all his offices, it was in every way impossible for him to do more than what he was trying to do in his personal capacity.

In that capacity, he did contrive to get reinforcements on the way to Shanghai, expecting that the advice that he offered would, as agreed, be followed, and the vanguard of those reinforcements actually arrived in the vicinity of Shanghai on the appointed date, which was two days after Chiang Kuang-nai and Tsai Ting-kai had taken the personal responsibility of bringing disaster upon the forces which had gallantly stood their ground until that time.

These irrefutable facts are a complete answer in themselves to the accusations made later by Tsai. During the time of the Shanghai War and after the defeat of the Chinese forces, those around the Generalissimo who were cognizant of the true situation pleaded to be allowed to publish the facts. The Generalissimo emphatically refused permission. The two defenders of Shanghai stated during the hostilities that they themselves would make public the true state of affairs, but after the armistice they kept silent, except when they stated, perhaps grudgingly, on a few occasions that there was no fault to be found with the Generalissimo's part and that the Government had supported them to the fullest extent with necessary supplies.

Taking advantage of the Manchurian situation and the severe fighting in Shanghai, the Communists in Central China

resumed their activities, and for a time Pengpu in Anhwei, Hankow in Hupeh and the Peiping-Hankow Railway zone were threatened. The Communist situation became so serious that it was obvious that only Chiang Kai-shek could cope with it. Wang Ching-wei and other prominent Party members made a strong appeal to Chiang that he should emerge from his retirement and take an active part in public affairs. Aware of the danger ahead, Chiang consented to accept a position in the Government. On March 6, 1932, he was reappointed Chairman of the National Military Council, and automatically he became Commander-in-Chief of the National Armies. In view of the renewed activity of the Communists, he decided to take personal command of the anti-Communist campaign again. He arrived at Kuling in Kiangsi on June 9, where he immediately called a military conference. Late in June, he went to Hankow. A rigorous military campaign followed. As a result, the Communists in Hupeh, Honan and Anhwei were completely routed; their strongholds at Kinkiachai and Sintsi on the Hupeh-Honan border were captured.

Besides the anti-Communist campaign, Chiang had other matters to worry him. One of them concerned the relationship between Wang Ching-wei and Chang Hsueh-liang. On August 6, Wang Ching-wei resigned his post and, at the same time, issued a scathing denunciation of Chang Hsueh-liang, whom he blamed for the *débâcle* in Manchuria. His resignation was followed by that of all the Ministers of the Government. Wang's action naturally caused consternation, not the least of those disturbed being the Generalissimo himself. Chiang had always been in need of a competent political colleague to keep him in touch with Party affairs and to expound the policy of the National Government to the articulate classes of the nation as well as to the world outside. He decided upon a radical step in order to bring the political members of the Government at Nanking to their senses. He announced on August 9 that unless Wang withdrew his resignation he would himself resign also. Consternation now reigned supreme at Nanking. Meanwhile, Chang Hsueh-liang resigned from his

post as Pacification Commissioner at Peiping, and Chiang sent a telegram to Wang on August 14, assuring him that affairs in North China would be settled according to his wishes. It was finally arranged that the Generalissimo should take over the position that had been held by Chang Hsueh-liang in North China in addition to his other duties.

The resignation of Wang was steadfastly refused, and he was offered leave of absence instead in order to obtain medical treatment. On August 23, the members of the Cabinet, with the exception of Ku Meng-yu, Minister of Railways, withdrew their resignations. Wang continued in retirement in Shanghai, where he was visited by Chang Chun as the personal representative of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Chang Chun was accompanied by Tang Yu-jen, Secretary of the Central Political Council. They both urged Wang to resume his duties. Mayor Wu Te-chen was also instructed to use his efforts to persuade Wang to return to Nanking. But Wang, who was really ill, sailed for Europe to receive medical treatment on October 22, and T. V. Soong became Acting-President of the Executive Yuan during his absence.

The Chinese-Japanese situation in North China during the months of November and December remained tense, and the year 1933 began with further Japanese aggression. On New Year's Day, the Japanese Army bombarded Shanhaikwan on the pretext that the Chinese defenders of the city had first fired on them. The city was captured, and one Chinese battalion that had put up a gallant resistance was wiped out. Then followed a full-fledged Japanese campaign in Jehol Province, which was easily taken from the inefficient and cowardly Chairman of the province, Tang Yu-ling. Japanese planes inaugurated a veritable reign of terror by aerial bombing of defenceless cities in Jehol, killing a large number of civilians.

The Chinese people were enraged at the ruthlessness of the Japanese Army in North China. Politicians at Canton immediately began laying their plans to embarrass the National Government by playing upon the natural indignation

of the people. On January 17, the South-western Executive Committee and the South-western Political Council issued a joint telegram to the Government, demanding an explanation of its attitude towards Japan. They charged the authorities, or rather Chiang Kai-shek, with having reached a secret understanding with the Japanese. The charges were indignantly refuted by the Government authorities.

On May 31, the Tangku Truce Agreement was signed, according to which there was to be a cessation of hostilities between the Chinese and Japanese. Of course, the Canton politicians in the South renewed their attacks at this point, claiming there were secret annexes to the Truce Agreement. In the North, Feng Yu-hsiang appointed himself Commander-in-Chief of the People's Anti-Japanese Army and issued a circular telegram. He denied opposition to Generalissimo Chiang, however, declaring that he only desired to defend Chahar.

During the month of July, Chiang was conducting an officers' training camp at Hainhuiissu near Kuling, where it was planned to give intensive training to junior commanders in the handling of men on difficult terrain such as was to be experienced in warfare against the Reds in Kiangsi. While conducting this important work, he held a conference with leaders of the Government at Kuling, at which Feng's activities and relations with Japan were fully discussed. Feng thus far had not made progress with his military activities, but he was receiving support from the discontented politicians at Canton. Eventually, Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei, who had returned from Europe and resumed his position as President of Executive Yuan, agreed upon a joint telegram to Feng, which was despatched to him on July 28.

The substance of this telegram deserves to be placed on record. They said that Nanking was firm in the resolve to sign no treaty ceding territory or recognizing the fruits of military aggression. If pressed beyond that limit, it was prepared to face war. China was ready to do her utmost to secure domestic peace and international security. It was

impossible for those who sent the joint telegram to ignore the dangerous situation that Feng was creating. The Government, therefore, demanded that Feng should return immediately to the fold, or at least cease his activities in the North. Such activities, the joint telegram pointed out, affected the safety not only of Chahar but of the whole nation, and the Government was not in a position to temporize or make concessions. The Government asked him to try to appreciate the difficulties of the Party and the exhausted and distressed state of the nation in general; he should share in the responsibilities, and the Government in turn would co-operate with him. In short, the telegram said in conclusion, the crisis had become so grave and the Communists so rampant that the Government had no choice but to endure considerable humiliation and first strive for peace and the fundamentals of unity.

Unfortunately, however, this telegram, appealing to Feng's patriotism, failed to produce any effect. The Government, therefore, started to move troops from Hopei into Chahar. The advance was rapid. About the beginning of August a clash occurred near Hsuanhua, Chahar, between Government troops and a body of Feng's forces. These latter were irregulars without much organization and with poor supplies. They were defeated and forced to retreat. Within a few hours, Feng sent an envoy to inform the authorities in Peiping that he would accept the Government's demands. On August 6 he announced his retirement.

Following this, a general named Fang Cheng-wu, a follower of Feng Yu-hsiang, started a revolt on his own account. After a grandiloquent announcement of his intention to overthrow Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in one fell swoop, he began to move his troops from the Hopei-Chahar border toward Peiping. Government forces pushed out to meet him, and after a few skirmishes the rebels were driven back into the hinterland. Fang was relentlessly pursued, and, early in October, his troops were rounded up and completely disarmed. The last immediate domestic menace in the North was thus removed.

A more serious threat to the National Government came in the autumn of 1933. This was what was subsequently known as the Fukien rebellion, started by a number of jobless politicians including Chen Ming-shu, Tsai Ting-kai, Li Chishen and Chiang Kuang-nai. The real motive of the uprising was a pressing need for money by the politicians who had lost their positions when Chen Ming-shu was ousted from office as Chairman of Kwangtung.

The new movement started with a mass meeting in Foochow late in November, 1933. A manifesto was issued; the National Government was denounced. An attempt was made to induce Chen Chi-tang, of Canton, to support the rebellion, but he refused. The military force of the revolters consisted of the troops of the Nineteenth Route Army, former defenders of Shanghai. After the Shanghai hostilities, this Army was partially reorganized, its thinned ranks being filled with young recruits. It was then sent into Fukien and had been there for several months engaged in intermittent warfare with the Communists in the west Fukien hills. The latter had refused to accept the reputation of the famous Army at par and had inflicted several severe defeats upon it. The men of this Army consequently became badly demoralized, and the growing influence of the plotting politicians at Foochow upon their leaders prepared them for revolt.

Chiang Kai-shek, turning toward this new menace, did not hesitate. Within three days of the mass meeting he had troops on the march southward. The activities of the rebels had been quietly noted for some time, and Chiang was by no means totally unprepared. He did, however, issue a brief warning to the Nineteenth Route Army, giving them a week to clean up the new Fukien "government" and return to the fold, failing which he, Chiang, would "destroy the jade and the stone alike," as he put it.

Adopting the old trick of the Northern militarists, the rebel leaders had flaunted aloft the banner of national salvation and resistance to Japan, whereas it was strongly suspected, and with reason, that they had already surrendered to the

Japanese. They were utilizing this dual policy as a means to attack the Kuomintang and seize power. The fame of the Nineteenth Route Army was forgotten, nor did the loyalty or disloyalty, the success or failure of that force, any longer matter. The Army was, as a matter of fact, already being denounced by the nation at large and condemned both in China and abroad for its loss of moral integrity.

It was this moral collapse of the Nineteenth Route Army that stirred China deeply. Pleas poured into Foochow, urging that the politicians might do what they liked with their new "government," but the Nineteenth Route Army should stay out of the affair. One telegram from the North read, in part: "Brave soldiers of the Nineteenth Route Army, how can you justify yourselves in the eyes of the world, how can you hope to face Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and how above all can you face your deceased comrades who laid down their lives in battle resisting the Japanese, how can you look them in the face if you have earned so much honour and glory and now let yourselves become pawns of the rebel Chen Ming-shu and his kind, thereby becoming unforgivable offenders?"

Notwithstanding popular opposition, Chen Ming-shu convened his "Emergency National Congress of People's Delegates;" he was made Chairman of the Executive Committee, with Tsai Ting-kai, Chairman of the Military Committee, Eugene Chen, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hsu Hsi-ching, Minister of Finance, and Chang Po-chun, Minister of Education. Huang Chi-hsiang headed the general staff. A Central Executive Committee was created; the Nineteenth Route Army received a new name—the People's Revolutionary Army; the Kuomintang was repudiated; a policy of desire to ally with Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists was announced. The Fukien rebels, in short, were busily engaged in setting up a little China of their own.

There was a certain amount of quarrelling in the ranks of the Nineteenth Route Army between anti- and pro-Chen factions, and the people of Fukien themselves, outside the sphere of influence round Foochow and Amoy, simply deplor-

ed the fact that the rebels were obviously about to bring more trouble down on their already troubled heads. The Army itself was not by any means a unit in its determination to revolt against Nanking.

Late in November, Chiang ordered a general campaign against Fukien. Nanking forces began to advance into the province by three routes. One column marched south into the northern part of Fukien from Chekiang. A central column moved eastward from Kiangsi, and the third drove down on to the Kiangsi-Fukien border to clear that wild and mountainous region of Communists, cut off the Fukien rebels from the Red forces in the west, and give other Government troops a free hand to deal with the Nineteenth Route Army. Generalissimo Chiang flew to western Fukien to assume personal command of the campaign.

The Fourteenth Route Army formed the spearhead of the advance toward Fukien and moved swiftly down the Min River. The Nineteenth Route Army fell back rapidly, Foochow was thrown into confusion, and in a very short time the Army abandoned the city, retreating toward the south. Government marines, landed from gunboats, followed them, occupying Foochow as soon as that city had been left clear. The retiring Nineteenth Route Army had no chance to reorganize and was driven into southern Fukien within a few days. Finally, when two divisions from Nanking were landed at Amoy and the advancing Fourteenth Route Army entered Chuanchow, the revolt was virtually at an end.

In this campaign, the powerful air force of the Government was given an opportunity to demonstrate its worth. Temporary airdromes were established at Wenchow and Chuchow and, from these points, the bombers made trip after trip, dropping high explosives into the rebel lines and about their headquarters. These repeated and disastrous bombings had a very definite effect on the morale of the harassed Army, and their final defeat by infantry was greatly facilitated.

Actual fighting only lasted two weeks, at the end of which time the Nineteenth Route Army had been scattered. Stray

groups were rounded up, for the most part, and they surrendered. The Army was later completely reorganized by Nanking to form the Seventh Route Army, and the name of the Nineteenth Route Army was a thing of the past. China and the world were astonished at the rapidity with which this major revolt was crushed. As for those who had organized an independent "government" in Foochow, most of them again went into exile. Many of them had replenished their purses before the retreat from Foochow. The banks there were thoroughly and efficiently looted by the departing politicians.

In justice to that veteran fighting unit, the Nineteenth Route Army, it must be recorded that its heart was not in the rebellion against the Government, and as a matter of fact a large number of officers went over to the Government side. Madame Chiang Kai-shek assisted in arranging for the resumption of their allegiance to the Government. This was not generally known at the time, the news of her trip having been carefully guarded until the end of the campaign. She left Chuchow, in south-western Chekiang where the Generalissimo had established his headquarters, by plane for Kienyang in northern Fukien at the start of the fighting. Landing at Kienyang, she represented the Generalissimo and received the emissaries of some of the officers of the Nineteenth Route Army, who had signified their desire to negotiate terms of surrender. Among these was Tan Chi-hsiu, a high ranking officer in the unit. Chiang had also made a determined effort to influence the rank and file and subordinate officers of the Nineteenth Route Army to renew their allegiance, as he was certain that many of the officers were unwilling participants in the revolt.

Madame's mission was successful. Tan Chi-hsiu rejoined the Government forces with his own men. Lu Hsing-pang, commander of a division engaged then in anti-bandit operations, also had not favoured the revolt and had bided his time to rejoin Nanking, meanwhile keeping in constant touch with Chiang. The time came in December, and he was given a

Government command. Others followed his example, and one after another various division commanders of the Nineteenth Route Army surrendered with their men to the Government.

After the successful conclusion of the campaign in Fukien, the Government again turned its attention to the Communists in Central China and to the ever-present problem of reconstruction. At the same time, throughout 1934, Nanking made continuous efforts to improve its relations with the dissenting leaders in the South. One large bone of contention was the opposition of these leaders to the convocation of a Party Congress. The Fifth National Kuomintang Congress was to have met in November, 1933, according to the rules of the Party, which required that the members meet once every two years. Due to the Fukien rebellion, it was postponed for a year. It was, however, declared in the Kwangtung capital that, unless the Nanking authorities saw fit to yield to the views of members of the Central Executive Committee at Canton, none of them would attend the Congress in 1934. The Government continued its endeavours to bring about co-operation and sent emissaries to Hongkong and Canton. Eventually Hu Han-min agreed to attend the Congress, but, to give more time to the task of reconciling quarrelling Party leaders as well as to avoid interruption of the anti-Communist campaign by calling army officers away from the front to attend the session, further postponement was urged, and appeals to this effect were received from the Kuomintang headquarters of 16 provinces.

It was eventually decided to postpone the Congress again. Wang Ching-wei defended the postponement by stressing the danger of Communism, but in reality the most important factor was the truculence of the Southerners, although neither Chiang nor Wang wished to ruffle their easily disturbed feelings by laying stress upon the fact.

About that time, Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei issued a manifesto in which they advanced a five-point programme for a clear division of power between the Government and regional authorities, believing that such a programme

might help to stabilize the nation and remove Southern opposition for the time being. This programme was concerned with law enforcement, personnel, regional administration and economic planning, central and regional finance, and central and regional armies.

The Government only fixed general principles regarding law enforcement, details being left to provincial and municipal governments to work out. It was felt by Chiang and Wang that the authority to appoint officials should be vested in the Central Government, but that their selection and their recommendation might be left to the regional authorities. To ensure the security of employment, their tenure of office was fixed at three years and no Government employee could be discharged without good reason, while those who were capable whilst in office might be reappointed.

Regarding administration and economic planning, plans, it was declared by Chiang and Wang, should be made by regional governments on the basis of their individual requirements together with budgets and estimates, to be submitted to the Central Government for approval. After approval was granted, the Government would not interfere apart from the routine investigation of the carrying of the plans. It was also stipulated that a clear demarcation should be made between national and regional revenue and expenditure. All national revenue, such as Customs receipts, should be remitted to the Central Government, while subsidies might be granted where there were deficiencies in regional finance.

The matter of armies was of significance. It was declared by Chiang and Wang that a standard should be established as to what constituted the National Army and the regional forces respectively. For national defence the National Army should be under centralized control, while regional forces such as police, peace preservation corps and militia should be placed under the regional governments, though their strength should be fixed by the Central Government.

Decisions in relation to the purchase of fighting equipment from abroad either for National or regional armies, according

to the five-point programme issued by Chiang and Wang, were to be left entirely to the Central Government.





**The Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek on their North-western tour.**

## CHAPTER XXII

Series Of Spectacular Air Trips—Generalissimo And Madame In The North-west—Ten Provinces Visited—A Unique Journey—Enthusiastic Receptions Everywhere—Generalissimo Welcomes Missionary Co-operation—Flight To Central And South-western Regions—A New Deal For Kweichow—Governor Removed From Office—Ovation at Yunnanfu—Surprise Flight To Chengtu—Generalissimo Inaugurates Sweeping Reforms In Szechwan—Madame Chiang Kai-shek Lauds The Airplane

IN THE autumn of 1934, Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek embarked on an extended series of trips by air that took them, in the next year, into nearly every corner of the Republic of China, no matter how remote. These trips gave the Generalissimo a more comprehensive idea of what his own country and people were like, and they gave the country and people, in turn, an excellent idea of what the Generalissimo was like and what he stood for.

At the beginning, the trips were unpremeditated and unplanned, and developed accidentally. The Generalissimo and Madame Chiang, accompanied by Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang (who had recently returned from Europe, and was then engaged in anti-Communist operations in Central China under the Generalissimo's direction) went to Loyang to participate in the opening of a new military academy. On the spur of the moment, they decided to go on to Sian, farther west in Shensi. Even then, their plans did not envisage anything beyond Sian, but when there they resolved to proceed up into Kansu Province, and thus the party went on from point to point until eventually they had visited some ten provinces in the North and North-west and covered over 5,000 miles.

The Generalissimo's tour was the first of its kind ever made in China by the head of a government, whether it were Emperor, President, or military chief, to cover so vast and representative a territory. It was made possible, of course, by the use of planes, for China is a huge country and a great deal of it is almost inaccessible if the traveller moves by train, car, or even by horse or camel. At any rate, for a man so deeply involved in affairs of state, such a tour, except by air, would have been impossible owing to the length of time it would have required.

These trips brought about what might be correctly described as a new era in the relations between the National Government and the provincial administrations and between the Generalissimo and his countrymen. So enthusiastically was he hailed wherever he went, that the tour became a triumphal procession from one province to another, but without the usual Chinese pomp and pageantry that might have been expected of a man in his position. He discouraged ceremony, travelled light and fast, saw much and asked many questions; the simplicity of the man was largely responsible for the great wave of popularity that sprang up in his wake when travelling.

The tour of inspection in Shensi developed into a gala trip, as the various cities tried to outdo one another in giving the Generalissimo and his party a hearty and colourful welcome. From Loyang they went to Sian, one of China's ancient capitals. They received a tremendous ovation from both citizens and soldiers, and were given a tea reception in the famous historical garden which in December, 1936, was to be the scene of the Generalissimo's detention. The old Capital had been profusely decorated with flags, great crowds assembled at every vantage point, bands played, and cannon boomed a 21-gun salute. The enthusiasm was a revelation to the Generalissimo, who had never counted much on his popularity in the North-west.

Troops were reviewed and the Generalissimo gave an endless number of interviews to provincial officials who

reported on outstanding, though localized, problems of government and reconstruction, such as road-building, economic questions, education and opium suppression work. Madame Chiang was almost as consistently busy enlightening various groups as to Government policies and the aims of the New Life Movement. It was substantially Madame Chiang's effort to forward the latter movement that incidentally developed a new phase in the Generalissimo's relations with foreigners, which hitherto had not been intimate. They decided to sound out the possibility of arranging co-operation between representatives of the New Life Movement and the foreign missionary body, and that caused them to invite every member of the latter to a reception. There the missionaries were astonished when the Generalissimo told them that the Government welcomed their co-operation in the work among the masses, and they responded to his appeal that they should aid the New Life Movement. They formed a Sino-foreign Committee without more ado. The Governor of the Province was called in by the Generalissimo, who instructed him to assist the Committee and work with the missionaries for the good of the people.

Sian is the cradle of Chinese civilization and the birthplace of many famous men who have served China with great distinction. In a public speech the Generalissimo appropriately pointed out that China's present troubles arose from the fact that the vision and principles of the great men of Shensi's past have been forgotten, declaring that an effort to resurrect those principles was embodied in the New Life Movement.

In addition to speech-making and conferences, he personally saw to other things. He inspected the conditions of the city, insisted on economic development, and became interested in the preservation of historical monuments and the great tumuli of long-dead Emperors.

From Sian the party flew to Lanchow, capital of Kansu, where the Generalissimo listened while Government officials outlined their plans for reform and suggested others. This city was devastated by soldiers under the old militarists in former years, and the desolation thus wrought was still

apparent on every hand. Before his departure from Lanchow, the Generalissimo received General Ma Lin and General Ma Pu-ching, military leaders of the remote, far western province of Kokonor, who travelled, day and night, to interview him. He urged the civil and military authorities of Kansu, as well as the two Kokonor generals, to work, not for themselves, but for the nation as a whole. Here the missionary body was again assembled and its co-operation to forward the New Life principles was secured.

The Generalissimo and his party took off for the Mongolian frontier, flying to Ninghsia, an extremely remote city (an oasis) on the desolate borders of the Gobi Desert and most difficult to reach. Here a Mohammedan population, with their different ideas, customs, and problems, were encountered. They were enthusiastic and elaborate in their welcome, and appreciative of the attention given them. The party flew back to Sian. The region in between, as the Generalissimo observed from his plane, is wild and desolate, and for some 200 miles is an uninterrupted wilderness, broken only by an indescribable system of miniature mountains. It is bordered on the north by the blazing red sands of the Little Gobi Desert, in the western part of Inner Mongolia, which are prevented by the Blue Alashan mountain barrier from making a desert of the fertile plain on which Ninghsia stands, while the Yellow River prevents the sands of the Ordos Desert flowing in from the east.

When the plane landed at Sian, the Generalissimo had flown 1,000 miles on a triangular course over difficult and dangerous country; he had learned much that he had not known before, and he returned with knowledge of great value when it came to considering the problems of that distant part of China. While inspecting troops in various places visited, the Generalissimo took the opportunity to preach his new doctrine of simplicity, cleanliness, manliness, honesty and helpfulness.

From Sian, the party went by train to Loyang and from there to Kaifeng. Here, again, Madame Chiang invited the

missionaries to a reception which the Generalissimo, as on previous occasions, attended in person and reiterated his assurance that the Government welcomed their work on behalf of the Chinese people and explained to them the purpose of the New Life Movement. Madame Chiang, as previously, spoke to the company in English, testifying as to the results obtained by the movement in Kiangsi. Subsequently, the missionaries formed a committee to assist the New Life Movement in Honan Province in the eradication of trachoma. In other places visited, anti-opium clinics were founded.

From Kaifeng, the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang flew to Peiping, while Chang Hsueh-liang returned to his work in Hankow. On the way to Peiping they made a hurried stop at Tsinan in Shantung to see General Han Fu-chu, the Governor. After reaching Peiping, both of them entered the Union Medical College Hospital where they underwent a thorough medical examination.

On November 4, they visited Kalgan, Chahar, and proceeded later to Kweihwa, Suiyuan, where they arrived on the evening of the 6th. The next day, there was a full schedule of conferences, followed by a unique Mongol border region race meeting. The championship was won by a twelve-year old Chinese boy, Jacken, who gained as his prize the promise of an education at the expense of the Generalissimo, which greatly delighted the huge crowd.

On November 8, the party flew to Taiyuan, Shansi. In an address before 1,000 officials and other residents, the Generalissimo made a slashing attack on the opium and other drug evils, which he condemned as the greatest curse of China and the worst obstacle to the New Life Movement. He declared that the extirpation of the opium evil, of foot-binding and of other vices was among the aims of the movement. He also expressed his disapproval of immorality and gambling as well as corruption. To eradicate them, the co-operation of the public was necessary, he pointed out, it not being sufficient for the Government to issue orders if the people themselves were apathetic.

There was a brief side trip to Taiku, not far from Taiyuan, where the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang were the guests of Dr. H. H. Kung, the city's most distinguished citizen, at his ancestral home. The return to Taiyuan ended the tour of the North-west by the Generalissimo's party. Propaganda for the moral regeneration of China, combined with personal contacts that were of inestimable value as a unifying factor in the life of the nation, was among the achievements of this 5,000 mile trip by air, rail and motor car to parts of the country that are largely off the beaten track travelled by leaders of modern China.

During the tour, the Generalissimo made careful observations of economic, financial, political, educational, moral and administrative conditions in the North and North-west. Shensi, Kansu, Shantung, Suiyuan and Shansi appeared to him to have made great progress, showing what might be done for the welfare of the people despite the lack of adequate finances if the authorities were determined and conscientious. The shrunken provincial treasury had not daunted the Shansi and Suiyuan authorities from undertaking construction work. The Tatung-Puchow light railway in Shansi, built by soldier labour, was a noteworthy example. What impressed the Generalissimo most in Shansi was the arsenal that had been turned into a factory for manufacturing general articles such as railway coaches, lamps, electric fans, pumps, weights and measures, and needles.

Peace and order, according to the Generalissimo's finding, reigned in Suiyuan. Progress has been made there in agriculture, the wool industry, breeding of ponies, establishment of granaries, co-operatives and pasturage institutes. Kansu, in spite of its turmoil in the past, had opened a way for future reconstruction through its efforts to suppress banditry and to disband wandering troops. In Shantung, the Generalissimo had found a high order of efficiency in the district administration and discipline in the militia corps which gave signal service to the province. Much progress had been made throughout the whole North in road construction and public health.

Nevertheless, the one common fault in all these provinces, in the opinion of the Generalissimo, was that, while individual provinces were making progress in reconstruction, co-ordination between them was lacking. Economy in time, expense and personnel would be secured if all provinces would co-operate in their various projects. In addition there was negligence on the part of the authorities in tackling the problems of afforestation and river conservancy. Afforestation was the most important work in an agricultural country like China and was the prerequisite to rural rehabilitation. There was also a lack of educational reforms in the majority of provinces.

The Generalissimo had seen the North-west and North by air and received much benefit therefrom. Now he wished to see the West and South. A short time after his return to Nanking, he and Madame Chiang set off again on an extended trip by plane through the Central and South-western regions, including Kiangsi, Hupeh, Hunan, Szechwan, Kweichow and Yunnan. This was no haphazard, accidental journey, as the first one had started out to be.

The Generalissimo flew to Hankow and thence up the Yangtze River through the Gorges to Chungking in Szechwan. Madame Chiang travelled by steamer to see the Gorges. Thence they struck off into the remote province of Kweichow, hitherto hard to get into and little known. They flew to Kweiyang, the provincial capital.

Two months before their arrival in the city, Government troops had reached there in the nick of time, for the Communists were not far away and the demoralized provincial troops had apparently planned to loot the city and retire, but after the disciplined troops appeared on the scene everyone was delighted except the local forces, who sullenly faded out of the picture.

Upon his entrance into Kweiyang, the Generalissimo immediately busied himself with conferences with local officials, but also found time to take walks around the city and see for himself the conditions existing at that time. He was

not long in discovering that the province was opium-ridden and that the people were sodden with the drug. The farmers had become largely dependent on growing the poppy for their livelihood. There was a lack of other productive work and the development of natural resources had scarcely more than started. Farming methods were primitive; roads and communications were unsatisfactory. Kweichow presented the spectacle of being probably the most backward in its culture and development of all the provinces of China.

Furthermore, the Generalissimo found that there had been chronic misgovernment. Officials never appeared in their offices before noon and then stayed but a short while. In Tsunyi and several other cities some distance from the provincial capital, one could not have a telegram sent until afternoon as there was no one on duty to despatch it. Mail from the coast took a month; there was no telegraph news service, and Kweichow neither knew nor cared much what was happening beyond its borders.

After the Generalissimo had seen all this for himself, the honeyed words the official welcomers had lavished upon him fell like water from a duck's back. He was not at all the customary polite, visiting official who saved the collective "face" of these officials. He flayed the curse of opium and told them that they would have to wipe it out and do something to develop the province and give the people legitimate and proper employment. Eventually, he indicated that that was all he had to say, and in a dead silence, broken only by the faltering efforts of a band to make a happy noise which dismally failed, and a few desultory cheers, the Generalissimo strode out with a grim face to go to the pretentious, but draughty place in which he was quartered, there to concoct the rough outline of a scheme to develop the economic resources of the country and raise the standard of living of the masses under the auspices of the People's Economic Reconstruction Movement.

Before his departure from Kweiyang, the Generalissimo personally saw to it that Wang Chia-lieh, the corrupt and

inefficient Governor of Kweichow, was removed from office. Wang was later taken out of the province with his wife in Chang Hsueh-liang's plane. A former Governor of Anhwei replaced him at Kweiyang, and there followed a general house-cleaning of officials of the old regime. Shortly afterwards, the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang left Kweiyang for Yunnanfu in the farthest south-western province. It was the first trip that he had made into this region. The plane flew over a mountainous country only a short time before traversed by the Communist Army, and he could see for himself the difficulties confronting the marching men of his Army.

The Generalissimo received a tremendous ovation upon his arrival in Yunnanfu, surpassing that given him anywhere on his previous travels. Immediately after his arrival, he went into conference with Yunnan officials. The Communists were his problem and that was why he was there. Yunnanfu had had its scare, but the leaders of the Communist Army for some reason had made no attack on the city or any other large Yunnan centre; they went forward as fast as they could travel. The day the Generalissimo arrived in Yunnanfu, the Communists, to the north, had weather in their favour on the upper reaches of the Yangtze, for, while previous efforts to cross the river had been frustrated by Government bombers, they contrived to get over safely in rain and mist, and, having crossed, they worked as far northward as they could, travelling at an incredible speed for marching men in rough country, pursued by Government Armies.

After viewing the desperate poverty of Kweichow, the Generalissimo was inclined to be favourably impressed with what he saw in Yunnan. While much of his attention was given to military affairs and to plans for the continued campaign against the Communists, he still found time, with the aid of Madame Chiang, to advance the interests of the New Life Movement at Yunnanfu. The chief objects against which the movement was directed in that province were poppy cultivation, opium smoking and domestic slavery, as well as child labour. This last cited was rampant in the tin mines of

Kokiu. General Lung Yun, Governor of Yunnan, promised his full support of the Generalissimo's programme.

During his tour, the Generalissimo also interested himself in the Miaoos, the aborigines of the South-west, who are found in considerable numbers in Kweichow, Yunnan and parts of Szechwan. They are a clean, hard-working people, but are looked down upon by the Chinese, a feeling which the Miaoos reciprocate. Being mountain folk, they devote their time largely to stock raising. The Generalissimo, a mountain man himself, declared that they should be given a chance to improve themselves, and plans were made for the education of some of the 70 clans or tribes of Kweichow. Later, the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang remembered the Miaoos by sending them a gift of some blooded cattle with which to improve their herds.

Concluding the visit to Yunnanfu, the Generalissimo and his party flew to Chengtu, the capital of Szechwan. That province had suffered more than any other from the rapacity of the numerous warlords. In 23 years of the Republic there had been 477 military conflicts in Szechwan, all but two of which had been waged by Szechwanese, but the Generalissimo had a fair knowledge of what was going on and he had decided upon sweeping reforms. Long before his arrival at Chengtu, the influence of the National Government began, quietly and unobtrusively, to extend to that province.

Meanwhile, the generals and their ill-disciplined troops continued to be defeated by the Communists, and public opinion was rising against them. In the spring of 1935, the situation was so serious that General Liu Hsiang, Governor of Szechwan, in Chungking, intended to abandon Chengtu to the Communists and hold his strong position in the river port. Then Nanking, by order of the Generalissimo, began to move in earnest. Regiments of well-equipped men surged up through the gorges and were deployed over the province. With this show-down, Liu and his confreres called a secret

conclave and formulated schemes for resisting Nanking's intrusion.

They started the "Szechwan for the Szechwanese" movement, and tried to prevent fresh Government troops from entering Szechwan and to send away those who were already in the province. A 74 year old Confucian scholar, a native of Szechwan, came to the support of the National Government by issuing a circular in which he declared that history showed that Szechwanese bring only calamity to Szechwan, through their greed and selfish fear of every one but themselves. He added that the fact that Chiang Kai-shek was not Szechwanese did not matter; what mattered was that he was Chinese.

At this critical moment, the Generalissimo literally dropped down among them out of the clouds. His sudden advent had an electrifying effect upon everyone in Szechwan. The Generalissimo busied himself with conferences with civil and military officers, educators, scholars and merchants. They were told frankly that he had come, not only to expel the Communists, but also to clean up the province. He was at once hailed with acclamation by the populace, who greeted him, not only as a military commander who could defeat the Reds in battle, but also as the national leader who could bring a ray of hope into their troubled lives.

Even as far away as London note was made of the immediate improvement of the situation in Szechwan that followed upon his arrival in that province. In a leading article on April 12, "The Times" said: "In General Chiang Kai-shek they (the Communists) have an opponent of far higher calibre than the Americanized intellectuals who once seemed to control the new China. He has shown a remarkable capacity to turn failure into success. His efforts to rescue the 50,000,000 people of Szechwan Province from corrupt officials and tyrannical militarists are meeting with remarkable results." In the meantime, the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang, who had accompanied him into Szechwan, had given liberally of their time and efforts to promoting the interests of the New Life Movement in the province as well as concerning themselves

with measures for the suppression of the opium-smoking evil.

As a part of Generalissimo Chiang's plans for the redemption of Szechwan, Liu Hsiang resigned from his military posts in order to devote his entire attention to civil administration and rehabilitation measures. His Twenty-first Army was split into three smaller units under separate commanders. Szechwan was divided into eight pacification areas with a military commander assigned to each. Instructions were issued to all commanders to complete the anti-Red tasks in that province within six months. They were forbidden, however, to concern themselves with financial, judicial and Party affairs within their jurisdiction, while on the other hand those whose duty it was to look after these non-military matters were forbidden to interfere with the functions of the military.

Towards the end of July, Liu Hsiang, as Chairman of the Szechwan Provincial Government, upon the instructions of Generalissimo Chiang, issued a number of regulations to his officers and men. Among these were: military officers found guilty of trafficking in morphia shall be given the death penalty, regardless of their rank; officers are prohibited from maintaining separate offices of their own in cities where their headquarters are not located; they are not to squeeze money from the people on the pretext of building watch towers; women are not to be transported from place to place in military motor cars.

In order to carry out his reform scheme effectively, the Generalissimo established at the foot of the great Buddhist mountain of Omei a camp for the training of leaders "to build up the nation." High officials, magistrates, educationalists and leaders in other walks of life were required to undergo rigid training for leadership. The curriculum included military knowledge, political science, economics and educational methods. Instruction was given in telegraphy and signalling.

On October 6, the Generalissimo in an address at the enlarged weekly memorial service at the Szechwan Provincial Party Headquarters in Chengtu, declared that Szechwan is an

ideal base for the regeneration of the nation, but, in order to rehabilitate the province, he said, the time-honoured virtues must be revived, and the intelligence of the people quickened. He urged the people to lead an upright and useful life. In the education of the people, the Generalissimo laid emphasis on the virtue of calmness and tranquillity, making the pointed suggestion that, if the leaders kept their heads, there would be no confusion. In conclusion, Chiang recommended two reforms for Szechwan: first, that youths of tender age should not be permitted to pull rickshas or enlist in the Army, a reform which he urged for ethical as well as practical reasons; and, secondly, that the military strength of the province should be reduced so far as numbers were concerned.

In the midst of this intense activity the Generalissimo was called back to Nanking. Although he did not stay in Chengtu long, he had initiated many reforms which will prove in due course of great benefit to the people of Szechwan. First of all, Liu Hsiang and his associates are no longer independent warlords, but are subject to orders from Nanking. The districts are being better governed. Thirty new magistrates who are graduates of the new training schools are looking after their welfare. In Chengtu taxes are being collected according to prescribed rates, not upon the whims of the assessors. Bankers, who used to make large profits out of exchange, are financing co-operative credit associations. Hydraulic experts are improving the immense irrigation system for the benefit of the people. Chengtu and Chungking have been linked by a paved highway, and a railway is now being constructed.

The profound psychological change and the greater physical changes which have come to that province, in the words of a foreign resident of Chengtu, "indicate the constructive and practical trend of events since the Generalissimo and his Nanking Government have taken hold of Szechwan's affairs in earnest. Barring accidents which would divert Chiang's attention too long from Szechwan, there would appear to be no good reason why this geographical keystone

of China should not become also the economic and political king-pin making for much-needed national solidarity."

Madame Chiang Kai-shek, who had accompanied the Generalissimo in these aerial travels, which were responsible for so many reforms in Szechwan and other provinces they had visited, rightly concluded that of all the inventions that have helped to unify China perhaps the airplane is the most outstanding. Indeed, its ability to annihilate distance, she says, has been in direct proportion to its achievements in assisting to annihilate suspicion and misunderstanding among provincial officials far removed from one another or from the officials at the seat of Government. She points out that, prior to the advent of the airplane provincial officials, especially those in far-flung provinces, were almost rulers unto themselves, and that in the particularly remote provinces they seldom were able to visit the Capital and exchange of correspondence was almost futile, because of the great length of time absorbed in the coming and the going. Nor could the high officials of the Capital ever feel it possible to take extended journeys into the interior except at very rare intervals. In the old days, such journeys, she explains, not only absorbed considerable time, but they were full of discomfort, hardships and inconvenience for the travelling functionary as well as for all the lesser ones through whose territory it was his obligation to pass. Only along the railway lines could officials move with anything approximating speed and comfort before the airplane appeared, but the railways touched a mere fraction of the great country.

Next to the Generalissimo, Madame Chiang is in the best position to evaluate the influence of air travel on national political and social development, to say nothing of its economic aspects. A review of the aerial itineraries of the Generalissimo in her own words, therefore, will be of extreme interest: "He has flown to almost every province of China—journeys that he never could have undertaken in ordinary circumstances. From Nanking to Yunnan and back, *via* the Yangtze River

route, would have taken two months of quick travel by the usual means of transportation. Yet now it may be done in one day by airplane. The journey from Chungking to Kweiyang, in Kweichow Province, used to absorb 16 days of arduous sedan chair travel, and enormous energy. The chair journey from Kweiyang to Yunnan took a similar amount of time, and required as much stamina. Yet the Generalissimo swept over this ocean of mountains by airplane in about one and a half hours for the first section, and two and a half for the second. Roads are now connecting these points, so travellers who are unable to use airplanes may employ motor driven vehicles and save themselves, their flesh, their bones and their nerves the aches and pains produced by weeks in cramping chairs.

"It is not necessary to list in detail the almost constant important journeys that have been made by the Generalissimo in pursuance of his duties. Suffice it to say that he has flown the length and breadth of the country, over rugged mountain, fertile plain, and desert sand, and he has been able to do things of inestimable value and far-reaching importance for the country. He has been enabled, with comparative ease and without loss of time, to meet officials of remote regions in their own *yamen*, and there solve with them their varied problems, satisfy their minds and give them assurances of Nanking's close interest in them and their worries.

"At the same time, he has been able to acquire a working knowledge of the topography and characteristics of the country such as no high official has ever been able to do before, and this, added to his personal contacts with different officials and peoples, has provided him with unprecedented equipment for the performance of those duties which fall to his lot in the furtherance of his plans in the interests of a better China. Other officials are following his example in more limited, but just as important, ways. All of them certainly are demolishing provincial jealousies and establishing relations on basis of understanding. What the airplane has done for the Generalissimo in his official work is truly wonderful."

## CHAPTER XXIII

Attempted Assassination Of Wang Ching-wei—Chiang Becomes Head Of Government—Changes In Cabinet—Revival Of Student Movement—Chiang's Plan To Reorganize Civil Service—Strained Relations With Japan—The Tachibana Interview—Abusive Japanese Major-Generals—Tada's Notorious Pamphlet—"Chiang And Kuomintang Must Go"

ARRIVING at the National Capital from Szechwan, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek held conferences with Wang Ching-wei, H. H. Kung and other leaders. Thereafter, he paid a brief visit to his ancestral home but returned to Nanking in time for the opening of the Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang on November 1, 1935. On the first day of the session an unfortunate incident happened, which resulted in placing upon the shoulders of the Generalissimo the additional responsibility of civil administration. Wang Ching-wei, President of the Executive Yuan, was fired upon by an assassin from a crowd in the headquarters of the Kuomintang while a group picture was being taken to commemorate the occasion. He was badly wounded, was forced to retire from his post and had to go to Europe for special medical treatment. This left the Executive Yuan without a President. During the session, the Generalissimo was elected to fill the vacant position. Several changes were made in the Cabinet. Critics then pointed out that five of the nine Cabinet officers were men who had received at least ■ part of their education in Japan, and immediately raised a cry that evidence had now been found of a pro-Japanese policy on the part of the Generalissimo. It was not long, however, before the Japanese themselves discovered that it was a pro-

China rather than a pro-Japan Cabinet that the Generalissimo had chosen.

Chiang outlined his policy to the new Ministers shortly after their appointment. They were instructed as soon as possible to conclude the period of political tutelage and to proceed with vigorous measures for reconstruction through united efforts. Diligence and conscientious work were demanded by the Generalissimo. The records of all public functionaries, he said, would henceforth be thoroughly examined. The efficient would be given special encouragement. The inefficient would be punished without leniency. Overlapping and lack of co-ordination in ministerial functions would be eliminated. In short, officialdom, he warned, would be purified in fact as well as in name so that political reforms could be instituted and important tasks accomplished without delay.

Reconstruction work, he promised, was to be expedited without fail. By economic reconstruction he meant the exploitation of China's rich natural resources and the development of productive enterprises; the valuable treasures of the land and in the earth were to be fully utilized. This reconstruction, he pointed out, should be done primarily for the benefit of the people; unnecessary expenditures were to be avoided in order to achieve the best possible results. Each man must exert himself to the utmost to attain national peace and happiness. The New Life Movement and the People's Economic Reconstruction Movement which sought to consolidate the material foundation of the nation should, he urged, be supported. China must rely upon her own resources henceforth, and employ her own efforts for salvation.

The country, he proceeded, was in an extremely difficult position, and its continued existence depended on what was done immediately. Realizing the gravity of its responsibilities, the Government, he asserted, should quickly devise measures for the solution of problems detrimental to China's freedom and equality. In this respect, the Government, he threatened, would make no compromise.

The policy, as outlined by the Generalissimo to the Cabinet and made public soon after, was received with considerable interest and, in most quarters, with commendation. Not by the Japanese, however. They quickly became vocal in their objections. Major-General Rensuke Isogai declared at Shanghai that the political influence and interference of the Kuomintang with the Central Government must be eliminated before Sino-Japanese relations could be stabilized. One Tokyo paper complained that "the situation has become worse than when Wang Ching-wei was President of the Executive Yuan and Minister of Foreign Affairs." The Japanese Ambassador, Akira Ariyoshi, urged the need for China to abandon the policy of relying upon Western Powers, but the Chinese reception of this unasked advice was not encouraging to him.

Another problem that confronted the Generalissimo at this time was the revival of the student movement, which had been dormant for several years. The youth of Peiping, enraged by the Japanese encroachments in North China, began to hold demonstrations, and their protests were re-echoed by student bodies throughout China. Eventually, the Generalissimo decided to summon students and teachers from colleges and universities throughout China to Nanking to learn for themselves the policy of the Government.

Such agitation and unrest in China in past years had become a source of much embarrassment to the Government in times of national crisis, particularly in connection with Sino-Japanese relations. The Government has been criticized by some for its leniency in dealing with the students, but it has to be remembered that the tradition of scholastic leadership is still strong in China. The students are looked upon as the future rulers of the nation and as such are treated with respect and consideration despite their youth. This attitude toward them is shared by all elements of the population, and any undue harshness in dealing with the young zealots who wish to argue with officials of the Government as to their duties is resented by the people.

The method of handling the problem adopted by the

Generalissimo was undoubtedly politic and wise. After hearing his views on the situation and his explanation of the Government's policy, the students might direct their energies into constructive channels. When the students and their teachers, numbering 300, met in Nanking the Generalissimo spoke to them frankly. He told them that the Government expected them to observe discipline and to pay attention to their studies. So long as they expressed their views without violating school discipline or disturbing peace and order, there would be no trouble for them. If, however, their activities should go beyond legal bounds, they would have to be treated in accordance with law. He said he had no intention to evade his responsibilities and he asked them to have confidence in the Government. It was inevitable at times that a government had to make sacrifices, he pointed out, and to preserve China's unity the National Government would not shrink from making them. The rebuilding of the nation's strength, he explained, depended upon orderly cultural development and economic reconstruction.

After listening to the replies from some of the students and professors, the Generalissimo made the momentous announcement that the Government would not sign any agreement detrimental to China's territorial and sovereign rights and would not enter into secret agreements. The policy of dealing frankly with the students met with considerable success, and the hope was inspired that in future national crises, if the student movement became active, it might be turned into useful channels.

Conditions in the public service next occupied the Generalissimo's attention. In an address at the Central Party Headquarters at Nanking, he declared that the organization and training of public functionaries was urgently necessary. Individual sacrifice for the service of society and the State was the basis of the Government. In Western nations, whether in time of peace or war, the people, especially the public officials throughout the country, were statistically checked, organized and given training in general mobilization. China's

plan was to start the work in the Capital among those officials who were held responsible for the direction and guidance of the people and for the administration of affairs of State. After they were organized, the people would follow. The scope of the work could then be extended throughout the country; the Government would thus attain a maximum of efficiency and enhance its own strength.

In bringing all this out, the Generalissimo employed an old adage: "In time of peace the wise man prepares for war; in time of war he maintains the same calm as in time of peace." He indicated that preparations should continue despite hardships and labour. If she were fully prepared, in the event of war, China could meet the emergency. "If we perspire more in times of peace, we will bleed less in times of war."

The Generalissimo warned the Government that, after laying a firm foundation of independence and in order to implement its new plans and policies, it must particularly observe the laws of the State itself, keeping its honesty and integrity above suspicion. Only thus could it overcome the dark forces of selfishness and egoism. He pledged himself to secure the observance of strict honesty by the public officials under his own jurisdiction. If any such Government officials should be found guilty of peculation, avarice, or corruption he would take the blame; he declared that he would never shirk or evade that responsibility or cover up a scandal under any pretext.

A subsequent conference of considerable importance and significance was held in Nanking in the spring of 1936. Some 90 provincial commissioners of civil affairs and education, and special administrative commissioners were present at this conference, coming from the ten provinces of Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei, Kiangsi, Hunan, Hupeh, Fukien, Shantung, Honan and Shensi; also the Provincial Chairmen of the five provinces of Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei, Kiangsi and Hupeh, and 34 representatives of Central Party Headquarters, the National Military Council, the Ministries of Education, Interior and Finance and the National Health Administration.

The purpose of the conference was to review the work of local administrations, especially in civil affairs, and to devise measures for the correction of past administrative deficiencies and find proper solutions. The first of such meetings was held in Nanchang, Kiangsi, early in 1934, and at that time it was planned to hold similar conferences annually. There was no conference in 1935, however, owing to the Generalissimo's preoccupation with the Communist campaign.

In the opening speech at this conference, the Generalissimo required each official attending to make a detailed report upon the actual situation of local administration in his particular province or area; the difficulties encountered and the defects of the present administration as shown by actual experience. These reports would serve as valuable references for future reforms. He also urged that the efficacy of existing administrative laws must be maintained. Stress was also laid by the Generalissimo upon the necessity of improving the local fiscal system so as to balance income and expenditure.

The Peace Preservation Corps, he pointed out, had become a nuisance in some districts and they should be abolished and the appropriations for their maintenance used for the institution of the *pao-chia* (mutual protection) system or for the improvement of the local police. He then referred to the lack of co-ordination in the work of the different organs of provincial administration—for example the Departments of Civil Affairs, Finance, Education and Reconstruction often worked independently of each other. The relations of these departments being closely interwoven, they should co-operate fully with one another.

While he held the view that education should be improved both in regard to quantity and quality, the latter was by far the more important at the present time. One of the most significant social problems that confronted China was the inadequate training of many who had taken up teaching as a calling. He considered that it was essential first to improve the teaching staffs of the schools. Efforts must be made to train competent teachers for primary and middle schools

in order to develop elementary education and build on a firm foundation. He deplored the fact that numerous college graduates were unemployed. In order to kill two birds with one stone, he urged that the unemployed graduates be given special teachers' training so that they might become qualified primary and middle school instructors. The number of primary and middle schools was to be increased in 1937 by one-fourth and a suitable number of teachers was therefore needed for training.

Then, he proceeded, there were two urgent problems of civil administration to be considered: reform of the police system and the institution of land administration. It was general knowledge that some of the policemen were incompetent and corrupt. In many districts opium dens, gambling houses and brothels were operated under police protection. This corruption was not only rife in out-of-the-way districts, but also in large towns and cities. In regions where police funds were lacking he recommended the abolition of the police altogether and the introduction of the *pao-chia* system, or the replacement of the police by militia.

Turning to land administration, he pointed out that the land problem was one of the fundamental political problems of China and land administration was one of the basic tasks of the Government. So long as that problem was unsolved it would be well-nigh impossible to proceed with the work of political reconstruction. It was not true that large sums of money were absolutely necessary for the institution of an efficient land administration. In any event, the minimum funds needed should be raised.

While the domestic problems faced by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the National Government relating to internal affairs bulked large in the eyes of the world and of China, the nation's foreign relations, chiefly those with Japan, bulked even larger. The critical period began, of course, in September, 1931, and since then there had been one crisis after another as the Japanese pushed further into the mainland of

Asia, through Manchuria, Jehol and North China; there had been the attack upon Shanghai itself in 1932, and the years that followed brought their special problems to be faced in regard to Sino-Japanese relations.

In all this the Generalissimo was definitely and intimately concerned. He had been closely engaged in the campaign against the Communists in Central China, but he had never relaxed his vigilance and kept personally abreast of Japanese developments. He is now the one man in China to whose views the Japanese are attaching the greatest importance.

His grasp of the situation and his attitude towards the relations between China and Japan were indicated in an interview which he granted to Tachibana, a Japanese correspondent at Nanking, late in 1934, in which he expressed himself in favour of peace, but declared that China wished to be treated with the respect and the consideration due her. A verbatim report of this interview, made available shortly afterwards, threw considerable light on the situation. The following excerpts are relevant:

Tachibana: The present attitude of China towards Japan appears to be one of continued resistance: it is said that in the coming crisis of, perhaps, 1935-6, when Japan may be hard pressed by international difficulties, China will seize the opportunity to oppose Japan. Is this true?

Chiang: It is natural that certain sections of our people should feel this way. All who are cognizant of world trends, and particularly those in the Far East, however, are unanimous in their opposition to another world war. We all know that the happiness and prosperity of the Far East depends upon world peace. It is self-evident from the standpoint of China's own good that she will not desire another disastrous world war. China and Japan are sister nations in the Far East and all their relations one with another should be based upon justice and goodwill. Apart from mutual respect and confidence, there is no other stable foundation upon which to build international relationships.

Tachibana: Following the Manchurian Incident, has

China's policy of close co-operation with the League of Nations and the Powers tended towards further complicating the Far Eastern situation?

Chiang: Since China is a member of the League, it is only natural that she should observe all the articles of the League Covenant.

Tachibana: Does the recent increase in the military and economic influences of the Powers in China retard Sino-Japanese co-operation?

Chiang: As far as I can see, America and Europe have not only refrained from extending their power in China, but are gradually relinquishing some of their special concessions.

Tachibana: What is the best possible solution to Sino-Japanese relationships?

Chiang: There is only one fundamental solution to all Sino-Japanese problems, and that is the observance of mutual respect and confidence. The key to this situation is entirely in the hands of Japan.

Tachibana: Japan's aim at the London Naval Conference has been to insure her independent position in the Far East. What is your opinion on this question?

Chiang: I have not studied the question in detail, but my sincere desire for the London Naval Conference has been that such an agreement be reached as will bring lasting peace and happiness to all mankind.

Tachibana: Japan hopes that the present policy of the Kuomintang will not continue, but rather that Dr. Sun Yat-sen's pan-Asiatic programme should be the ruling principle. What is your opinion?

Chiang: The Kuomintang of to-day is the Kuomintang of Dr. Sun Yat-sen; it has not departed from the original principles of its renowned founder. I am sure no one would object to our late Leader's pan-Asiatic doctrine of equality and mutual co-operation becoming a reality.

Chiang added, later on: "China is already unified. The South-west presents no problem. I assure you that China's day of internal strife is over. The Kiangsi Communist

question has been successfully solved; but in other parts of the country there may still be disturbances by roving bands of Communists. These will be gradually brought under control.

Tachibana: What is China's border policy?

Chiang: All Chinese territory should come under the direct sovereignty of China.

As early as February and March in 1935, Japanese military officers stationed in Shanghai had begun to whisper to members of the foreign correspondents corps: "Watch out for May and June as something important is going to happen in North China." Toward the middle of that year it became apparent to all that there were plans afoot to change the *status quo* of North China, this being made manifest particularly by virulent attacks by the Japanese military on the Generalissimo, Chang Hsueh-liang and the Kuomintang.

Colonel Takashi Sakai, Chief of Staff of the Japanese Kwantung Army, declared in June that the Japanese Army did not intend to confine its activities to North China but had reached the conclusion that the Generalissimo, as head of the Chinese military establishment, must go. Chiang, he declared, by using the financial and military resources of the Government "under the pretence of unifying China, has actually been corrupting North China, which he regards as a colony. Japanese Army leaders felt that their safest policy was to uproot the influence of Chiang entirely, but particularly in the North. They declared that it was no longer the Communists, but the Generalissimo who would put an end to China's national existence. The Japanese Army, therefore, intended to take the necessary measures to compel the Nanking Government to abolish all organizations, including garrison troops, Kuomin-tang political branches, the so-called 'Blue Shirts' and other groups, and also all those organizations devoted to the encouragement of consumption of native goods which had been responsible for creating anti-Japanese sentiment throughout China as well as disturbances within 'Manchukuo.' "

Shortly before, when he was in Tientsin, Sakai said that the

Japanese military had a fixed policy for North China which could not be changed. He even told Ho Ying-chin, then Chief of the Peiping Branch Military Council, that Chiang's orders to Ho were "insincere"—a favourite word with the Japanese Army leaders when speaking of the Chinese—and that Chiang's "double-faced policies" should be rejected. Most of Sakai's conversations with Ho in those tense days consisted of monologues delivered by the Japanese officer in the characteristic style of Japanese military men when dealing with their Asiatic "cousins." No one, of course, misunderstood the import of the threats and personal attacks on the Generalissimo by the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army. There was no disguising the fact that the Japanese had decided upon a fresh series of aggressions in China.

Vice-Admiral Gengo Hyakutake, commander of the Japanese Third Fleet, visited the Generalissimo's headquarters at Chengtu, Szechwan, in June, when he explained his own views regarding the North China issue and added more threats. He stated that the Japanese Army and Foreign Office were determined to take strong action, that Japan was negotiating the matter with the utmost sincerity and that Nanking should do likewise. The Japanese verbal onslaughts reached a climax in a written denunciation inspired by Major-General Hayao Tada, commander of the Japanese forces in North China, if not actually written by him. This was a most extraordinary document, typical of the contemporary Japanese military mind, but was made distinctive among other outbursts from Japanese warlords by the intense hatred that was manifested toward the Generalissimo and the Kuomintang, a hatred that, perhaps, was not entirely free from the elements of fear. General Tada held that the great obstacles to organizing a new autonomous state in North China were the Generalissimo and the Kuomintang. In his statement to Japanese journalists on September 24, 1935, Tada said, *inter alia*, that Japan and Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Party could not exist alongside each other. Unless the Japanese Empire was to be brought to submission, the obstacles must be removed.

After a study of these attacks, the conclusion was inevitable that the excuses which would be forthcoming to justify "positive action" had already been carefully prepared. Quite evidently the Japanese had become alarmed at the success of the New Life Movement and the evidences that were forthcoming of the rapid growth of a genuine national sentiment in China. Japan recognized that the development of national consciousness among the Chinese would doom her grandiose aspirations for expansion to failure and she was determined to prevent it by every means within her reach.

Toward the end of June, it became known that the Generalissimo had decided upon a huge programme for the creation of a new and powerful air force in China. In addition to the Hangchow Aviation Academy, plans were made for an additional large aviation school in the interior. All this caused the Japanese to complain even more bitterly that the Generalissimo showed no sign of altering what they described as his vague policy towards Japan.

While the Generalissimo was far from adopting an attitude complaisant to all the impossible demands of the Japanese, he had attempted to be conciliatory. It was with this in view that he publicly announced in September, 1935, that "China and Japan are sister countries and they should co-operate on the basis of justice and friendship." He suggested that China's search for assistance from Western nations in solving her economic difficulties could not be regarded as a measure to boycott Japan any more than her endeavour to co-operate with Japan could be considered as a desire to restrict her relations with Western nations.

As for developments in the North, he raised the question whether, in the circumstances, the time was mature for Sino-Japanese co-operation. He emphasized that a spirit of sincerity and justice should be upheld by both China and Japan in their attempt to find a solution of all outstanding issues and to bring about true Sino-Japanese rapprochement.

"The foundation of the diplomatic policy of China lies in the word 'peace,'" he continued. "Peace is China's policy

toward all foreign nations. If Japan is desirous of sharing the responsibility with China for the maintenance of peace in the Far East, she should adopt a more reasonable attitude toward China. Mutual agreement is necessary to achieve friendship. A new Chinese-Japanese policy should be based on the fundamental principle of mutual equality and independence. China is an autonomous and independent nation and there is absolutely no possibility whatever of her giving up her territorial and administrative rights. For the sake of maintaining peace in the Orient and out of consideration for Japan's interests, it is not impossible for China to make reasonable concessions, but there must be a limit."

His efforts looking toward the removal of Sino-Japanese misunderstanding notwithstanding, the Japanese found a new matter to worry about in the autumn of 1935. Several Japanese spokesmen were of the opinion that the Generalissimo's activities in Szechwan, particularly his action in calling an important military conference in Chengtu, had the objective of working out a scheme of national defence against "alien" aggression. Others declared that all machinery from the arsenals in Shanghai and Nanking was being transferred to Szechwan and that this constituted evidence of Chiang's plans to develop a powerful military base in that province from which the Generalissimo would eventually launch a drive against Japan. The Japanese also regarded as significant the Generalissimo's action in ordering the Twentieth and Forty-fifth Armies from Szechwan to Shensi for a continuance of the Communist drive in that area. They continued to attack him in the Press with unabated vigour.

## CHAPTER XXIV

Fifth National Congress—Important Speech By Generalissimo—China's Foreign Policy Explained—Yin Ju-keng Turns Traitor—“Autonomy Movement” In North China—Japan's Thinly Veiled Intrigues—Hirota's Three Points—Bellicose Japanese Militarists—Military Revolt In Tokyo—Japanese Smuggling In North China—Semi-Independent South-west

AMIDST these verbal attacks made by the Japanese military officers upon the Generalissimo, the so-called autonomy movement in North China embracing five provinces, namely Hopei, Chahar, Shansi, Suiyuan and Shantung, was launched. The movement was considered by both Chinese and foreigners as a thinly-disguised further aggression on Chinese territory by Japan. It continued through the summer months of 1935 without any serious development. In fact, it did not proceed according to the Japanese plan. Han Fu-chu, Governor of Shantung, was non-committal. Sung Cheh-yuan, who is supposed to have been at the forefront of the separatist adventure, was distrusted by the Japanese. Yen Hsi-shan did not lend himself to the movement, which was gradually whittled down from five provinces to two, namely, Hopei and Chahar.

The Japanese now realized that even these two provinces would not be entirely amenable to them and that their leaders could not quickly reconcile themselves to Japanese interference in their administrative affairs. They accused the Generalissimo of employing terrorist tactics to prevent autonomy, and the Japanese Army, it was reported, took a very serious view of his “double dealing.” Late in November,

1935, Lieutenant-Colonel Tan Takahashi, Japanese resident officer at Peiping, registered a strong protest with the Chinese authorities of the Peiping-Mukden Railway against the transfer of rolling stock from the North to the South allegedly by order of the Generalissimo. The Japanese were much disturbed at the continued rumours that the Generalissimo was mobilizing both military forces and means of transportation to fight the autonomy movement. Eight divisions of China's National Army were unofficially reported to have been mobilized in Honan. Every effort was made by the Generalissimo to ensure the loyalty of the Chinese leaders in the five provinces concerned. The task of the Central Government was simplified by the fact that some of the important subordinates of Sung Chch-yuan were anti-Japanese. Yin Ju-keng, Administrative Inspector of the Demilitarized Zone of Hopei, however, declared the districts that had been demilitarized by the Tangku Truce Agreement independent of Hopei on November 24. The Foreign Office at Tokyo ordered the Japanese Ambassador in China, Akira Ariyoshi, to warn the Generalissimo that the latter must not arrest Yin for his traitorous activities or suppress the movement by force. The attitude of Japanese nationals in China revealed quite clearly the aims of Japan, which the movement was to further. "Complete union with Japan," declared a Shanghai Japanese newspaper, "is the only way to save China."

Two days prior to the creation by Yin of the autonomous regime in Eastern Hopei, the Fifth National Congress of the Kuomintang was held in Nanking. As a token of the ascendancy of the influence of the Generalissimo among his party members, he was elected in the Congress at the head of the list of 208 members of the new Central Executive and Supervisory Committees, receiving a total of 495 votes out of 515 votes cast. Naturally the Japanese evinced considerable interest in the gathering, and Akira Ariyoshi, the Japanese Ambassador, sounded the Generalissimo after the closing session regarding the view that the Government would take of the situation in the North. The Generalissimo informed him that the Govern-

ment was fully cognizant of the strained situation and was prepared to take appropriate measures in the event of unexpected developments.

During the presence of the outstanding military leaders in the Capital, the Generalissimo summoned them to a special military conference, which was attended by Chang Hsueh-liang, Yen Hsi-shan, Ho Ying-chin, Feng Yu-hsiang and others. The conference caused much speculation in Japanese circles.

The Congress itself was extraordinarily successful. A great deal of routine work was done in a spirit of sincere unity, but the most important event was a speech by the Generalissimo in which he outlined the Government's foreign policy. Referring to external relations, he recalled the events in Manchuria which began on September 18, 1931. He briefly traced the subsequent developments, the Shanghai conflict and the long campaigns in North China. The entire nation had suffered greatly for four years and, entrusted as he and other members of the Standing Committee were by the Party with the responsibility of dealing with the situation, he had felt that suffering very keenly. The country, however, he said, had learned its lesson through the national emergency. In her international relations, China sought the independence and equality of the nation; internally, she sought self-reliance and strength.

This point, the Generalissimo explained, had been emphasized by Dr. Sun, who advocated equality, the abolition of unilateral treaties and spiritual and material reconstruction. He had set forth his ideals clearly in his "Fundamentals of National Reconstruction," "Plans for National Reconstruction," and other works.

How far, then, had China exerted herself in the decade toward achievement of these objectives? Chiang asked and he answered his own question. The two aspects of the national movement had to proceed simultaneously and along parallel lines in order to gain success. If China paid attention only to one phase of the problem she was certain to meet with setbacks, a natural and inevitable consequence.

"The relations between States," the Generalissimo said, evidently hoping that Japan would change her policy toward China, "are entirely different from those between individuals. Between States there can be no permanent enmity. This is proved in the diplomatic history of Europe in the past century, when States were friends at one time and enemies at another. For the relations between States are complicated and their scope is wide and not simple as are those between individuals. In a given case, from one point of view, it may seem that there can be no reason for friendship between two States, but in another case and from another viewpoint it would seem that there can be no reason for estrangement. Concrete cases of this description are numerous. Relations between States are, therefore, relative and not absolute.

"In other words, international relations, involving alliances or separations, amity or enmity, should be determined by consideration of the prosperity or decline of the nation involved and the vital interests of the people and not by momentary sentiments or local interests. Carefully to weigh, in the light of these considerations, what is urgent and what admits of delay, and to compare matters which are weighty with those which are of lighter importance in determining the final policy—this is the point that should be noted by all responsible statesmen."

Each time China suffered a great humiliation, the Generalissimo continued, she could not but examine herself. It was said by Dr. Sun that there was more than one country that could bring about China's ruin. This was a warning that she must take seriously to heart, for the unprecedented national emergency was no exception to the rule of cause and effect and was not the result of accident. Mencius had once said: "A man must first insult himself before people insult him; a State must first attack itself before others attack it."

If China should fail to rely on her own efforts, the friends of to-day might become the foes of to-morrow, the Generalissimo pointed out; on the other hand if she strengthened herself and was self-reliant it was not impossible that her present foes

would become her future friends. The ancient adage that help comes from others only when one first aids oneself, and that fortune smiles only on the one who looks after his own welfare, he said, was based on the same idea.

"Placed as we are, we should pay particular attention to two points: first, we should regard the completion of the organization of the State as our supreme duty, which must not be affected by temporary conflicts of interests. This is clearly set forth in a saying of the Great Sage: 'If one cannot be patient in a small matter, gigantic schemes are likely to be upset.' The diplomatic situation during a period of emergency cannot be tackled by ordinary methods.

"Secondly, changes in the international situation occur with rapidity and without warning. When an incident occurs, it must be handled with promptness and resolution."

The internal and external difficulties which had faced various Oriental and Occidental nations after the European War were, he said, more or less similar to those which had confronted China during the preceding decade. Owing to the determination of the authorities to take resolute and prompt action on vital issues, the crisis had been successfully overcome.

The rise or fall of China with one-fourth of the population of the world, Chiang explained, has a vital bearing on world peace and human welfare—a fact that enlightened statesmen of all friendly Powers have begun to recognize. What China is assiduously seeking is the continuation of her national existence and co-existence with world Powers. She wants nothing else. If she continues to carry out sound and concrete domestic reforms internally and pursues a policy of frankness and sincerity toward the various friendly Powers, he believed that the day would come when an understanding, both internal and external, would be achieved.

"We now come to this conclusion," he said. "In pursuance of these points, to prevent any international change which might cut short our national existence and block the path of our regeneration, we should be guided by the vital interests

of the State and the people. With regard to all minor problems, we should show the greatest patience, and, within the limits of non-encroachment on our sovereign rights, we should seek harmonious relations with the friendly Powers. On a basis of reciprocity and equality we should look for economic co-operation with them. Otherwise, we shall obey the State and make a supreme resolve. I dare neither to boast, nor to evade responsibility; as long as the maintenance of peace does not become entirely hopeless we shall not abandon peace, nor shall we talk lightly of sacrifice unless and until the final crisis comes. For, while personal sacrifice is a small matter, national sacrifice is of the greatest importance, and while an individual's life is limited, the life of a nation is eternal.

"If a limit is set for the continuation of peace, if the will to sacrifice is resolutely formed, and if we make a supreme effort for peace with the determination to make the sacrifice as a final resort—with a view to stabilizing the national foundation and reviving the national spirit—that, I sincerely believe, is the only policy we can pursue to overcome the emergency and achieve national reconstruction."

Following the significant speech of the Generalissimo, the Japanese Ambassador, Major-General Rensuke Isogai and Rear-Admiral Osamu Sato, the latter two being respectively military and naval attachés of the Embassy, met to discuss the means of attaining their object of aggression through co-ordination of the efforts of the different branches of the Japanese Government service in China. The three-point programme of Koki Hirota, then Foreign Minister of Japan, was made the basis of their discussion. These points were:

1. The suppression of anti-Japanese movements in China.
2. Creation of a system of co-operation between China and her immediate neighbours, Japan and "Manchukuo."
3. Joint measures to be undertaken by the three countries for the prevention of the spread of Communism in the Far East.

During an interview shortly afterwards, the Generalissimo told the Japanese Ambassador that Hirota's programme was

not acceptable to China, at the same time emphasizing again the inviolability of Chinese territory. On this occasion, Ariyoshi solemnly averred that the current rumours that Japanese agents were behind the autonomy movement were false and without foundation. He stated that the Tokyo authorities regarded the movement in North China as "an expression of the unanimous desire of the people of that area," but he intimated that the sending of troops to Hopei Province to suppress the autonomy movement would not be tolerated by the Japanese Government.

Replying, the Generalissimo laid emphasis upon the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations and said that he had plans for their further improvement, but he pointed out that, if autonomy and independence in North China should be brought about with Japan's backing and in defiance of the wishes of the Central Government, a bitter Chinese feeling against Japan would follow and such a situation, if it arose, would place the National Government in a very difficult position.

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek continued to keep a firm hand on the relations between his country and Japan at the end of 1935 and in 1936. As President of the Executive Yuan, he exercised a controlling influence over China's attitude toward Japan and maintained a normal and cordial relationship in face of great provocation from the Japanese militarists. Major-General Isogai, upon his return from China to Tokyo, for instance, declared that "her (Japan's) policy is decided regardless of the attitude of China. The Nanking Government, headed by Chiang Kai-shek, has in the past made a temporary settlement of problems arising between Japan and China by the so-called double-faced diplomacy." He added that "it is no concern of ours whether Chiang Kai-shek's Government is sincere. What is important is that Japan should give no opportunity for Chinese equivocation in its attitude toward Japan and Japan should keep China continually aware of its decisive attitude."

Isogai had returned to Tokyo to persuade his Government to hold no conference with Nanking on Sino-Japanese

problems unless China first acceded to all Japanese demands. He also recommended a firmer and more unified policy to settle immediately the deadlock in Sino-Japanese relations. He later outlined a variety of points as the basis of Japan's future policy toward China. Generalissimo Chiang, he said, had found himself unable to succeed in his former policy toward Japan, and the prospect of Japan's carrying out her China policy had accordingly become brighter. Outstanding Sino-Japanese problems could be solved easily should the Nanking Government follow the suggestions which had already been communicated by the Japanese Government, and there was actually no need for a Sino-Japanese conference in Nanking. The fundamental solution of Sino-Japanese problems was seemingly impossible unless the Generalissimo severed his connections with the Kuomintang.

Isogai went on to say that the position of the South-western officials, especially those of Kwangsi Province, coincided with that of Japan from the viewpoint of Far Eastern security. Hence it was not necessary for Japan to pay much attention to minor occurrences in that part of China. It would rather be wise to give the South-west positive assistance, enabling it to succeed in its plans for reconstruction.

On February 26, 1936, a portion of the Japanese military forces in Tokyo revolted. The revolt was marked by the assassination of some Japanese Cabinet Ministers and high officials. This was taken by Chinese leaders as foreshadowing a more rigid policy on the part of Japan toward China. As a result of political changes in Tokyo incidental to the murderous outbreak by the Army, Hachiro Arita, new Japanese Ambassador at Nanking, returned to Tokyo where he became Minister of Foreign Affairs. Speaking on the subject of Japan's foreign policy, he made the usual references to the ties of blood, culture and mutual inter-dependence of Japan and China, but on the nature of the co-operation which he proposed should exist between the two countries he was silent. It was generally assumed that by co-operation he meant domination by Japan.

Arita was plainly told before he left China that the adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations was dependent upon whether Japan suspended all military action in North China.

The signing of a mutual assistance pact between the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia at this time was the occasion for a display of further Japanese irritation. It was made an excuse for the Kwantung Army and for "Manchukuo" to pledge themselves to "protect" the so-called East Hopei Anti-Communist and Autonomous Government against Communist raids. The National Government's protest to Moscow over the Soviet-Mongol pact resulted in evoking still more Japanese ire. The Japanese said, "It had merely gone through the motions of objecting, seemingly satisfied that Soviet policy is directed against Japan and 'Manchukuo.'"

It was rumoured in Japan, in April, that the Generalissimo was planning to check Japan's advance to the west by concentrating large forces in Shansi under the pretext of a Communist drive. This, it was declared, was obviously "another example of China's failure to co-operate with Japan and a glaring example of China's insincerity."

There was still another problem, however, for the Generalissimo to face in 1936, when smuggling in North China by Japanese and Koreans became a serious matter. The Customs authorities in the Tientsin and Chinwangtao districts were baulked at every turn and restrictions were placed on their activities by Japanese commanders stationed in that area. After the first six months of the year, Customs officers found themselves compelled to submit to the exigencies of the new situation, and the Customs preventive vessels were withdrawn from the waters of the so-called demilitarized zone. For that matter, the preventive control of the Customs had been practically non-existent since the autumn of 1935.

In the early months of 1936, the smuggling scandal in North China became a matter of international importance, exciting widespread comment abroad. The Foreign Office at Nanking made repeated protests to Tokyo, but failed to receive any satisfaction. The evasive answers of the Japanese to diplo-


matic protests concerning the smuggling from Great Britain and the United States indicated that connivance in this "shoddy swindle," as "The Times" of London described it, was not merely an affair of local military action, but a deliberate stroke of governmental policy.

By May, the losses to the Chinese Customs through the rampant smuggling activities were estimated at \$30,000,000. The situation had become very serious, and a strongly-worded note was sent to Tokyo, pointing out that the powers of prevention of the Customs admitted of no interference from any source. The Japanese Government was again requested to take effective steps to restrain their military authorities from further unwarranted and illegal interference. It was declared that there was no reference in the Tangku Agreement to the question of armed Customs vessels, nor could any articles of that Agreement be construed as imposing restrictions on the anti-smuggling activities of armed Customs patrols.

Nothing came of this, however, save intimations from the Japanese that they were innocent, and that the real cause of the smuggling was the high Chinese tariff. Lieutenant-General Tada, retiring commander of the Japanese garrison in North China, cynically stated that a reduction in import duties was the best way of meeting the situation. Additional Japanese troops began pouring into the North.

In spite of this, General Chang Chun, Minister of Foreign Affairs at Nanking, made a dignified and statesmanlike appeal for better understanding between China and Japan. He avoided recrimination and disclaimed any thought of securing advantage by playing one nation against another. He urged a policy of live-and-let-live for both Japan and China. This appeal was morally unassailable.

The outcome of the attacks on the Chinese Maritime Customs, as well as the continued aggression of the Japanese Army in the North, increased the difficulty of reaching a peaceful settlement of the outstanding problems between China and Japan. The Generalissimo, both in his capacity as



The Generalissimo Entraining.



President of the Executive Yuan and Chairman of the National Military Council, had made clear through his own words and actions as well as through those of Chang Chun, his personally-chosen head of the Foreign Office, his desire to remain at peace in order to devote his entire attention to the economic rehabilitation of China. But the Machiavellian actions of the Japanese Army in the North pointed definitely in the direction of war in which Japan, China, Soviet Russia and possibly other Powers may be involved.

It will have been seen from previous chapters that, while the National Government under the Generalissimo had been increasing its prestige and power, it was not yet able to speak for a united China at this stage. In the North, though nominally officials were appointed by Nanking, in some cases it was obvious that many of the appointments were made because the appointees were known to be pro-Japanese—in fact some of them had been associated with the Nishihara loans and other shady undertakings of the Japanese. It was clear that the Japanese were determined to apply the technique which had been so successful in Manchuria and Jehol to North China, though with less crudity and brutality.

South China was even less under the control of the National Government than the North. Nanking had no voice whatsoever in the appointment of the South-west Political Council and the South-west Central Executive Committee. Those bodies, though not recognized by foreign countries, conducted themselves as if they possessed sovereignty. The military forces in Kwangtung and Kwangsi were nominally part of the National Army, but, in fact, they gave allegiance only to their own commanders. It can be said with truth that the South-west was a liability to Nanking instead of being an asset. Matters such as the reformation of the national currency and judicature were impossible as long as two of the provinces, one of them populous and wealthy, and both of them important, were to all intents and purposes self-governing. The Japanese were well aware of this. In fact, they did

everything within their power to instigate Southern opposition to the Government, as admitted by Isogai.

The Generalissimo knew that his vision of unification would never materialize until the South-west, at all events, definitely took its orders from Nanking. There is reason to suppose that some of his advisers repeatedly urged him to crush the two Kwang provinces by force of arms, as he undoubtedly could have done had he so desired, but it has never been the Generalissimo's policy to use force if he thinks that the end sought can be gained by other means. He has often exercised patience that has won the admiration of the understanding and the disapproval of grosser minds. Yet, when the Generalissimo once becomes convinced that appeals to reason are unlikely to accomplish anything, he is quick to strike and strike hard.

An event was to occur in July which was to justify to the fullest extent the Generalissimo's policy of patience and to increase his prestige immeasurably more than if he had marched his victorious Armies through Kwangtung and Kwangsi.

## CHAPTER XXV

**South-west Again Restive—Fictitious Anti-Japanese Expedition—Movement Directed Against Central Government—Troop Movements In South—Kwangsi Forces In Hunan—Chiang Appeals To Chen Chi-tang—Government Troops On The Alert—Plenary Session Of C.E.C.—Defections From Chen Chi-tang—Address By Generalissimo—Government Determined To Put Down Rebellion**

AS EARLY as May 29, 1936, the Japanese papers published reports that hostilities had broken out between the Central Government and the South-west. These reports were, of course, untrue, but the South-west had begun a demonstration that seemed likely to embarrass greatly the National Government and possibly precipitate civil war. The military leaders, Chen Chi-tang in Kwangtung and Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi in Kwangsi, placed the troops under their control on a war footing and announced the formation of the "Anti-Japanese National Salvation Forces." Chen Chi-tang became Commander-in-Chief and Pai Chung-hsi, Vice-Commander-in-Chief of this organization. There was a certain amount of subtlety about these proceedings. Telegrams were sent all over the country declaring that the patriotic trio could not bear to see the aggression of Japan in the North and calling upon the National Government to declare war upon the aggressor. On account of the critical relations between China and Japan over the situation in North China, this was calculated to have a considerable popular appeal, although the evidence it gave of disunity within the councils of China was dismaying alike to genuine Chinese patriots as well as to those non-Chinese who wished China well.

The anti-Japanese aspect that the Southern leaders attempted to give to their movement could not, however, even deceive children, let alone their elders. Everyone knew that the Kwangsi warlords had been employing Japanese advisers and that the Japanese were selling arms and war supplies to Chen Chi-tang for his alleged anti-Japan campaign. On June 12, Major-General Seiichi Kita, the Japanese military attaché in China, actually confirmed the fact that the Southern leaders had bought arms and munitions from Japan for their proposed anti-Japanese expedition. The movement was obviously directed against the Central Government. The Southern leaders believed that the anti-Japanese sentiment of the people of China, as well as the Generalissimo's preoccupation with the affairs of North China, would combine to place them in a winning position in a battle for concessions from the Central Government.

At the beginning of June, troop movements in the South began, and Kwangsi detachments advanced 15 miles into the province of Hunan which borders Kwangsi on the north. On June 7, the Generalissimo sent a telegram to Chen Chi-tang, urging the latter, as Commander-in-Chief of the Kwangtung Army, to abandon military preparations and calling his attention to the folly of independent action against foreign aggression. This message was a reply to telegrams despatched to the Central Government by Kwangsi and Kwangtung on June 2 and 4, urging Nanking to declare war against Japan and threatening to fight alone if the Central Authorities refused to co-operate.

"You cannot gamble with the existence of a nation on a momentary impulse," declared the Generalissimo, who stressed that, while the determination of Kwangsi and Kwangtung to resist aggression had earned much sympathy, national salvation must be achieved by the concerted efforts of the entire people. Separate action, he stated, would immediately cause a loss of international prestige, increase the disrespect of China's enemies, disappoint her friends and impair the country's ultimate capacity of resistance.

The only way for China to save herself and insure her

continued existence, the Generalissimo pointed out, was to face the dangerous situation as a unit and use her united strength to attain that end. Should there be lacking a fixed policy, the country, in the event of one part of it starting a movement independent of the rest, would surely forfeit the respect that was due to her. He continued:

"From the viewpoint of military principles, any movement that is to be successful should be executed under one single command, and should be well co-ordinated. Take an international war for illustration. Even the troops of a friendly Power are moved about only after careful consultation with the general staff of its ally; thereby, through their combined efforts, the common objective is attained.

"You, I am sure, are well aware of these military principles. If you suddenly mobilize troops in the hope of securing assistance elsewhere later, but without previous consultation, it is certain that your status as military men would be adversely affected.

"Moreover, the matter of war or peace is of great importance to both the Party and the nation. How can you refuse on account of a momentary impulse to seek the views of the majority in deciding upon so vital a matter which concerns the life of the nation?

"During these few days many rumours have been in circulation which have aroused much suspicion and distrust. Critics have gone so far as to observe that, if Kwangtung and Kwangsi have really taken the action reported, they would obtain results which would be the direct opposite of their wish to save the country.

"Knowing you as I do to be true patriots, I refuse to believe that you will give support to the movement which would show others that we are divided among ourselves. I implore you not to allow your troops to enter the territory of your neighbouring provinces, thereby causing suspicion as to your motives and impairing the whole national plan. Let me also express the hope that you will send responsible representatives to Nanking and settle with us various questions.

"With the country in its present predicament, it is not possible to have our own way in everything. The determination of the Central Government to save the country is as firm as yours. Wise as you are, you cannot fail to see my point. Please convey the gist of this telegram to Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi."

Three days later the Generalissimo sent a second message to Chen Chi-tang, urging him to withdraw the advancing troops of Kwangtung and Kwangsi in accordance with the instructions of the Central Government in order to stop current rumours.

"At the Second Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee which will be held a month from now," the Generalissimo's message began, "all pending political issues will be decided by the Party. It is the duty of all loyal soldiers to abide by the orders of the Party and the State and they should never take independent action which would cause uneasiness among the people."

Reminding the Kwangtung military leaders that, at the present juncture, when the North China situation was grave, when the diplomatic situation was getting tense and when the nation was grieved over the whole outlook, the Generalissimo said that he felt sure that Chen and other South-western officials and officers would not seize such a serious moment to aggravate the national crisis. Originally, he did not believe the many rumours which had been current, but according to unimpeachable reports the troops of Kwangtung and Kwangsi had entered Yungchow and Chenchow in southern Hunan on June 8. Furthermore, information had reached him that they were continuing to advance northward. Immediately upon receipt of these reports, continued the Generalissimo, the Central Government had ordered troops stationed south of Henchowfu to retreat northward in order to avoid a clash pending negotiations looking toward a peaceful settlement of the situation.

Generalissimo Chiang then strongly urged Chen Chi-tang to order the advancing forces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi to

cease mobilizing and to return to their original garrison areas. Otherwise, he warned, the continuous adoption of independent action, heedless of the orders of the highest organ of the Central Government to suspend their military movements, would give observers the impression that this was not an anti-Japan campaign of a part of the Chinese Army, but a case of local troops and officials resisting the orders of the Central Government. He expressed the opinion that there must have been some malcontents and near-sighted army leaders who were using anti-Japan propaganda as a pretext for moving their troops across their provincial borders in order to further their personal ambitions.

"They fail to realize, however, that, as the national crisis is daily becoming aggravated," added the Generalissimo, "people cannot be deceived by such disguised pseudo-patriotism. I appeal to you not to fall into the trap of the irresponsibles, lest you sacrifice your past revolutionary record and fame. Since we have stuck together through thick and thin, I deem it my duty to offer you my sincerest advice.

"As our country is now in such a precarious position, we would still have to tax our utmost abilities in safeguarding our national existence, even if we acted together with the support of the people. If at the present crucial moment of life and death there should be an internal split, what will posterity think of us?"

Recognizing the commanding position that Chen Chi-tang held in the South-west, the Generalissimo expressed the fear that a false move on Chen's part might spell his personal ruin. He, therefore, urged that Chen should follow the order of the Central Government and immediately recall the troops of the two Kwang provinces. Such a move, it was pointed out in the message, would not only clarify the present threatening situation but would also testify to his genuine patriotic fervour.

The Generalissimo in addition again asked Chen to convey his sentiments to Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi, the Kwangsi military leaders. The change of the political situation from

uneasiness to stability, the Generalissimo concluded, would not only be a blessing to the country, but also to the two Kwang provinces themselves.

While the Generalissimo was appealing to reason and endeavouring to persuade the South-western militarists to adopt a sensible and patriotic attitude, he was by no means neglecting the military requirements. Large bodies of troops from Hupeh were moved into Hunan with a speed that was undoubtedly disconcerting to Kwangtung and Kwangsi. The Governor of Hunan, Ho Chien, remained loyal, though some of the local provincial militia were removed elsewhere on account of their doubtful loyalty. The Southern leaders, dismayed at the turn of events in Hunan, began to protest against the concentration of the National Armies, declaring that the proper place for them was in the North, facing the Japanese. By June 12, an advance of Nanking's troops and a corresponding retreat of the Southern forces were reported, but both sides were careful not to let a major engagement result. Nanking's stand was still that a peaceful solution of the difficulties should be found, and the Southern leaders did not want war either—all they wanted was money.

A Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang was announced for July 10 at Nanking and all parties were urged to await the decisions of this body on the issues pending between the Central Government and the two Kwang provinces. Consequently, military operations were for the most part confined to a mobilization of forces. The war of propaganda was, however, in full force. The Southern leaders sent representatives to Shanghai and Peiping, and at the latter city they were well received and listened to, although Sung Cheh-yuan and Han Fu-chu showed a disposition to wait and see what was going to happen before making commitments.

To make their anti-Japanism look real, the dissident politicians at Canton organized a huge anti-Japanese parade in that city on June 13. Up to this time, the Japanese had

regarded the professed anti-Japanese sentiments of the Southern leaders with a good deal of complacency, knowing that it was not sincere, but the parade in Canton was a different matter, as they knew that the anti-Japanese sentiment of the populace was genuine. Consequently, the Japanese hastened to protest against the parade and, to "save his face," Chen Chi-tang felt compelled to reject the Japanese protest.

By June 17, the concentration of Central Government forces in Hunan was completed. The rapidity with which this had taken place greatly enhanced the prestige of Nanking, especially with the people of Hunan, which threatened to be the field of hostilities. It was not without its effect also on the Southern leaders, who now began to hedge and issue statements, expressing regret that the purpose of the Southern anti-Japanese expedition was "misunderstood."

They formulated a series of new demands which they presented to the Central Government, primarily a demand for financial assistance to the two Southern provinces to enable them to tide over their financial difficulties. The other demands concerned the anti-Japanese movement, a postponement of the People's Convention, which was due to meet in Nanking on November 12, and the reform of the constitutional laws of the country. By this time, it had become quite generally recognized that money was what the Southern leaders wanted most of all. Kwangtung Province was in the grip of a severe financial panic. As for Kwangsi, it had formerly derived most of its revenue from a transit tax on opium being shipped from Szechwan, Yunnan and Kweichow to the coast. Upon Generalissimo Chiang strengthening the Government control over the western provinces named, the Kwangsi warlords were no longer able to collect much opium tax.

On June 20, the official Japanese news agency, Domei, reported that the Generalissimo had issued an ultimatum to the Southern leaders, demanding their submission, but this was stigmatized at Nanking by an official spokesman as mere propaganda. It was apparent from the beginning of the

rebellious movement in the South that the Japanese hoped that a clash might take place in order that they could fish in troubled waters. As a matter of fact, both sides were waiting for the results of the Plenary Session to be held at Nanking on July 10. The chief events toward the end of June consisted of an appeal for peace by the Northern generals, Sung Chih-yuan and Han Fu-chu, and of an attempt to reorganize the former Nineteenth Route Army at Canton.

Again showing his realization of the value of the Press for the dissemination of accurate information, the Generalissimo permitted a number of Chinese newspapermen to interview him in Nanking. He declared that the fate of China rested in her own hands. If all the people in the country would co-operate and work together loyally the difficulties confronting them would be overcome. On the other hand, if there were dissension among themselves disaster would overtake them.

"At this critical moment," he explained, "our responsibility to our country is especially great. The Central Government must carry out its policy of internal peace and unification to the end, and, it is hoped that all our fellow countrymen will understand our attitude and do their best, as citizens of the country, to help the Government in carrying out this policy.

"China should be a unified nation. From our past history we learn that peace and prosperity only existed when the country was unified, while the reverse was true when it was not. Hence, if the administration of the country is under centralized control, the Central Government must bear the responsibility and not yield it to others.

"Yet due consideration must be given to sectional interests, even in a unified country. The psychology and customs of the people of various provinces are often different, and they must receive consideration when efforts are made to maintain a uniform administrative system."

The Central Government, he said, was perfectly willing to discuss with absolute candour the affairs of the provinces in order to arrive at the best solutions of their problems. It was also ready to assist with men and money in the development

of the provinces, but the aim, he pointed out, must be the welfare of the whole nation, and personal interests and prejudices must be put aside. He expressed the hope that the people in the provinces would realize the importance of co-operation, and of the maintenance of proper discipline. The Central Government, he indicated, was trying to unify the country by peaceful means. Hence the provinces should support it in order to make the nation strong and improve its international position.

A most important requisite in maintaining peace and increasing national strength, he pointed out, was strict military discipline and centralized military command. All movements of troops should be carried out in accordance with the orders of the highest office in the Central Government upon which devolved the responsibility of deciding the national policy. It was only thus that the country could be governed and the nation made strong. He continued:

"If any section of the country has suggestions to make concerning national affairs, they should be made in a peaceful way and with perfect open-mindedness. No independent action should be taken which might lead to disorder in the country.

"Recently the troops of Kwangtung and Kwangsi have been moved into Hunan, Kweichow, Kiangsi and Fukien—an action which does not agree with the foregoing principles, and it is much to be lamented. I still believe, however, that the officers and soldiers of these provinces are patriotic enough to respect the policy of the Central Government and will co-operate with it for the benefit of the country, if they will consider the matter carefully. If they do, I am ready to treat them with the greatest sincerity. I will not blame them for what they have done, or send the troops of other provinces into Kwangtung and Kwangsi. With perfect frankness, I wish to ask for a candid response and the loyal support of the authorities of these two provinces.

"As to my personal attitude, it is already known to all unbiased people in the country. At this critical moment,

being entrusted by the Party and the nation with such heavy responsibilities, I will exert my utmost in working for the future of the nation and the race. I have already announced my unwillingness to be a candidate for the Presidency under the new Constitution, and I can emphatically assert that I do not care for any personal glory or advantage. I feel that my greatest contribution to national needs comes through being able at any time to visit both near and distant parts of the country and observe the requirements of the people, and thus be always available to assist in the solution of various problems connected with military reorganization, educational reforms, economic reconstruction, rural amelioration, inter-provincial communications, and all other questions affecting the fundamental welfare of the people. I only want to lead my compatriots to face hardships and lay a firm foundation for the Republic of China, which should be the aim of all citizens of this country."

From the beginning of the rebellious movements in the South there had been reports of dissensions in their ranks. Even before the open defiance of the Southern leaders was expressed, Chou Lu, the President of Chung Shan (Sun Yat-sen) University, had insisted upon a peaceful solution of various problems with Nanking, and as a protest against the war policy of Chen, Li and Pai, left for Europe. The Canton residents in Nanking had sent messages to their native province, urging that it should refrain from playing the role of a puppet. Even in Kwangsi, a much better-governed province than was Kwangtung, there were reports of resistance on the part of peasants to the conscription measures of the Kwangsi leaders.

Later, it became known that even some of Chen Chi-tang's chief lieutenants opposed his anti-Nanking move. On July 7, there was a spectacular confirmation of these reported dissensions when 21 flying officers of the Kwangtung Army deserted to Hongkong while 10 others with four planes flew to Nanchang, where they offered their services to the Central Government. The fliers who went to Hongkong issued a

scathing denunciation of the military leaders of Kwangtung and Kwangsi. They accused these leaders of being in league with Japan. Their message, issued in the form of a long joint circular telegram, said in part:

"Since his occupation of Kwangtung, the rebel Chen (Chi-tang) has imposed an unprecedented burden of taxation on the people. For himself alone, he has accumulated no less than \$100,000,000. The large amount of real estate properties in Canton and Hongkong which he owns is unparalleled throughout the country. Mo Hsiu-ying (Chen Chi-tang's wife) has established a real estate company, and Chen Wei-chou (Chen Chi-tang's brother) has often been engaged in smuggling by means of gunboats. They are competing unfairly with legitimate merchants and are making use of their wealth in manipulating the money market. Yet the Kwangtung Army has not been paid for six months, and the people are required to pay 'tens of kinds' of taxes. Chen only knows how to fatten himself, and cares nothing for the suffering of the people. He is indeed a traitor to Kwangtung and a parasite on the people.

"He has, moreover, put to death numerous innocent persons and imprisoned others without justification. He would arrest any citizen or soldier who dared to criticize his policy. The third-degree methods adopted by him are indescribable. Under such tyranny, what confession cannot be extorted? Consequently, countless people have died on framed-up charges. Since the outbreak of the present crisis, for instance, over 300 officers and men of the 6th division, over 100 professors and students of the Sun Yat-sen University, over 400 cadets of the Military Academy, as well as numerous staff members of various official organs, suspected of opposing him, have been placed under detention. Many others are being detained daily, while, by his orders, innocent persons are being secretly shot every night by the Bureau of Public Safety."

It might be added at this point that the charges by the Kwangtung airmen of Chen Chi-tang's oppression of the people were substantially correct. For five years, Chen had

been milking the province for the benefit of the private fortunes of himself, his family and his associates. These facts should be kept in mind when considering the reports that "silver bullets" had been used liberally by the Nanking leaders in buying over the subordinates of Chen Chi-tang. It has become the custom in China, especially among foreigners, to assume that "silver bullets" are the decisive factor in breaking up incipient rebellions. It may well be protested that, in this instance, there was little need for such tactics, when the people of Kwangtung themselves were determined to be rid of their oppressor.

On July 9, General Li Han-wen, the Pacification Commissioner for eastern Kwangtung, dissociated himself from the Southern movement. On the same day, General Yu Han-mou, commander of the First Kwangtung Army, against the wishes of General Chen, flew to Nanking where he conferred with Generalissimo Chiang. Other defections rapidly followed. On the 14th, two of the four gunboats of the Canton Navy deserted to Nanking.

Speaking before the weekly memorial meeting at the Central Party Headquarters in Nanking on July 12, the Generalissimo reiterated the policy of the Government of adhering to peaceful means for the settlement of the dispute with the two Kwang provinces. He stressed the importance of effecting a unified political administration and military command before the Government could turn its attention to external problems. The foundation of the nation's foreign policy must, he said, be strengthened by an efficient internal administration and, unless the internal administration were consolidated, resistance to foreign aggression was well-nigh impossible.

While recognizing the gravity of the external menace, the Generalissimo solemnly declared that the Central Government could not evade its duty of quelling internal uprising. To settle internal unrest, he continued, it was necessary that reason and common sense should both be taken into considera-

tion, but he emphasized that there should be a line of demarcation between loyalty and rebellion.

Assuring his listeners that the Central Government had during the past six months followed strictly the domestic and foreign policies as formulated by the Fifth Kuomintang Congress, Generalissimo Chiang pointed out: "We should all remember that, if our internal administration is unified and our national foundation stabilized, all Powers of the world will respect us. When China has achieved real solidarity, no nation will dare antagonize us."

Analyzing the causes behind domestic instability, Generalissimo Chiang said that it was the result of the inability of the Party leaders to stand together. The blame, he added, should not be placed on the people, who one and all loved their country. In order that home conditions might be stabilized, disputes within the Party must first be settled, and this could best be done by observing Party discipline and the laws of the State. Then, referring to the independent action taken by the two Kwang provinces, the Generalissimo stated that such a move could not be tolerated in the eyes of the law, but, he added, the Central Government has, from the very beginning, adopted an attitude of tolerance, seeking a solution of the situation by peaceful means. He, however, deplored the slogan "to unify military command under the anti-Japanese banner" used by the leaders of the two Kwang provinces to justify their action, because, he explained, unified political and military command must precede active armed resistance against alien aggression.

Facing realities, he declared, the Government would exhaust every available political means to settle the present imbroglio, but, meanwhile, he hoped that the South-western military leaders would repent of their misdeeds. On the other hand, the Generalissimo added, the Central Government was determined to uphold Party discipline and national unity and would have the courage to put down any rebellion. "We must all realize," he emphasized, "that due to pressure brought to bear from outside, it is all the more necessary that internal

uprisings should be quelled. The Central Government must not give in to the ambitious designs of a few military leaders."

The Generalissimo expressed the belief that a revolutionary government which retreats in the face of imperialistic oppression could never fulfil its mission. The reason, he explained, why the Central Government chose to employ political means to settle internal trouble was not because the Government was afraid of being faced with both internal and external pressure. It was because of past friendships which existed among all Party comrades and because of the desire to consolidate the national strength so that the entire nation might be rallied to resist foreign encroachments and accomplish the important mission of rebuilding China.

The following day, he addressed the second Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee and he replied to the motion submitted by the South-western delegates calling for an anti-Japanese expedition. The motion had already been rejected. He gave his opinion that such a proposal was submitted because the South-western leaders had never fully understood the foreign policy of the Central Government in consequence of their isolation. Even the resolution made by the Fifth National Kuomintang Congress in November, 1935, to the effect that "peace will not be forsaken by China until there is no hope for peace, and the idea of sacrifice will not be lightly embraced until China is driven to the last extremity where sacrifice is inevitable," had not been well-understood by the South-western members.

Chiang clearly stated that the maintenance of China's territorial integrity was the point at which national sacrifice and struggle would be called for. China would not tolerate any nation seeking to destroy her territorial integrity. "China," he repeated, "will never sign any treaty detrimental to her territorial integrity." If and when any nation should attempt to force China to sign any paper agreeing to the recognition of "Manchukuo," that would be the time for China to make the supreme sacrifice. If and when every available political means should fail to baulk any aggressive

designs on Chinese territory by a foreign nation, thus threatening the existence of the Chinese nation, that would be the time for China to make the supreme sacrifice.

"This, in brief," the Generalissimo said, "is the limit to China's struggle for peace and existence." Events during the past six months had convinced most people that the situation had not reached the point where there was no hope for peace. He frankly told the session that, compared with previous conditions, the past six months, indeed, gave forth a greater ray of hope for peace.

While the Fifth National Kuomintang Congress was in session, he continued, the Italian-Ethiopian war was just beginning. Naturally, world opinion was in sympathy with Abyssinia, but unfortunately to-day Abyssinia was a lost country. The defeat of Abyssinia, however, did not mean that we should not follow the path of Abyssinia in striving for the preservation of our sovereignty and independence. China would not be afraid to be another Abyssinia if that were the only way to save the nation and the race. "Though we are not afraid to be another Abyssinia," he declared, "we are not willing to be a second Abyssinia." If the entire nation and all the Kuomintang members were able to stand together solidly behind the Central Government, China would never be a second Abyssinia.

The existence or extinction of China was now in the hands of the Kuomintang, and all the Central Executive Committee and Central Supervisory Committee members particularly should shoulder the responsibility. "Are we, then," the Generalissimo asked, "to push the nation into an unwalkable path when matters have not come to the stage where there is no hope for peace? Are we to precipitate the extinction of the nation just because of one moment's impulse when the nation still has hope of salvation?" He answered these questions by saying that he was confident that all those who understood clearly the foreign policy of the National Government would not lightly take such a step. The purpose of organizing a National Defence Commission (which had been decided upon)

was that the responsible military leaders of all sections of the country would discuss those problems together. With perfect understanding and genuine co-operation one and all would be able to take up the duties of resisting foreign aggression shoulder to shoulder in the event of unavoidable eventualities.

Since the conclusion of the Fifth National Kuomintang Congress, the Central Government had spared no effort in promoting the work of national salvation on the basis of the policy previously agreed upon. Finally, the Generalissimo asked the Central Executive Committee and the Central Supervisory Committee members from the South-west then attending the Plenary Session, to communicate the policy of the Central Government to the South-western leaders.

## CHAPTER XXVI

Chen Chi-tang Expelled From Posts—South-west Council Abolished—Chen Escapes To Hongkong—General Yu Pacification Commissioner Of Kwangtung—Problem Of Kwangsi Militarists—Generalissimo's Chivalry And Generosity—No Presidential Aspirations—Fresh Japanese Demands—Counter Demands By China—Chiang Speaks Plainly To Kawagoe—Japanese Non-Plussed By China's Firmness

AT THE Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee at which the Generalissimo made his momentous pronouncement on foreign policy, Chen Chi-tang was expelled from all his posts in Kwangtung, though to save him to some extent from humiliation, he was appointed a member of the newly-organized National Defence Commission. The South-western Political Council and the South-western Executive Committee were abolished. In place of Chen Chi-tang, Yu Han-mou was appointed Pacification Commissioner of Kwangtung and he was instructed to move his troops to make effective the decrees of Nanking. Chen instructed the commander of the Second Kwangtung Army to disarm Yu's First Kwangtung Army, but it was a vain command. He also sought to obtain the assistance of the Kwangsi warlords who replied by sending some of their troops to Kwangtung, to the great alarm of the populace who feared the Kwangsi military as their oppressors of a few years before.

Defections among the Kwangtung forces now became a daily occurrence. The crowning one of all came on July 18, when what remained of the Kwangtung Air Force, after secret preparations, loaded up 62 machines with more than 160 pilots and mechanics and took off, four machines for Hongkong and

57—one came to grief in the take-off—for the Nanking lines. Eventually 56 of the machines arrived at the Central Government's air base at Nanchang, whence they sent a telegram to the Generalissimo asking him to inspect them and their machines.

Chen Chi-tang fled to Hongkong on the British gunboat *Moth*, not being willing to trust his person to one of his own naval vessels. From his hiding place in Hongkong he pleaded with the Central Government to send him on a foreign mission.

It was the obvious insincerity of the alleged aims of the Southern leaders that had rallied the people of the nation to the support of the Central Government. The net result of the Southern fiasco was really an immense strengthening of the power of the National Government, although temporarily it had been weakened in its position in North China in regard to the demands of Japan.

The Southern movement ended with the Central Government completely in control of Kwangtung practically without firing a shot. After Chen Chi-tang's flight, the Central Government sent T. L. Soong and other financial experts to reorganize the finances and the monetary system of Kwangtung.

An appreciative editorial was published in London by "The Times" on the success of the tolerant policy of the Central Government under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. It said, in part:

"An anti-climax is seldom the occasion for congratulation. This one, however, reflects favourably not only on China's leader, but on China as a whole. The country staged a fiasco which is in itself not a very glorious achievement, but with Japan alert at misinterpreting any effective action, it would have been perilous to have staged anything else and the outcome, besides strengthening the hand of the Central Government, is a healthy symptom of political sanity....in all classes of the population. The refusal to fight is a step towards national solidarity. China is to be congratulated."

It might be added that the lessons of the fiasco in the South, following so closely upon the heels of the equally

unsuccessful, but more bloody, rebellion in Fukien, are not being lost upon certain of the dwindling number of persons possessing the warlord mentality. Unless they are assisted by foreign aggressors, it is not likely that any of them will lightly undertake to challenge the might of the Central Government. The fact that the attention of the authorities at Nanking is engrossed with perplexing and difficult relations with their aggressive island neighbour is not, it has been shown, an assurance that the militarists with the warlord mentality would be safe in the future in pursuing their traitorous activities.

The downfall of Chen Chi-tang in Kwangtung Province was a portent of the fate that lay in store for the rebellious leaders of Kwangsi Province if they continued to be recalcitrant. The only question in the minds of those who had considered the dwindling fortunes of the Southern malcontents was whether the final liquidation in Kwangsi would be effected by peaceful means or as the result of a civil war which, while it would seal the fate of the Kwangsi leaders, might eventually also be disastrous to the interests of the National Government, pressed as it was by external difficulties.

After the retirement of Chen Chi-tang, the Kwangsi military leaders withdrew their troops to their own province. Immediately afterwards, the National Government confirmed them in their previous appointments, thereby giving them an opportunity to accept the new dispensation gracefully and without loss of dignity. They allowed a fortnight to pass before replying to this overture, however, and though the Kwangsi troops had been withdrawn from Kwangtung, they were still kept on a war footing. Thinking that Li and Pai might not have been satisfied with these appointments, and perhaps wished the Government to show them a greater degree of confidence by giving them more important positions, the Generalissimo secured the appointment of Pai as Chairman of Chekiang and of Li to the National Military Council. At the same time, they were removed, of course, from the positions in which they had previously been confirmed. In order,

apparently, to embarrass the Government, they then accepted the offices in Kwangsi to which they had first been re-appointed, and simultaneously moved some of their troops into Hunan.

For three weeks, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek tarried in Canton, whither he had gone shortly after the flight of Chen Chi-tang, directing the negotiations with Li and Pai and refusing to be disheartened even when the Kwangsi leaders sent their armed forces to invade the neighbouring provinces. It is worthy of note that this was the first occasion that the Generalissimo had been in Canton since he departed to lead the Northern Expedition to success. Though the weaker parties in the dispute, the Kwangsi generals proved to be difficult to deal with. Chiang, however, was ably assisted in the course of the negotiations by Chu Cheng, the President of the Judicial Yuan. The latter, accompanied by Cheng Chien, the Chief of the General Staff, and Chu Pei-teh of the National Military Council, visited Nanning in an effort to bring Li and Pai to terms.

The Generalissimo, favourably impressed by the admitted excellence of the administration of Kwangsi affairs, was not inclined to be harsh in his demands, while Li and Pai for their part seemed determined, as though conscious of Chiang's spirit of leniency, to make as good a bargain as possible for themselves and their province. In the meantime, a spirit of uneasiness pervaded the nation as the negotiations went on behind the scene, and there was more than one bitter denunciation of the Kwangsi leaders for their slowness to listen to reason.

But at last, on September 8, the terms of the final settlement of the Kwangsi problem were made public. Li Tsung-jen was appointed Pacification Commissioner for Kwangsi, Pai Chung-hsi a member of the Standing Committee of the National Military Council, and Huang Shao-hsiung, who had been appointed to a post in Kwangsi, was re-appointed to his former post as Chairman of the Chekiang Provincial Government. In addition, the following measures were agreed upon:



Paying last respects to the late General Chu Pei-teh.



1.—With regard to the work of national salvation and national defence plans, it was agreed that the Kwangsi authorities should hereafter obey and be guided by the Central Government.

2.—The existing Kwangsi troops were to be reduced to six divisions and were to be placed under the command of Li Tsung-jen.

3.—The restoration of the organization of the former Nineteenth Route Army was to be sanctioned by the Central Government. The Army was to be temporarily assigned to stations in southern Kwangtung.

4.—The Central Government would send deputies to readjust the civil and Party affairs of Kwangsi.

5.—Rigid suppression of the opium and gambling evils was to be enforced in Kwangsi.

The leaders of the former Nineteenth Route Army did not seem entirely satisfied with the settlement, and units of that organization under General Oung Chao-huan made an incursion into south-west Kwangtung and later were involved in a disgraceful outrage at Pakhoi against a Japanese citizen. This caused considerable embarrassment, but finally these units were persuaded to obey orders regarding their withdrawal. Tsai Ting-kai, the former commander of the Army, proceeded to Hongkong and later went into retirement.

Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi abided by their agreement and, on September 16, were formally sworn into office by Cheng Chien and Huang Shao-hsiung as representatives of the Central Government at the oath-taking ceremonies.

During the Generalissimo's stay in the South, an event occurred which has been described as "an occasion unique in the history of South China." The Generalissimo on September 18, proceeded by launch to Canton from his headquarters at Whampoa to attend a dinner given by Mr. Herbert Phillips, then British Consul-General there, at which he was co-guest of honour with Sir Andrew Caldecott, then Governor of Hongkong. The meeting between the Generalissimo and the Governor was marked by the greatest cordiality and has led

to a signal improvement in Sino-British relations in South China. The inspiration for the visit of the Governor to Canton came from Madame Chiang Kai-shek, who had been in Hong-kong for medical attention—another instance of her sound statesmanship.

The successful liquidation of the Kwangsi dispute was a source of tremendous encouragement to patriots throughout the length and breadth of China. Nor was the rejoicing confined exclusively to Chinese. The British Shanghai daily, the "North-China Daily News," in a leading article on this occasion declared: "General Chiang Kai-shek, endowed with greatly enhanced authority as the result of the unity now established between Canton and Nanking, can make an effective claim to confidence in his leadership by the proof that he has given of his reliance on the virtue of friendly compromise and mutual conciliation rather than on the power of military dominance.... The sage forbearance which has facilitated the settlement in Kwangsi, with honours equally divided, has happily and logically prepared the ground for such a notable advance in the national system of government."

As a result of the critical situation in South China during the late spring and summer months of 1936, the Japanese Army in North China increased its pressure. The smuggling scandal in the North abated somewhat under the pressure of adverse international opinion, but the Japanese countered by intriguing for a special taxation bureau of the Hopei-Chahar Council that would take the place of the Chinese Customs and thus "legalize" smuggling by Japanese nationals. There was also much tension on the borders of Suiyuan due to the presence of bandits and irregular troops supported by Japan's puppet state in the North-east, while at the same time there were indications of Japanese intrigues in Fukien and other southern provinces, including the abetting of the two rebellious Kwang provinces by munition sales on easy terms.

All these aggressions on Chinese territory and infringements on the sovereignty of China combined to inflame the

sentiment of the Chinese people. As a consequence, a series of incidents occurred at Chengtu, Pakhui, Hankow, and Shanghai, in which some half dozen Japanese lost their lives. Repeated orders had been issued by the Executive Yuan for the protection of foreign residents and the maintenance of local peace both to the provincial and municipal authorities, but this was without avail in the face of continuous provocation on the part of the Japanese. On September 30, similar orders, on the instructions of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, were again issued at Nanking.

The various incidents involving Japanese led to demands on the part of Japanese residents in China for "strong action." During the latter part of September, the Japanese Ambassador Shigeru Kawagoe opened negotiations with the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chang Chun, ostensibly for the purpose of a settlement of these incidents in which Japanese had lost their lives. But it quickly developed that the murders, as "The Times" (London) pointed out, "served their turn as a pretext, and the negotiations now proceeding in Nanking are cynically irrelevant to the original agenda. Japan is making fresh demands upon China."

There had been an effort to keep the negotiations completely secret and the communications were entirely oral between Kawagoe and Chang Chun, for Japan still had in mind the outcry that arose at the time of the notorious Twenty-One Demands. This is, of course, a very difficult thing to do when the interests of one of the parties do not demand secrecy. Both the Chinese and Japanese Press became filled with reports of the Japanese "demands," and these reports in turn found circulation abroad. The Gaimusho officials at Tokyo were greatly enraged and their spokesman, Eiji Amau, tried to make the Reuter News Agency the scapegoat, but Reuters neatly turned the tables by pointing out that they had merely quoted the Japanese Press.

As a matter of fact, demands were made by Kawagoe, but the Japanese Foreign Office seemed to think that by labelling them "proposals," or "suggestions," or some other term, they

could deceive the Chinese and the world at large. The mask was laid aside, however, when one of their military spokesmen referred to Kawagoe's proposals as the "stern requirements of Japan." Still, there has never been an authoritative statement either from Tokyo or Nanking as to the exact nature of the demands laid down by Kawagoe at his first and subsequent meetings with Chang Chun.

According to the despatch of one foreign correspondent at Shanghai to his head office which is as close to the truth as could be, "Kawagoe during the recent negotiations with Chang Chun presented the following seven demands: (1) complete suppression of the anti-Japanese movement, including the activities of the Kuomintang, prohibition of anti-Japanese organizations, revision of all text-books to eliminate anti-Japanese teaching; (2) autonomy of the five northern provinces; (3) revision and considerable lowering of the Customs tariffs for Japanese goods; (4) engagement of many Japanese military advisers; (5) co-operation against the Reds; (6) establishment of direct aerial communication between Fukuoka and Shanghai; (7) establishment of a Japanese Consulate in Chengtu.

"Chang Chun at the same time presented to Kawagoe the following counter-proposals: Annulment of the Shanghai Agreement of 1932, annulment of the Tungku Agreement, liquidation of the East Hopei regime, withdrawal of 'Manchukuo' forces from Chahar, and suppression of Japanese smuggling activities." Reports further added that, when he heard these desires enumerated, Ambassador Kawagoe stood up with every appearance of consternation and threatened to discontinue the negotiations. The third meeting, at which these counter-proposals were presented, ended in a tense atmosphere. The attitude of Chang Chun, it was also claimed, was definitely authorized by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. It was reported that this turn in the negotiations led the Japanese Ambassador to wish to end his conversations with Chang Chun and to open discussions with the Generalissimo instead.

Meanwhile, Generalissimo Chiang had been occupied with

affairs in the South, but the Japanese Press, taking their cue from official sources, now became vociferous in their demand that he return to Nanking to conduct the negotiations in person. Finally, the Generalissimo left Canton on September 28, flying to Nanchang whence, after a brief stop, he continued on his way to Kuling. Owing to a false report of his having arrived at Nanking, the Japanese papers in Shanghai gleefully announced that Chiang had arrived at the Capital as he had been ordered to do so by the Japanese. Later, they learned that the Generalissimo was taking a short rest at the Kuling resort, besides holding conferences there with leading members of the Government.

There is no doubt that the Japanese were taken by surprise at the unexpected firmness of the Chinese Foreign Office. It was frankly admitted on all sides that no progress had been made in the negotiations. To make matters worse, the situation was attracting unfavourable comment in the foreign Press. At this juncture, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Hachiro Arita, gave a statement to foreign newspaper correspondents on September 28, in which he declared: "All these unfortunate incidents may rightly be said to be the logical consequences of the anti-Japanese education, anti-Japanese instigation and other forms of anti-Japanese policy practised for many years, for which the Nationalist Government and the Kuomintang cannot evade their responsibility."

Arita's statement concluded by saying: "The outcome of the present negotiations can be in one of two ways only: the Japanese-Chinese relations will be either very much better or very much worse. In the existing situation they shall not be permitted to drift in the ambiguous state of affairs as has been prevailing in the past. China is now at the momentous cross-roads, to decide whether or not to shake hands with Japan. I very earnestly hope that China will grasp our hand in friendly response, whatever the difficulties she may have to surmount."

The Chinese generally interpreted Arita's statement as

meaning that China must either submit to Japan, or else fight, but, recognizing that it was possible that Arita might be trying to "bluff" them, the Chinese adopted a wait-and-see attitude. Moreover, it soon became known that the Gaimusho had despatched Kazue Kuwajima, Director of the Asiatic Affairs Bureau, with new instructions to Ambassador Kawagoe at Nanking. Japan had already asked for so much that Chinese scarcely expected that the new instructions would be stiffer; on the contrary, it was anticipated that the unexpected firmness of the Nanking Government might lead to moderation on the part of Tokyo. Kuwajima, assuming the customary fierce attitude of Japanese in speaking of Sino-Japanese issues, announced when he left Japan that "what Japan wants is not platitudes but action."

He arrived at Shanghai on October 5. On the following day, he went to Nanking and on October 7, he was on his way back to Japan. The stage was now set for an interview between the Japanese Ambassador Kawagoe and the Generalissimo, who returned from Kuling to Nanking on October 5. It was thought in many quarters that the time had now come for a "show-down" between the two countries.

On October 8, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek received Ambassador Shigeru Kawagoe at his official residence. The only other persons present at this momentous interview were Kao Tsung-wu, Director of the Department of Asiatic Affairs of the Waichiaopu, and Tozo Shimidzu, First Secretary of the Japanese Embassy. After a preliminary exchange of greetings, Kawagoe proceeded to express, in detail, his views regarding future Sino-Japanese relations and their bearing on the general Far Eastern situation. He said that, because of the intimate relations between China and Japan, immediate steps should be taken through mutual help and co-operation to work for the stability of peace in East Asia and for the welfare of the two countries. He added that it was unfortunate that during the past year incidents had happened to cause misunderstanding and misapprehension between the two nations. He declared that it was now incumbent upon the two

countries to do their utmost to remove the obstacles in the path of friendship, and to promote the co-operation that was mutually beneficial. In reply, the Generalissimo expressed his opinions in regard to the readjustment of Sino-Japanese relations. In general, he said that, from the standpoint of the situation in East Asia, a fundamental readjustment of relations between the two countries was most essential to-day. What China desired, Chiang told the Japanese Ambassador, was primarily freedom from encroachments upon her territorial integrity, and respect for her sovereign rights and administrative integrity. Therefore, the Generalissimo maintained, the discussions of all the outstanding problems between China and Japan should be based on the principle of absolute equality and mutual respect for each other's sovereign rights, as well as territorial and administrative integrity, and he believed that such discussions, carried on through diplomatic channels in an atmosphere of calm and friendliness, certainly would result in a satisfactory readjustment of the relations between the two countries.

Referring to the unfortunate incidents which had recently occurred, particularly those at Chengtu and Pakhoi, the investigation of which had already been completed, Generalissimo Chiang intimated that they would be dealt with in accordance with international usage. He also definitely informed Ambassador Kawagoe that discussions on diplomatic affairs were to be continued through the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Ambassador, stating that the views of the Foreign Minister were those of the Chinese Government.

After the meeting, Kawagoe told the Press that he was struck by Generalissimo Chiang's fervour in striving to find a way out of the crisis, as well as in seeking a general readjustment of Sino-Japanese relations. "The impression I received," he added, "is that we can trust General Chiang's sincerity in his efforts to solve the Sino-Japanese problems."

The Chiang-Kawagoe talk led to the resumption of conversations between the Chinese Foreign Minister, Chang Chun,

and Ambassador Kawagoe. These were conducted in great secrecy, even without the presence of interpreters. It was, however, reported that negotiations on October 21 were marked by Kawagoe centring his efforts upon trying to force China to accept the demand for anti-Communist co-operative plans. The plans consisted of two parts. Part 1 provided for joint military co-operation in the area between Shanhaiwan and Yenmengkwan, which meant Hopei, Chahar, Suiyuan and Shansi. It called for the organization of an anti-Communist commission to direct Chinese and Japanese forces operating against the Communists.

Part 2 related to Chinese and Japanese political co-operation against the Communists in the rest of China, which was understood to be a preliminary to a more comprehensive co-operation in the future. It called for: (1) the exchange of military intelligence, (2) the exchange of Communist prisoners, (3) the propagation of anti-Communist ideas, and (4) the prevention and suppression of Communist activities. Details for Chinese-Japanese co-operation along the lines here indicated were to be worked out between the Japanese Consul-Generals and the Chinese Mayors in various localities and given wide publicity. The Japanese idea was to let Americans and Europeans know that an arrangement for co-operation against the Communists had been made and that they should cease taking an interest in the question.

Japan's anti-Communist plan as disclosed during the meeting, China realized, would drag her into war on Japan's side in case Japan and Russia clashed. It was a mere camouflaged military and political alliance against Soviet Russia, which would certainly result in China being over-run by Japanese troops sooner or later. The plan would also lead to the suppression of all liberal phases of China's political and social life and all tendencies sympathetic towards liberal influences.

Minister Chang Chun refused to consider the demand, whereas Kawagoe insisted upon its acceptance by China. Furthermore, Kawagoe declined to give the slightest con-

sideration to China's proposals made at the third meeting—abolition of the Shanghai Agreement, the Tangku Truce Agreement and the Eastern Hopei regime; the withdrawal of so-called "Manchukuo" troops from North China and the suppression of Japanese smuggling activities—which were essential to the liquidation of the Sino-Japanese outstanding questions.

A wide divergence of views existed and the fifth meeting failed to come to any agreement. Admiral Osamu Sato, Japanese naval attaché, went to Nanking immediately after the meeting and expressed his view that a question of the utmost importance was the curbing of anti-Japanese activities and that the Communist issue was not so pressing. At the same time, General Seiichi Kita, Japanese military attaché, predicted strong Japanese action following the deadlock. This seemed to indicate that the Japanese naval representative in China had suddenly become more moderate in his attitude, whereas the Japanese military representative had continued to be provocative.

After the interview on October 21, the Japanese Embassy decided to despatch Yakichiro Suma, Counsellor to the Embassy, to Tokyo to report on the conversations and to obtain fresh instructions. A sixth meeting was held between the two conferees on October 26. In an interview at Kobe on October 28, before his return to China, Suma said: "The fundamental spirit of the instructions is that the Japanese claims have remained unchanged. There is no course other than to pursue the objects sought at the beginning." "I hope," he added, "that the Chinese will soon respond to the immutable, solid attitude of Japan in such a way as to bring the negotiations to an amicable conclusion."


Despatches from Tokyo indicated that, after a protracted discussion between officials of the Japanese Foreign Office and the War Ministry, it was agreed that every effort should be made to acquaint Chinese officials more fully with the "fair and equitable nature" of the Japanese proposals advanced for the settlement of Sino-Japanese differences. It was also revealed that Suma, while in Tokyo, had advised the muzzling

of the Japanese Press because of their references to the Japanese demands that had been made upon China.

On October 30, the Waichiaopu made three strong representations to the Japanese Embassy: the first, against the extensive manoeuvres of Japanese troops in North China; the second, concerning the forcible occupation of a Chinese house in Taiyuan by the Japanese; and the third, in regard to malicious speculations in the Japanese Press upon the assassination of General Yang Yung-tai.

The seventh meeting between Chang Chun and Kawagoe was held on November 10. Views were again exchanged between the two representatives on a settlement of the basic problems. While official communiquees issued from both sides indicated that no conclusions had yet been reached, the Chinese announcement emphasized that the Foreign Minister firmly maintained his previous position. It was reported that during the meeting Kawagoe asked for a speedy, amicable solution of the outstanding difficulties and urged the Chinese Government to give greater consideration to the actualities of the situation in order to attain this end. He declared that the Japanese were still striving for a general settlement, but conceded that they might accept a partial settlement if a comprehensive agreement was at present unobtainable.

He laid special emphasis upon military co-operation against the Communists. He suggested that Part 2 of such co-operation might be left in abeyance, but he pressed for the acceptance of the scheme as outlined in Part 1. The Japanese Army's scheme of anti-Communist military co-operation was seen to be utterly untenable, because it would open China's hinterland to the entry of Japanese troops. It was currently reported that, when the Japanese first proposed the joint front, Chang Chun replied that China would gladly accept such a scheme for the Manchurian provinces, Jehol, Yin Ju-keng's East Hopei area and northern Chahar, but that she could handle the problem unassisted in the remainder of the country. This wry humour failed to elicit an appreciative response from the Japanese Ambassador.



Visit to Hankow: the Chairman of Hupeh Province, General Yang Yung-tai in civilian dress.



The demand for Japan's special position in North China was also rejected in consideration of the fact that Chiang Kai-shek had given the nation a pledge that he intended to restore the Government's administrative authority in Hopei and Chahar. His recent conferences with leaders of Shantung, Shansi and Suiyuan indicated that these provinces were staunchly adhering to the Central Government, which was prepared to give them military, financial and political support.

As a change of tactics, Kawagoe expressed readiness to discuss minor issues first, hoping for a piecemeal settlement, but Chang Chun again rejected this procedure on the ground that, under Tokyo's instructions, the Japanese Ambassador refused to entertain China's counter-demands. Sino-Japanese negotiations had not improved up to the middle of November, 1936, and thereafter they resumed their normal state of suspended animation.

As to the results of the negotiations up to that stage, there can be no doubt that the Chinese had the better of the argument. Though the weaker party to the dispute, they had so considerably increased their military strength and had so improved relations with other Powers that they were able to resist the Japanese demands, and even had the courage to present counter-demands and protests on their own account.

Speaking of the situation in the Far East early in October, the "New York Times" commented editorially: "Repeated flagrant violations of China's sovereignty have increasingly inflamed public opinion. Under these circumstances it is extraordinary that there have been so few, rather than so many, attacks." In conclusion, the "New York Times" stated: "For the Japanese Government solemnly to ask the rest of the world to accept its aggression as justifiable is to expect too much of human credulity."

At about the same time, a leading article in "The Times" of London was equally outspoken, referring to Japan's record south of the Great Wall as not a creditable one, even from the point of view of Japanese expediency and declaring that Japan had so far obtained little for her trouble, though she

had seriously damaged her own credit with the world at large. "Though she has not got far," said "The Times," "she has got somewhere near the end of China's tether. If she persists in being overbearing and exorbitant there will come a time when China, or more accurately China's leaders, will revolt at being frog-marched any further." Speaking of Japan's present policy, "The Times" concluded: "The West will judge her by her ability to modify that policy—to correlate the spirit of her deeds with the letter of her protestations, to give China a chance. This country in particular is not unmindful of or indifferent to Japan's peculiar needs and difficulties; but Japan can expect little sympathy, and nothing more concrete than sympathy, until her much-vaunted altruism towards Asia is shown to be something better than a perfunctory disguise."

Such comment in the foreign Press, of which many similar examples could be given, shows that the foreign policy of the Nanking Government under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as the President of the Executive Yuan has been eminently successful. The attitude of the National Government of China has been so correct throughout the long period of Japanese aggression as to win universal foreign sympathy, while the recent stiffening of China's attitude has served to win additional plaudits abroad.

## CHAPTER XXVII

Chiang's National Day Greeting—No Longer A Disunited China—The Scourge Of Communism—Not Now A Real Menace—China's Progress In Reconstruction—Farmers' Burden Lightened—Improvement Of Land And Air Communications—Conferences With Northern Leaders—Chiang's Fiftieth Birthday—Unprecedented National Homage—Presentation Of Airplanes—Generalissimo's Birthday Message—Touching Tribute To His Mother

CHINA'S national independence day, October 10, popularly known as the "Double Tenth," acquired special significance in 1936 by reason of the delicate relations between China and Japan. The occasion was made an opportunity for a tremendous outburst of popular feeling. In fact, the main purpose of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's return to Nanking had been to participate in the Double Tenth festivities in his capacity as Chairman of the National Military Council and as President of the Executive Yuan.

Choosing the theme of China's unification and reconstruction, the Generalissimo issued his National Day greetings in the following terms:

"With the introduction of steamships, railways, wireless and airplanes, international relations have steadily undergone vast changes so that what takes place in one country is soon broadcast and known in all others. To the rest of the world China to-day is, therefore, no longer the *terra incognita* of the past. But it has often been rightly pointed out that if peoples have more information about China now, they have also more misinformation; China is better known, but not better understood.

"From the very start of her Republican career, China has striven to secure national unification within and international equality without, a justifiable aspiration that is inherent in any awakening nation. Issues involved in this transition from the old to the new order—based on the new conception of national and social life affecting her home government and interested foreign Powers—have given birth to such an unusually complicated situation within the country that an impartial and objective judgment from outside is not only difficult but almost impossible.

"Thus China's struggle for real national existence and for modern statehood has more often than not been misinterpreted, deliberately or otherwise. Even to-day China is still being denounced in certain quarters as a highly chaotic nation, incapable of exercising its administrative authority, unable to maintain peace and order within its territory!

"This misunderstanding on the part of certain people has caused some Powers to withhold sympathy for China's endeavours, thereby nullifying much of her effort to overcome the difficulties which long ago the rule of the Manchus had left behind.

"I think I can choose on this great day of national rejoicing no better topic than this—China's Unification and Reconstruction—with a view to clarifying whatever misunderstanding there still exists concerning China.

"The first point to which I call the attention of all foreign friends is that China to-day is no longer the disunited country of former years.

"For more than half a century before the founding of the Republic in 1912 there had been a steady weakening of the Central Authorities and a tendency toward provincial autonomy. This tendency for the provincial governments to defy the Central Government's control was accompanied by the rise to power of military commanders, whose selfish ambition for more power had repeatedly led to conflict with rivals or the Government forces, resulting in misery and disaster for the people.

"In 1927, when the National Government had just been established in Nanking, much unrest existed in different parts of the country.

"Then came Communism and with it came greater havoc and desolation, more suffering and damage. Cities and towns fell into the hands of the Communist bandits, lives were sacrificed, cultivated land laid waste; there was almost no human labour except for pillage, arson or massacre.

"Fully realizing that China could make no real progress with its programme of national reconstruction until peace was established throughout the country, the National Government of China, undaunted by the Herculean task confronting it, has ever since its inauguration endeavoured to remove all obstacles to unity and order.

"With courageous determination the Government went ahead step by step with its thorough and well-planned campaign against the Reds and other unruly elements. In 1933, Kiangsi, the stronghold of the Red Army, was retaken and gradually Hunan, Hupeh, Szechwan and Kweichow were also cleared of Communist-bandits or militarists.

"The remnant Communists, now encompassed in a few scattered regions, can be exterminated without much difficulty. At present, Communism is no longer a real menace to China.

"Unity and orderly administration through the suppression of Communist-banditry and the Fukien revolt are to-day further enhanced by bringing into the fold the Liang-Kwang provinces, which until very recently had claimed semi-independence.

"The second point is that, against great odds, China is forging ahead in the execution of her programme of national reconstruction.

"If the forcible suppression of militarism and Communism was a hard task, economic and political rehabilitation of the vast area already laid waste is one requiring even more courage and strategy, more originality and thoughtfulness. There being no effective organization among the people in the once Sovietized zones, the Government modified and intro-

duced the old system of *pao-chia* for mutual supervision, whereby joint responsibility is placed on the neighbours of all inhabitants, which makes it difficult for undesirable elements to mix among them and so lessens the danger of their being led astray in thought or in action.

"To lighten the burden of the farmers who constitute 80 per cent. of China's population, the Government promulgated mandates in 1934, pledging itself never again to increase the surtax on farmlands and abrogating burdensome taxes and obnoxious levies already in existence. More than 5,000 categories of such taxes have been abrogated, amounting to some \$50,000,000 a year.

"In recent years, the National Government has applied huge sums of money to river conservancy and to the repair and building of dykes and dams. A total of \$35,350,000 was spent in 1935 on conservancy projects alone. If this work continues one may expect much of the damage resulting from drought and famine to be avoided.

"Co-operative enterprises have been promoted, the total number reaching 26,224, of which 12,517 were established in 1935 alone. In view of their growing importance, the Ministry of Industries has added to its departments a new one of co-operatives. It also has established an agricultural credit bureau with an authorized capital of \$60,000,000 to be subscribed equally by the Government and the public. Its purpose is to utilize the combined strength of the people and the Government for the extension of credit to farmers and the distribution of farm produce.

"In the field of communications progress can be shown by statistical data. The mileage of railways has increased from less than 8,000 kilometers in 1925 to approximately 13,000 to-day; motor roads already open to traffic measure 96,345 kilometers and those now under construction 16,040 kilometers.

"Whereas in former days it took months to travel by boat or on horseback from Nanking to Canton or from Nanking to Kweiyang, the same distance may now be more comfortably covered by motor car in a few days.

"Air routes ten years ago were unheard-of in China; to-day airplanes fly regularly from Shanghai to Hankow, Chengtu, Peiping, Canton and even to Sinkiang. The amazing strides made in civil aviation can best be illustrated by the record of one company alone, the China National Aviation Corporation which carried only 354 passengers in 1929, but 10,304 in 1935.

"Nor is it in economic reconstruction alone that China has made progress; great efforts are also being made to improve the efficiency of public administration, to promote public health, to enforce compulsory education, to bring about financial reforms. Here I have merely indicated some of the most outstanding features of China's endeavours for reconstruction, but I can say without exaggeration that at no other time has China accomplished so much along all lines within a period of eight years.

"It is not my intention to boast, on this happy occasion of China's silver jubilee, of past achievements of the National Government, for there is still gigantic work left to be done. What I intend to bring out by making a brief review of past events is this: China is capable of doing great deeds by her own efforts, capable of wiping out the destructive forces of militarism and Communism, capable of undertaking constructive measures for the welfare of her people, in short, capable of setting her own house in order—provided she is given the chance to work out her destiny uninterrupted and unembarrassed.

"This chance we want and this chance we must have. To give China an opportunity for internal development is not only to render her indirect friendly assistance, but also to advance the cause of world peace because, with her peace-loving millions and her unlimited resources, China, once prosperous and strong, will be among the greatest stabilizing influences in the family of nations."

One of the most striking features of China's Double Tenth celebration in 1936 was the impressive Boy Scout review held at Nanking, on which occasion 10,000 Boy Scouts and Girl

Guides marched past the Generalissimo at the Central Stadium on the morning of October 10.

In an address to the Boy Scouts, who had assembled for the occasion from practically every province in China, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek stressed that China's unity to-day is the result of countless outpourings of blood and sweat by her 400,000,000 people and, therefore, commands the support of every citizen.

Disunity, continued the Generalissimo, has been the main reason why China has been looked down upon by other nations; why the *san-min-chu-i*, or the Three People's Principles, have not been fully realized, and why the plight of the people has been aggravated. In order that China may be saved, that China may be reborn, and that China may enjoy full equality and freedom, he emphasized, the whole country must be united first. Now that political unity has been achieved, he urged, the whole nation should pledge its fullest support to the Government, obey orders and stick to one another.

Enjoining his youthful listeners to treasure in their hearts the aspiration for national consolidation, Generalissimo Chiang said that to strengthen the foundation of unity and to realize national rebirth they must restore China's ancient virtues, which are loyalty, filial piety, magnanimity, love, righteousness and peace. With these virtues restored to the people, the Generalissimo asserted, China would be able to enjoy equality and freedom in the family of nations. What is more, he added, China in the future will be looked upon as a first-class nation.

He exhorted his audience to follow the 12 rules of conduct which were laid down by the Fifth Kuomintang Congress in 1935 for its members. Of these the first two called for loyalty and filial piety, which, in the view of the Congress, were the pillars of patriotism and domestic harmony. If every Chinese can practise the 12 commandments, the Generalissimo believed that China's lost rights can be recovered and the nation can be regenerated. He urged the Boy Scouts and Girl

Guides present to take back with them the 12 rules of conduct for the enlightenment of their parents, relatives, teachers and friends.

In conclusion, the Generalissimo, who is President of the National Boy Scouts Association, reminded his hearers of the importance of good health for, he said, we must have a strong body first before we can perform our duty toward our country.

After participating in the Double Tenth celebrations at Nanking, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, accompanied by Madame Chiang, left by air for Shanghai, whence, after a brief stay of a few hours, he flew to Hangchow. The purpose of the trip was to permit the Generalissimo to preside at the commencement exercises of the Central Aviation Academy on October 13, on which occasion he addressed the cadets.

But the trip to Hangchow was also utilized for important conferences with Han Fu-chu, the Governor of Shantung, Hsu Yung-chang, the Pacification Commissioner of Shansi, Yang Hu-cheng, the Pacification Commissioner of Shensi, Ku Ting-yuan, Secretary-General of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council and representative of Sung Cheh-yuan, and with other military and political leaders. The presence of the Northern military chiefs at Hangchow was taken as proof of their loyalty to the Central Government. Han Fu-chu, when interviewed by the Hangchow correspondent of the "Ta Kung Pao," declared that as far as Shantung was concerned both its domestic administration and foreign policy would be in accordance with the instructions of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the President of the Executive Yuan, because the province is a part of China. This was widely hailed all over China as an additional proof of the unity of the nation.

Returning to Nanking on October 19, Generalissimo Chiang again took plane on October 21, for Sian where he held conferences with Chang Hsueh-liang, acting Commander-in-Chief of the North-western Bandit-Suppression Forces; Shao Li-tzu, Chairman of the Shensi Provincial Government; and Yang Hu-cheng, Pacification Commissioner of Shensi. Later

Fu Tso-yi, Chairman of the Suiyuan Provincial Government, and Yu Hsueh-chung, Chairman of the Kansu Provincial Government, arrived at Sian for interviews with the Generalissimo. On account of the critical situation on the Chahar-Suiyuan border, much significance was attached to these interviews as they were thought to have a serious bearing on China's relations with Japan. The Japanese paper, the "Shanghai Mainichi," declared that the Generalissimo's trip was for the purpose of strengthening his influence over the troops of Chang Hsueh-liang and added that it shows that "whether he is in Hangchow or Sian, he aims solely at the unification of the nation and the strengthening of China's defences against Japan. The Generalissimo's progress towards national unification has been speedy beyond all expectations. One has only to look at his almost incredible peaceful conquest of Kwangtung and Kwangsi within four months to realize this progress."

The celebration of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's fiftieth (forty-ninth according to Occidental computation) birthday on October 31, 1936, 21 days after the celebration of the Double Tenth, was an unprecedented national demonstration. Some months earlier, a suggestion had been made on the part of some Nanking officials that the Generalissimo should be presented with airplanes on this occasion, but it had speedily become apparent that the movement to buy planes in the name of the Generalissimo had taken the form of self-dedication on the part of the people to the national cause. The Generalissimo had in their eyes become a symbol of the new-found national consciousness.

The subscription of funds to buy airplanes to be given to the National Government in the name of the Generalissimo succeeded far beyond the expectations of those who first took the matter up. Nanking alone donated 17 planes, and on October 31 no less than 55 planes were dedicated at the nation's Capital while the total number of birthday planes from the entire nation was expected to exceed a hundred.



Celebration of the Generalissimo's fiftieth birthday at Loyang.



At the presentation ceremonies in Nanking, a mammoth crowd, estimated at 200,000 people and representing one-fifth of the Capital's entire population, gathered at the Ming Palace Airdrome to witness the event. While Lin Sen, Chairman of the National Government, was speaking into the microphone and accepting the new planes, 35 of the gift planes roared overhead in two formations of 16 and 19, each sky-writing two Chinese characters "Chung Cheng," the formal name of the Generalissimo. Later another formation, this time 55 in number, swept the field one by one in single file, each dipping in salute to the central platform on which Lin Sen made his speech.

In the meantime, the Generalissimo left Sian for Loyang, Honan, where he met Madame Chiang, who journeyed there from Shanghai. The modesty of Generalissimo Chiang did not permit him to go to Nanking itself, where the festivities of the nation centred in honour of his natal day. It rained for 30 minutes just as the Generalissimo stepped off from his special train at Loyang on the 29th—the first time in many months. Consequently, the farmers were jubilant and the Generalissimo was given full credit for this event by the peasants who hailed him as their saviour.

On the evening of October 30, the cadets and officers of the Loyang branch of the Central Military Academy staged a gigantic lantern parade in honour of the Generalissimo, while on the same evening he was entertained at a dinner party by Tso Shao-tse, the head of the Academy. On the morning of October 31, some 20,000 people gathered in front of the Military Academy in order to pay their respects to the Generalissimo. For this occasion Yen Hsi-shan and Shang Chen had arrived and were present on the platform with other dignitaries when the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang arrived amid a 21-gun salute and the terrific cheers of the people present. The crowd expressed their felicitations by three bows in unison, following which Generalissimo Chiang made an affecting speech. The ceremony was concluded by Madame Chiang cutting two huge birthday cakes, which she had brought from Shanghai, and

distributing pieces to the representatives of each of the 30 organizations present.

As indicative of the feeling of the nation and the response abroad, more than 5,000 messages of congratulation for the Generalissimo from Government, Party, military, civil and public organizations in all parts of China and abroad were received by the Nanking Telegraph Office alone from October 15 to October 30. Newspapers all over the country devoted special editions to the celebration of the Generalissimo's birthday. Like the celebration of the silver jubilee of China's independence on October 10, this event also—but even more—was the occasion of a most exceptional out-pouring of the national spirit on the part of modern China, and those who witnessed these events at first hand could scarcely doubt the reality of China's long sought unity.

On October 30, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek issued a message in which he thanked his compatriots at home and abroad for their presentation of airplanes to the Central Government in honour of his fiftieth birthday. He expressed gratification over the unprecedented enthusiasm shown by the Chinese people in all parts of the country and in every corner of the world in raising funds for the strengthening of China's air force. As a private citizen, Chiang declared, he could hardly agree to the celebration of his birthday anniversary in such an elaborate manner, but as a member of the Central Government he wished to acknowledge the patriotic fervour of the Chinese people and to accept the planes on behalf of the Nation. The Generalissimo concluded his message by appealing to all the officers and men of the Air Force to take cognizance of the high hopes their countrymen placed in them to carry out the task of national salvation through the nation-wide presentation of planes. He exhorted them to do their utmost for the country by utilizing the gift planes to safeguard the independence and liberty of China.

The Generalissimo supplemented this message with a lengthy review on "Some Reflections on My Fiftieth Birthday," which follows:—

"Having devoted a good portion of my life to the cause of the Revolution, but before accomplishing one-hundredth part of the work I wish to do for my country, I find myself at the age of 50. Educated and maintained by the State for more than 30 years, I have since manhood enrolled myself in the Army and dedicated myself to the cause of the National Revolution.

"During all these years, what I ate, what I wore, and what other things I needed daily, were derived from the State, in other words, from the sweat and toil of the people. My debt to the country is great indeed.

"The hearty and inspiring spirit with which my compatriots, both at home and abroad, men and women, young and old, have contributed toward the purchase of the airplanes as a birthday present for the Government made me deeply conscious of the profound trust and great hopes that are reposed in me. Unworthy as I am, it awes me even more to think that I should be the recipient of such an honour which I know not how to repay.

"I recollect now the counsel of my teachers, the assistance of my comrades, and the heroism and sacrifice of my colleagues. They are as vivid as if they were before my eyes, and I reflect upon them with extremely mixed feelings.

"Among such deep impressions is the indelible memory of my mother who endured so much in educating and bringing up the fatherless boy. Now, while the trees by her grave have grown tall and thick, I cannot but realize how little I have accomplished and how I have failed to live up to the hopes that she had placed in me.

"The difficulties confronting the Party and the State are numerous, the misery of the people is still great, and the road to recovery is long. It makes me ashamed to think that I have allowed time to slip by without accomplishing my duty.

"While my mind is full of these unrestful thoughts, I choose at this time to make public the hardships and difficulties in which my mother endured in bringing up her family, so that the world may better realize and appreciate the position

of the helpless and the poor. I also hope that this may serve in some measure as an incentive for us to practise self-restraint and self-training, and to remind us of the great task of national salvation.

"I was born in a little village where my grandfather and my father maintained a farm and pursued their studies. Through diligence and frugality they had acquired a little wealth. My father died when I was nine years old. After that, my family had to undergo all sorts of difficulties and tribulations.

"It will be remembered that the then Manchu regime was in its most corrupt state. The degenerated gentry and corrupt officials had made it a habit to abuse and maltreat the people.

"My family, solitary and without influence, became at once the target of such insults and maltreatment. From time to time usurious taxes and unjust public service were forced upon us, and once we were publicly insulted before the court. To our regret and sorrow none of our relatives and kinsmen was stirred from his apathy.

"Indeed the miserable condition of my family at that time is beyond description. It was entirely due to my mother and her kindness and perseverance that the family was saved from utter ruin. With an iron determination she boldly undertook to save the family from its threatened fate and, with the same determination, she resolutely undertook to bring up the children in the proper manner.

"Her task was neither light nor enviable, for she had to look after everything herself. As a boy she loved me very dearly, but her love was more than the love of an average mother; she was a very strict disciplinarian. She never failed to hold me to strict account whenever I was unusually mischievous.

"Upon returning home she would ask me where I had been and what I had been doing, and when I got back from school she would question me on the lesson of the day. She taught me how to conduct and behave myself. She would make me do manual labour in order to train me physically. In a word, all her time and energy were devoted to my well-being.

"Having reached manhood, I determined to go abroad for a military education. At first many of our kinsmen and neighbours were quite surprised at, and some of them were hostile to, my decision. They certainly would have prevented me from carrying out my wish had it not been for my mother's resolute will and her efforts to supply me with the necessary funds. Later, when the general principle of our National Revolution became more deeply rooted in my mind, I decided to dedicate myself to the Party and the nation—a step which involved much difficulty and subsequent dangers. At that time, all my relations forbore from communicating with me. The only one who still believed in whatever I had undertaken to do, and did everything to help me, spiritually and materially, was my mother.

"At the time of the establishment of the Republic, I found myself at the age of 25. By then I had been able to improve our home for my mother and to gratify her wishes a little. Unfortunately, the establishment of the Republican form of government was not followed by the establishment of perpetual peace.

"Already internecine conflicts among warring militarists had occurred all over the land. In such circumstances, the application of Party principles was absolutely impossible, and for a time the cause of the Revolution seemed hopelessly lost. At this critical time, my mother again came to me with valuable advice. For a period of 17 years—that is, from the time I lost my father at the age of nine till I was 25 years old—my mother had never spent a day free of domestic difficulties. Though often anxious about my fugitive life during that period, she remained persistently calm and self-confident and regarded the reconstruction of our home as her only responsibility.

"Once she said to me: 'I had become such a poor widow since your father's death, and sometimes the conditions were so unbearable that I really did not know how to preserve ourselves. My sole conviction was that a fatherless child like you must be carefully brought up before we could expect any

success in this world. Our house must be carried on by an heir who could keep untarnished the good reputation of our family.' At another time she said: 'Such things as misfortunes, dangers, and human sufferings are of daily occurrence in every corner of the world, but in the face of these we must practise self-reliance and self-betterment in order to find a way out. Hence, the greater our domestic difficulties, the more important it is to uphold our family traditions; the worse our domestic disaster, the stronger we have to make our will. For a poor widow and a poor orphan, or anyone who is trying to support himself in this cruel world, there is nothing better than the strict observance of self-reliance and self-betterment.'

"At the first disappointment I encountered in the early days of the Revolution, my mother again came to my aid. She taught me how to make the principle of filial piety applicable to the whole nation. She told me to recall to mind how we overcame our home difficulties in the earlier days, and wished me to apply the principle in a broader sense—in a national sense—so that injustice and oppression might forever disappear from human history. She impressed upon my mind that to be merely a dutiful son does not fulfil all of the exacting conditions of the principle of filial piety; the principle demands also an unflinching devotion to the cause of the nation.

"All these good counsels were given by my mother with the purpose of guiding my life in this world. Although it has always been my ardent desire to do everything in accordance with my late mother's wishes, yet so far I have not been able to live up to her great expectations. Whenever I reflect on the conditions in which we two—a widowed mother and a fatherless son—lived in the shadow of cold realities, I cannot but pray for the day when I should be able to fulfil my mother's wishes in a worthy manner.

"Such is the great debt I owe to my country, and such is the great debt I owe to my mother. In some of my leisure moments, I have reflected upon my experiences during the past 50 years. I cannot but confess that the first 25 years of my life were beset with great difficulties. I suffered the loss of

my father, I was handicapped by the want of means, and again I was handicapped by my limited knowledge in the struggle for a better life.

"The latter 25 years were equally difficult, for upon my shoulders has fallen the great task of national salvation. All these long years of hard struggle appear to me as if they had happened yesterday. Fellow countrymen and dear comrades, it all depends upon one's own endeavour to bring back one's old glories, and, as the reflection on things gone by inevitably throws light upon the things to come, I take this opportunity to dwell a little further on the principles whereby a nation may establish itself.

"There is a proverb which says: 'From the family is built a nation.' The cause by which a family rises or falls can be equally applied to a nation. Just as with a family, a nation may be powerful at one time and weak at another. Whether a nation perishes or flourishes depends upon the endeavour and determination of its people. The past 100 years have witnessed a number of nations establishing themselves after years of hard struggle, and these nations have set us a noble example to follow. No crops can be harvested without a due share of labour, and no labour is ever denied its due reward. If we can keep on struggling with singleness of purpose, we are sure ultimately to triumph over our difficulties.

"At this point I would like to draw an analogy from my own experience. During my childhood, as I have just related, my family was in a most difficult situation, but, difficult as our situation was, and oppressed as we were by those in power, yet my mother went on boldly with her noble task of safeguarding the sanctity of her home and the supreme duty of bringing up her children. From this we may learn a profitable lesson. In our march towards national salvation, there is no difficulty too great for us to overcome if we have the courage and resolution, but I must point out that our success depends entirely upon our own efforts.

"Ever since the death of Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1925, China has encountered numerous disasters both within and without.

The country was first overrun by Communists, who almost succeeded in overthrowing the Republic and the Kuomintang. Following came a series of foreign aggressions which resulted in the loss of the Three North-eastern Provinces. In the midst of these disasters and sufferings, which covered a period of ten years, and which endangered the very life of the nation, the people began to lose confidence in their leaders and, in turn, to lose confidence in themselves. The situation undoubtedly was critical, and the crisis confronting the nation was unprecedented in our history, but in spite of this I still cherish great hope; I find despair neither in the defeat of international justice nor in our own apparent impotence.

"My hope lies in the revival of our old national traits of self-reliance, self-improvement, temperance, and self-consciousness.

"Should each and every one of us devote himself to the cause of national salvation with the same persistence and endurance as my mother showed in raising her family, it will not be long before China takes her place once more among the great Powers of the world. Should the women of the nation do their best to have their homes well-managed and their children properly brought up, I am sure their effort will contribute immensely towards the upbuilding of the nation.

"Our late Leader, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, once said that the existence of China as a nation depends entirely on following the line of her destiny. We should not imitate the superficialities of the West, nor plagiarize the Doctrine of Might of the imperialistic nations. The eight great virtues—loyalty, filial piety, kindness, love, faithfulness, righteousness, peace, and justice—are in accordance with the true spirit and time-honoured characteristics of the Chinese race. Filial piety is particularly emphasized in the testaments of our late Leader. We should, therefore, observe filial piety as one of our fundamental principles in rebuilding the nation.

"In practising the virtue of filial piety, we must strictly observe two fundamental codes of conduct. The one is to do

honour to our parents, and the other to conduct ourselves without disgrace. In order to do honour to our parents we must endeavour to improve ourselves and to follow the teachings of our forefathers. To conduct ourselves without disgrace, we must be fair and honest in our daily dealings, in order not to bring humiliation upon our parents. The Chinese nation has had a very long history and a glorious civilization. No nation can ruin us unless we first ruin ourselves. If each one of us recognizes his own weakness and endeavours to correct himself accordingly, he will have no difficulty in removing any obstacle he may encounter in life, and, if we can do this collectively, we can remove all obstacles confronting the nation.

"For my own part, I have been painfully conscious of my inability to discharge my responsibility in such a way as to fulfil the expectations of my countrymen and the fervent wish of my late mother. I am always mindful of two things—that, so long as the people are still in distress, I have not fulfilled my mother's long cherished wish, and that, so long as the task of national salvation is not yet accomplished, I shall be responsible for the distress and sufferings of the people. Therefore, I sincerely appeal to my countrymen to help me to fulfil my mother's ardent wish—to fulfil the great task of national salvation."

## CHAPTER XXVIII

Sino-Japanese Negotiations—China's Stiffened Attitude—Rejection Of Japanese *Aide Memoire*—Kawagoe Admits Opinions Changed—New Concept Of China Necessary—Invasion Of Suiyuan—Kwantung Army Aids Irregulars—Generalissimo At Taiyuan—Chinese Troops Capture Pailinmiao And Tamiao—Japanese Airplanes Active—Irregular Forces Surrender—Signal Set-back For Japan—German-Japanese Anti-Communist Pact—Reaction In China

THE two closing months of 1936 are likely long to remain memorable in China's history. For one thing the world saw a further stiffening in China's attitude towards Japan. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was firm and undisturbed as was reflected in the calm, but insistent, refusal of Foreign Minister Chang Chun to consider any proposals from the Japanese Ambassador which were derogatory to China's interests. Repeated threats of various degrees of severity that were uttered by responsible Japanese officials and officers failed to impress him.

Vice-Admiral Shimada of the Idzumo, flagship at Shanghai, publicly stated: "No more conferences and no more statements, only action now." Rear-Admiral Eijiro Kondo said, "Henceforth, Japan will not be lenient to those Chinese who regard Japanese nationals and officials as China's enemies." Lieutenant-Commander Matao Okino declared, "Our sacrifices will not come to naught. Henceforth, actions before words." Another Japanese naval spokesman said that the present crisis was more serious than the preceding Manchurian occupation of 1931.

Rear-Admiral Osamu Sato, Japanese naval attaché to the Japanese Embassy at Shanghai, informed the correspondent of the "New York Times" that the situation was rapidly worsening, saying that two Japanese destroyer flotillas, composed of eight vessels, would arrive at Shanghai shortly, and that a second and further body of reinforcements of numbers not reported were in transports *en route* to Chinese waters by the permission of the Japanese Emperor. He added: "We now realize the uselessness of continuing the present negotiations with the officials at Nanking, for they have no authority to make a satisfactory settlement."

In face of these threats Generalissimo Chiang remained undisturbed. He was frequently consulted by representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the negotiations proceeded, and repeated his instructions that some of the Japanese demands were entirely untenable. In the meantime, signs multiplied that the nation under the direction of the Generalissimo was girding itself for the expected break, and the feeling was widespread that the time had arrived when the Chinese Government could make no further concession.

The Japanese now awoke to the fact that the day was definitely past when Japan could formulate minatory demands in the confident knowledge that they would be meekly granted by China. At the end of the seventh session, a face-saving pretence was made by the Japanese in China that there had been some progress. In Japan, however, it was recognized that the negotiations had been a complete failure, and the Japanese Press and publicists were unsparing in their condemnation of the Prime Minister, Mr. Hirota, and Mr. Arita, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The "Nichi Nichi," an important and influential Tokyo paper, declared: "Bluntly, the Japanese authorities committed a glaring error of judgment at the start of the negotiations . . . The Japanese authorities are complaining of the procrastination of the National Government. The cause of the delay is not the fault of China, but that of the Japanese authorities, who are tactless and not bright

enough to know how to deal with the Chinese in their antagonism against Japan."

Arita admitted to the Japanese Cabinet on November 17 that the differences between the two countries were acute, but he believed that further parleys were still possible. Despite this effort to gloss over the situation, Gaimusho officials less than a week later were openly discussing the termination of the current negotiations for the readjustment of Sino-Japanese relations. Two Japanese admirals, Rear-Admiral Eijiro Kondo, retiring commander of the Japanese Special Naval Landing Party in Shanghai, and Rear-Admiral Seijiro Iwamura, Chief of Staff of the Third Fleet, added to the gloom by announcing to their countrymen that the Chinese were making feverish preparations for war along the Yangtze River.

The eighth meeting between Ambassador Kawagoe and Foreign Minister Chang Chun took place on December 4. Bickering immediately arose over an *aide memoire* presented by Kawagoe to Chang Chun, the latter refusing to receive it on the ground that its contents were at variance with the facts. Japanese diplomatic officials at Nanking were in high dudgeon over the return of the document, charging Chang Chun with "unprecedented insolence." They again sent the document to Chang Chun on December 5, but again it was returned to the Japanese Embassy.

Kawagoe's object was plain, though it is quite possible that his memory was more at fault than his morals. The *aide memoire* declared that an agreement had already been reached on the following points:

1. Establishment of a Sino-Japanese air service.
2. Employment of Japanese advisers by Nanking.
3. Reduction of China's tariff.
4. Control by the Chinese Government of subversive activities by Korean revolutionaries.

When it became known that the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs declined to admit that this *aide memoire* was an accurate record, a conference was held at Tokyo of repre-

sentatives of the Foreign, War and Navy Ministries at which it was decided that Japan should demand a definite acceptance of this remarkable document. No doubt Kawagoe sought to secure Chang Chun's acceptance of the *aide memoire* in order to convince Tokyo that the protracted negotiations had not been entirely without result. That would have dulled the edge of the criticism that was being turned against him. Some sympathy, or at least understanding, may be felt for Mr. Kawagoe. He had been asked to accomplish an impossible task, though he did not at first realize its impossibility. When he was Consul-General at Tientsin he was practically the spokesman of the Kwantung Army and the Japanese North China Garrison. With those powerful military forces behind him, he assumed a brusque and dictatorial attitude when dealing with Chinese officials, but, when he was appointed Ambassador, he speedily realized that at Nanking he was faced by an entirely different situation. The National Government was not to be browbeaten. Chang Chun made it clear that he was not receiving orders from a superior but was discussing matters with an equal.

Following the eighth session, a later meeting in the evening took place. That very day the Japanese Navy had landed units at Tsingtao in connection with a cotton mill strike, which proved the proverbial last straw upon China's patience. Chang Chun asked Kawagoe to call at his official residence at 7.30 p.m. The utmost constraint marked the interview between the two diplomats, and the meeting terminated in a virtual rupture, the Chinese Foreign Minister insisting that a continuance of negotiations was utterly useless while Japanese naval forces remained ashore at Tsingtao, and while the Japanese ambiguous attitude toward Suiyuan continued. The developments of that night marked a sensational reversal of positions and probabilities of a month earlier, when there was every indication that Japan would terminate the negotiations and deliver a virtual ultimatum. Instead, China apparently had reached the limit of endurance and had taken the firm and defiant stand that she would no

longer continue treating with the Japanese Ambassador unless the Tokyo Government could compel the Navy to evacuate its landed forces from Tsingtao and prevail upon the Kwantung Army to cease backing the Mongols and "Manchukuoans" in attacking Suiyuan. It was obvious that China had signified her readiness to meet force with force. The Japanese had accomplished nothing by the landing at Tsingtao beyond an intensification of the anti-Japanese sentiment in China and increased anxiety abroad over Japan's disregard of international law.

It is to Kawagoe's credit that he frankly recognized the new position. He went to Shanghai after the eighth session, and there gave an interview in which he confessed that Japan must acquire a new concept of modern China if the two nations were to come to an understanding. He said: "My own opinion on China has changed after my transfer south from the North and I have acquired a number of new ideas as the result of my stay in Nanking." He also said: "It is true that the Chinese attitude has visibly stiffened since the outbreak of hostilities in Suiyuan," but he claimed that the negotiations had not come to a rupture at the last meeting. This interview given by Kawagoe excited much favourable comment in both the Chinese and foreign Press in China. It also led to rumours of his resignation, but the spokesman at the Gaimusho denied the rumour, as to have repudiated Kawagoe would have been an open confession of the failure of Japanese policy towards China.

The failure of the negotiations was a bitter pill for Japan to swallow. Attacks were made upon the Tokyo Government, not only by the Japanese Press, but also by members of the Privy Council and the House of Peers. Foreign Minister Arita was severely censured. After Ambassador Kawagoe had left Nanking a storm of criticism of the "hush-hush" policy of the Hirota Cabinet in reference to the Government's foreign relations burst over its head. It is generally considered that the only thing that saved the Japanese Cabinet from resignation was the startling event that was soon to occur in Sian.

In the closing days of 1936, it was announced that the Chengtu and Pakhoi incidents, that had done so much to exacerbate Sino-Japanese relations, had been settled in the regular course of departmental arrangements to the satisfaction of all parties concerned. This settlement furnished an anti-climax to the long and troubled course of Sino-Japanese bickerings at Nanking and also signalized an outstanding victory for Chinese diplomacy, which from the beginning had insisted that the various incidents under review should, in each case, be dealt with on their own merits.

Developments in Suiyuan had assisted in restoring self-confidence to China. The Japanese obviously employed the negotiations as cover for further territorial aggression in North China, for, while Kawagoe was engaged in conversations with Chang Chun ostensibly to bring about a settlement of all outstanding questions in the interest of "friendship," his military compatriots were plotting for the seizure of Suiyuan. Even in the summer of 1936, before the commencement of the negotiations for the so-called readjustment of Chinese-Japanese relationship, "Manchukuo" and Mongolian irregular forces, directed by Japanese agents and equipped and even officered by Japanese, had begun to assemble in northern Chahar for the invasion of Suiyuan. At the same time, the forces of Fu Tso-yi, Wang Ching-kuo and Yen Hsi-shan assembled in eastern Suiyuan in anticipation of events. As early as August 15, 1936, a clash was reported on the Suiyuan border near Pingtichuan.

By the latter part of October, plans were well developed to invade Suiyuan along two routes by Wang Ying, the bandit leader of "Manchukuo" irregulars, and by Li Shou-hsin, the commander of the Mongolian forces. These leaders, according to despatches from the North, were to be assisted by eight military planes, belonging to "certain quarters"—a euphemism for Japan.

On November 7, 1,000 Japanese-manipulated Mongol troops occupied Pailingmiao. They attacked the Chinese lines under the cover of airplanes and tanks. The planes dropped

bombs on Chinese positions. An attack on Taolin was repulsed.

This unwarranted provocation aroused the entire Chinese nation. Popular subscriptions were raised to assist the Suiyuan defenders. Reports that the Chinese troops in Suiyuan were lacking in proper clothing and comforts were sufficient to start a movement to provide fur coats and other warm raiment for the Chinese defenders. This enthusiasm on the part of the people was attended by a corresponding worsening of relations with Japan, which was in no way lessened by the mendacity of numerous Japanese in both high and low positions, who declared that their country was in no way responsible for events in Suiyuan.

Indicating that serious developments were expected in the North-west, the Chinese Foreign Office on November 11 requested the representatives of foreign Powers, including Japan, to instruct their nationals to evacuate the provinces of Suiyuan, Ninghsia and Chinghai, as well as some districts under the jurisdiction of Inner Mongolia authorities, "because of military activities for the suppression of bandits." On November 16, Seiichi Kita, Japanese military attaché at Shanghai, admitted to a foreign correspondent that the reports that Japanese army officers had been assisting the irregulars composed of Mongols, "Manchukuoans" and bandits now massed along Suiyuan's eastern border were based on fact and that there was a plot to bring another great section of Chinese territory, comprising 117,000 square miles, under Japanese domination.

The first serious attack since July on Suiyuan by Japanese-controlled forces in Chahar was that delivered on November 15 in the region of Taolin, following an aerial bombardment by seven planes.

The planes were manned, of course, by Japanese pilots. Two of them were shot down by Chinese anti-aircraft guns ■ Hungkoerhtu on November 16. As an indication of Nanking's determination to offer armed resistance to the Japanese-inspired invasion of eastern and northern Suiyuan,

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek arrived by airplane in Taiyuan on November 17. There he held a long conference with Yen Hsi-shan and also had an interview with Prince Ah, Vice-Chairman of the Suiyuan Mongolian-Autonomy Council in regard to the defence of Suiyuan.

The visit of the Generalissimo to Taiyuan had two effects. ■ was an inspiration to Fu Tso-yi's Army and a reassurance to Yen Hsi-shan, Pacification Commissioner of Shansi and Suiyuan. In the second place, it was a plain intimation to the Japanese that the Central Government was taking a direct interest in the situation in the North and that any attempt to absorb Suiyuan would be resisted by the National Army. The Kwantung Army was left in no doubt regarding the magnitude of the task which they had so lightly and confidently essayed.

On November 18, at a meeting of 3,000 Shansi military, political and party officials, the Generalissimo declared, "We are fully prepared to cope with the situation in Suiyuan Province, and there is no need for undue alarm." He also said that the Central Government had devised adequate measures to face the invasion of Suiyuan by "Manchukuo" troops and irregulars, and urged that the crisis should be faced calmly. He commended the Shansi and Suiyuan troops for their untiring efforts to safeguard the national front line of defence.

An event which thrilled all China occurred on November 24 when Pailingmiao was captured by the forces of Fu Tso-yi and Wang Ching-kuo. This was a severe blow to the Japanese in more ways than one. It was shown that Chinese troops could meet and defeat superior numbers of Japanese trained and led Mongols and Chinese renegades. It was also a serious check to the Japanese plan to erect a barrier across the whole length of China's northern frontier. While Pailingmiao was in their hands, the Japanese had easy access to Ninghsia, where they had been extremely busy during 1936 establishing observation posts and military missions. Many documents, which were captured in the Pailingmiao Lamasery after

the fall of the city by the sudden surprise attack by the Chinese, left not the slightest doubt concerning the close connection of the Japanese Kwantung Army with the so-called "Manchukuo" and Mongol irregulars. The haste with which the special service men of the Kwantung Army fled after the fall of Pailingmiao prevented the destruction or carrying off of documents which explained in great detail the plans for the attack and capture of Suiyuan. This documentary evidence, supporting as it did what was already apparent to all, would be scarcely worth mentioning were it not for the fact that the then Japanese Premier, Koki Hirota, persisted in the pretence that the Suiyuan situation did not concern Japan. Still, to do Hirota justice, it must be pointed out that he admitted, in an interview on December 8, that there was a lack of co-ordination between the Home Government and its servants abroad, meaning by that, of course, that the Kwantung Army was in the habit of acting in accordance with its own wishes.

According to a Domei News Agency despatch published in the "Japan Advertiser" (Tokyo), an aerial battle took place on November 27, in which the Chinese planes shot down several "Mongol" craft. The Chinese planes, Domei reported, belonged to a recently organized squadron from the Central Army, comprised of planes given to the Generalissimo on his fiftieth birthday. In point of fact, this report, like so many issued by Japanese news agencies, was widely inaccurate. The Japanese planes, owing to the nature of the country, had done very little damage. Their use was evidently prompted by the desire to impress the Mongols and irregulars with the might of Japan in the air. Although Chinese planes were held in readiness in Shansi, and the preparation of landing fields and depots was rapidly pushed on, necessity for the use of the planes did not arise. The anti-aircraft batteries were well able to handle the situation.

The statements of the Kwantung Army and "Manchukuo" Foreign Office, in the form of Press interviews on November 27, which were issued in the hope of salvaging the hopeless situation, openly supported Teh Wang's invasion of Suiyuan,

and threatened China that "they would assist Teh Wang's 'Manchukuo' bands if the Chinese Army attempted to defeat them."

Replying, the Chinese spokesman at Nanking declared: "The Japanese Kwantung Army underestimates the determination of the Chinese people and Government. The time has ended when foreign nations could safely nibble away Chinese territorial fringes. If the Kwantung Army think they can, they will come in contact with Central Government forces, and, if they hope to localize the incident, they will be sadly mistaken. This would mean war."

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's speech on November 29 at the weekly Sun Yat-sen memorial service at Loyang may be regarded as another answer to the Kwantung Army's statement. He said that two important events had occurred in the past few weeks: the capture of Pailingmiao, and the conclusion of the Japanese-German Anti-Communist Agreement. The capture of Pailingmiao strengthened the conviction of the people that, if united, there would be no loss of national territory. He said, "In this sense, the fall of Pailingmiao must be regarded as a turning point in the history of the national renaissance and independence."

Prior to leaving Taiyuan for Loyang, the Generalissimo ordered permanent defensive works to be constructed along the northern frontier of Suiyuan. He and Yen issued a joint circular letter to the "Manchukuo" and Mongol irregulars, advising them to cut loose from outside influence, which aimed at instigating fighting among the Chinese themselves. "We being all Chinese," the circular said, "for what purpose are you launching attacks on Suiyuan? Are you really willing to let your children and grandchildren become slaves to other people?" The circular also appealed to them to awaken immediately from the folly of fighting their own brethren and to pledge allegiance to the Government, so that in the future they would not be condemned by the rising generations as traitors.

The inferiority of the Japanese-trained troops was further

proved when the Suiyuan defenders repulsed an attack upon Hungkoerhtu. These irregulars sustained heavy losses. Spurred on by the Japanese, they made a counter-attack upon Pailingmiao on December 5, but were again driven off after losing 500 men. As a result of these events, the prestige of Nanking and the popularity of the Generalissimo attained new heights.

On December 9, the Suiyuan troops captured Tamiao, the last important stronghold of the "Manchukuo" and Mongol forces in northern Suiyuan. This victory finally disposed of resistance to Government forces in that area. The capture of both Pailingmiao and Tamiao led to a complete demoralization of the irregular forces; some were forced into the mountains and cut off from all supplies. Defections among them now became a regular occurrence and were encouraged by the Government leaders by extending lenient treatment to those who surrendered.

Two days after the capture of Tamiao, two brigades consisting of 5,000 irregular troops and 200 officers, formerly under Wang Ying, surrendered to the Suiyuan Army. These units brought with them 12 motor trucks, four pieces of field artillery, 20 machine guns, several short wave radio sets and poison gas bombs.

The hostilities in Suiyuan, which had at first seemed to be only of local interest, had become of national, even international, importance. The world became aware that it was witnessing a preliminary trial of strength between aggressive Japan and an awakened and determined China. The process of hostilities showed that a challenge had been given to the Japanese assumption that China would eternally cringe before threats and a show of force. That challenge brought an abrupt halt to the piecemeal acquisition of Chinese territory by the Kwantung Army. More than that, the invasion provided the moral stiffening for the Chinese nation that enabled the Government leaders at Nanking to take an uncompromising attitude in the negotiations with Japan. As the leader of the Government and of the nation, Generalissimo

Chiang Kai-shek immeasurably strengthened the hold that he possessed upon the imagination of all classes of Chinese. This was demonstrated on the occasion of his fiftieth birthday, but fate ordained that an even greater tribute should be paid to him a few weeks later on Christmas Day.

Shortly before the end—or at least a temporary cessation—of the Suiyuan fighting, the conclusion of an anti-Communist pact between Germany and Japan was announced. This news was received in China with interest, not altogether unmixed with anxiety. That the pact was directed against the Soviet Union was obvious. Many Chinese publicists feared that, in an indirect way, an attempt would be made to compel China to become associated with a movement against the U.S.S.R.

The announcement that the pact had been signed was hardly unexpected. Reports that negotiations were going on in Berlin had been in circulation for over 12 months. Signs were not wanting that the two nations felt that they had natural affinities. Fuehrer Hitler went so far in 1935, in one of his pronouncements on the relative value of Aryan and non-Aryan peoples, to make a special exception in favour of the Japanese. When, finally, on November 26, 1936, the news was published that the two nations had signed an agreement, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Hachiro Arita, is reported to have been so overcome by emotion that he hugged the picture of Adolf Hitler, the Nazi Fuehrer, in his ecstasy of joy. There were also gestures between Japan and Italy, looking towards the recognition of the mutual conquests of each country in Manchuria and Ethiopia, but Italy did not join in the anti-Comintern pact, at all events, openly.

The German-Japanese treaty not only aroused the gravest apprehensions in China; it was not well received either in America or Great Britain. "The Times" (London) was most outspoken in its criticism of Japan, saying that Japan's latest move could not fail to arrest the recently noted abatement of Russo-Japanese tension, while her new affiliations would enhance the anxieties of those who see disaster looming in the

vicinity of Russia's western flank. Japan, "The Times" added, has gained two new friends whose penchant for "recognizing obvious realities" does not extend to accepting the axiom that signatures to international agreements are binding. In doing so, she has exacerbated her relations with Russia, jeopardized her own freedom of action and apparently obtained no considerable compensatory benefits. She has also, concluded "The Times," prejudiced the prospects of an Anglo-Japanese rapprochement, the desirability of which she has been wistfully emphasizing for some time past, for it is no part of British policy to be committed to entanglements involving adherence to doctrinal groups.

Nor were all the Japanese as happy as Foreign Minister Arita when they heard about the German-Japanese anti-Comintern pact. The "Nichi Nichi" pointed out that the new agreement would encourage a rapprochement between China and the Soviets, while Japan's endeavours to promote friendly relations with Great Britain and the United States could not be expected to take a smooth course. Even Foreign Minister Arita, when explaining his conduct of the nation's foreign affairs before the Privy Council, admitted that Sino-Japanese relations had taken a turn for the worse after the Japanese-German agreement.

Both Japan and Germany hastened to explain to a suspicious world that there were no secret clauses in the pact between the two countries, but this action on the part of the two governments did not appease public opinion abroad, where the idea quickly took root that the agreement was simply a façade to conceal ambitions for further territorial aggrandizement on the part of Germany and Japan, with Italy possibly a partner in the not-distant future. Certainly, the new Fascist bloc, ill-defined as it may be, was a great shock to China which had cultivated friendly, and even intimate, relations with both Germany and Italy.

In order to allay popular feeling and, if possible, to prevent the situation from resulting in a worsening of the relations of China with the two great European nations,

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek publicly expressed the belief that the German-Japanese anti-Red pact would not alter the diplomatic position of the two countries or the general situation in the Far East. He diplomatically added that he did not believe that there was any secret military alliance between the two countries and did not think that Germany could afford to ignore entirely the friendship of China and other countries. At the same time, he pointed out, the suppression of the remnant Communists in the North-west was exclusively China's domestic affair and would never be affected, or its process hampered, by outside influences or international politics.

There has never been any question of the hostility of the National Government towards the Chinese Communists, but the action of Japan in demanding the right to assist China in the suppression of the Reds at the time of the Chang Chun and Kewagoe negotiations, and the subsequent German-Japanese anti-Comintern pact, have led many conservative Chinese to wonder if it would not be well to come to an understanding with the Chinese Communists in the North-west in order to enable the Government to meet more effectively the external menace from the aggressions of Japan. The anti-Red pact that Japan so persistently urged upon the Nanking Government is considered by most Chinese as nothing less than an attempt to make China join hands with Japan in a war against Russia. Chinese, of course, have absolutely no desire to help Japan fight that country's battles. Indeed, if a choice must be made, it is likely that the average Chinese would prefer a partnership with the Soviet Union, particularly so at the present time when such an alignment might also place China in the same camp with France and Great Britain and even the United States. This feeling among all classes of Chinese found dramatic expression during and after the *coup* which took place at Sian on December 12.

## CHAPTER XXIX

Generalissimo And North-eastern Army—Warnings Rejected—Early Morning Coup—Generalissimo's Temporary Escape—Capture And Removal To Sian—Rebels' Eight-Point Programme—Government Takes Prompt Action—Country Bewildered And Indignant—Chang Hsueh-liang Cashiered And Punitive Expedition Ordered—Donald Flies To Sian—Chiang Ting-wen Sent To Nanking—Suspension Of Hostilities—Attitude Of Japan

WHILE satisfied with the successful military operations in Suiyuan against the invaders with Japanese backing, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was not so happy about conditions in Shensi and Kansu. The anti-Communist campaign, which had been entrusted to Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, was not going well. In the spring of 1936, the Communists had forced their way into Shansi and had caused serious trouble before they were driven back by Central Government and provincial troops. A large number of the Reds made their escape from Shansi and re-established themselves in the north of Shensi. Sinister rumours of fraternization between Chang Hsueh-liang's troops and the Communists became so insistent that they could not be disregarded.

On November 24, Chang informed the Generalissimo that the situation at the front was tense, and asked permission to interview him at Loyang. He flew by plane to Loyang on December 3, and presented a lengthy verbal report. Against the advice of his subordinates, the Generalissimo left Loyang for Sian the following day, determined to straighten out the complicated situation and, at the same time, to direct the bandit-suppression campaign. On his arrival at the airfield in Sian, he was met by several hundred officers of the North-

eastern Army who intimated that they wished to present their view on the anti-Communist campaign. The Generalissimo told them to communicate with him through Chang Hsueh-liang. This was the first open sign of the dissatisfaction of the North-eastern Army with the Government's policy of continuing operations against the Communists.

At Sian, Generalissimo Chiang held several conferences with the senior officers concerning the anti-Communist campaign. Being convinced that the spirit of the North-eastern Army would not permit of the prosecution of the campaign to a successful issue, he appointed General Chiang Ting-wen (this officer is not related to the Generalissimo) as Commander-in-Chief of the North-western Bandit-Suppression Forces for Shansi, Shensi, Ninghsia and Suiyuan. Rumours immediately began to spread among Chang Hsueh-liang's troops that he was to be demoted; that his Army was to be split up, and some divisions transferred to Fukien. In the meantime, the Generalissimo was warned that it would be unsafe for him to continue staying at Hua Ching Chih (Lintung) about 15 miles from Sian, and he was advised to return to Loyang. As he had implicit confidence in Chang Hsueh-liang, he threatened the intelligence officers who gave him the warning with dire punishment for spreading unfounded rumours.

He stayed on at Hua Ching Chih in perfect tranquillity and saw Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng daily without feeling the least distrust of them. Hua Ching Chih, in which he made his headquarters, is a hot spring resort, with a mountain behind serving as its background. The Generalissimo, while visiting Sian, always chose this as his place of residence, both for its scenic beauty and for its good mountain air. The house that he occupied is located at the foot of the mountain. For his protection he had with him only a score of his own bodyguards, who were assisted by 50 gendarmes. Chang Hsueh-liang sent one battalion of his bodyguard to give further protection to his chief. These were stationed in the outskirts of Hua Ching Chih.

On the evening of December 11, the Generalissimo gave a dinner to which both Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng were invited. Yang did not come, on the plea of being himself the host at a dinner that night, but Chang put in an appearance. The dinner was over by nine o'clock, and Chang left Hua Ching Chih shortly after. Before leaving, he introduced to the Generalissimo ■ Colonel Sun Ming-chiu, whom he said he wished to send to the front to undertake special work and to whom he wished the Generalissimo to address a few words of encouragement. The Generalissimo, without knowing the real reason why Colonel Sun was there, spoke to him encouragingly as requested. Later, it was learned that Colonel Sun had been entrusted by Chang with the formidable task of imprisoning the Generalissimo. Sun led the troops which surrounded Hua Ching Chih only seven hours later.

Before retiring to rest on December 11 the Generalissimo gave the finishing touches to his plans for breaking the power of the Communists once for all. From the reports of his intelligence officers, he knew that the morale of the Communists had been greatly weakened. They had been harried from place to place, and were now bottled up in a part of the country which was barely able to support them. One crushing blow would remove the sole remaining obstacle to China's unification. Plans to administer that blow had been completed, and the Generalissimo retired to rest in the confident belief that ■ period of three or four weeks would see the end of the anti-Communist campaign.

The dramatic happenings of the following day may well be given in the Generalissimo's own words\*:

"At 5.30 a.m., when I was dressing after my exercise, I heard gun firing just in front of the gate of my Headquarters.

\* This quotation with others which follow is from the diary kept by the Generalissimo during his detention at Sian. Excerpts from the diary, with the story of Madame Chiang Kai-shek's experiences concerning the detention, have been published by the China Publishing Company under the title "Sian: A Coup d'Etat."

I sent one of my bodyguards to see what was the matter, but as he did not come back to report I sent two others out and then heard gun firing again which then continued incessantly. Thereupon, I felt that the North-eastern troops had revolted. On this visit to Shensi I had only my personal bodyguards and 20 uniformed soldiers. The soldiers who had been put on guard duty outside my Headquarters were Chang's bodyguards. Presently Lieutenant Mao sent a messenger to report that a mutiny had broken out and that they had already reached the second gate, but that from telephone communication with the barracks behind the mountain he learned that there was nothing untoward in evidence. I asked where Lieutenant Mao was and was told that he was at the front compound near the bridge directing the bodyguard. The messenger said that Mao begged me first to proceed to the mountain at the back of my quarters. I asked what the mutinous troops looked like, and was told that they had on fur caps and belonged to the North-eastern troops.

"Accompanied by Tso Pei-chi, one of my own guard officers, and Chiang Hsiao-chung, an A.D.C., I started for the mountain at the back of the house. After crossing the Fei Hung Bridge we found the eastern side-door securely locked and the key could nowhere be found. We then scaled the wall which was only about ten feet high and not difficult to get over, but just outside the wall there was a deep moat, the bottom of which was about 30 feet below the top of the wall. As it was still dark, I missed my footing and fell into the moat. I felt a bad pain and was unable to rise. About three minutes later I managed to stand up but walked with difficulty. After having walked several tens of paces we reached a small temple, where some of my bodyguards were on duty. They helped me to climb the mountain.

"At that time I was under the impression that the mutiny was local, that only a section of the troops at Lintung had mutinied, possibly at the instigation of the Communist bandits, and that it was not a preconceived plot planned by Han-ching (Chang Hsueh-liang). I also thought that if the whole of the

North-eastern Army was in revolt, my Headquarters would have been completely surrounded. The absence of mutinous troops outside the wall further convinced me that the mutiny was local. I believed that if we could cross the hill and wait for daybreak, the trouble would be over. On the eastern side of this hill there was no path, but we considered it was not safe to go west, as we might meet the mutinous troops on that side. So we proceeded east. There were precipitous cliffs on which we fumbled about for a hold as we climbed.

"After about half an hour we reached the mountain top and sat down on a piece of level ground for a short rest. I sent a bodyguard to a cliff before us to reconnoitre. Presently gun firing was heard on all sides. Bullets whizzed by quite close to my body. Some of the bodyguards were hit and dropped dead. I then realized that I was surrounded, that the mutiny was not local and that the whole of the North-eastern troops took part in it. So I decided not to take shelter, but to go back to my Headquarters and see what could be done. I walked down the mountain as quickly as I could. Halfway down the mountain I fell into a cave which was overgrown with thorny shrubs and in which there was barely enough space to admit me. I felt exhausted. Twice I struggled to my feet but fell down again. I was compelled to remain there for a rest and to wait further developments.

"As the day gradually dawned, I could see from the cave that the Lishan Mountain was surrounded by a large number of troops. Then I heard the detonation of machine guns and hand grenades near my Headquarters. I knew that my faithful bodyguards at the Headquarters continued their resistance and that the rebels were using artillery to attack them. It was about nine o'clock, after which time no more firing could be heard. The rebels sought for me. Twice they passed the cave in which I took cover, but failed to discover me.

"About 20 or 30 feet from my refuge I heard someone hotly arguing with the rebels. It was Chiang Hsiao-cheng's voice. The rebels made a more thorough search. I heard one of the mutinous soldiers above the cave saying:

"Here is a man in civilian dress; probably he is the Generalissimo." Another soldier said; "Let us first fire a shot." Still another said: "Don't do that." I then raised my voice and said: "I am the Generalissimo. Don't be disrespectful. If you regard me as your prisoner, kill me, but don't subject me to indignities." The mutineers said: "We don't dare." They fired three shots into the air and shouted: "The Generalissimo is here!"

"Sun Ming-chiu, a Battalion Commander of Chang Hsueh-liang's Bodyguard Division, then approached me. He knelt before me with tears in his eyes and requested me to go down the mountain. Then I knew that the soldiers attacking the Headquarters belonged to the 2nd Battalion of Chang's Bodyguards. Sun accompanied me down the mountain. When we reached my Headquarters I intended to go in for a rest. I saw through the doorway that things were in great disorder and the ground was strewn with dead bodies. Sun asked me to go by motor car to Sian. He said that my room was already in a state of confusion, and that he had received orders from his superiors to invite me to Sian. I ordered Sun to find the Deputy Commander (Chang Hsueh-liang), who he said was in Sian waiting for me. He added: "We don't dare to mutiny against our superior officers; we wish to make a personal representation that Your Excellency will kindly grant our request." To this I shouted in anger: "Hold your tongue, you rebels! If you want to kill me, kill me right now!" Sun and the Commander of the 2nd Brigade of the 105th Division saluted once again and requested me to board the car for the city. As I wanted to see Chang Hsueh-liang and find out from him what all this meant, I entered the car.

"Sun Ming-chiu and the Brigade Commander helped me into the car. Tan Hai, the most trusted A.D.C. of Chang Hsueh-liang, sat with the chauffeur. The car went straight to Sian. When nearing Tungkwan (the East City Gate), I saw Chang's personal car, and the Brigade Commander told me that the Deputy Commander was coming. When the car approached us, Chang was not in it, but he had sent an officer

who had been instructed where I was to be taken. My destination was to be the New City Building, which is the Pacification Commissioner's Headquarters at Sian, occupied by Yang Hu-cheng. A feeling of doubt arose in my mind. As I understood it was the North-eastern Army which revolted and besieged my Headquarters, why then should I be sent to Yang's place? By that time the car reached the East Gate. I was further surprised at seeing the guards wearing armlets of the Seventeenth Route Army (Yang's Army). I then thought that as Yang did not attend my dinner of the previous night, he must have been detained by Chang. I also believed that the high officers of the Central Government at Sian must have met with the same fate, and that the armlets of the Seventeenth Route Army worn by the soldiers had possibly been taken from Yang's soldiers after being disarmed by Chang's men and were used to conceal their identity. Yang is an old comrade of our Party and has been in long association with the Revolutionary Movement. It was my strong conviction that he took no part in the revolt. We reached the New City Building at ten o'clock."

The Generalissimo's bodyguards and the gendarmes had resisted the attacks of Chang Hsueh-liang's troops for nearly an hour. More than 40 of them were killed and wounded. Among those killed while resisting the mutinous soldiers was Chiang Hsiao-hsien, in charge of the Generalissimo's bodyguards, while Chien Ta-chun, chief of the Generalissimo's staff, was wounded.

While Chang Hsueh-liang's troops surrounded Hua Ching Chih, attacked the Generalissimo's bodyguard and searched for him, Yang Hu-cheng's soldiers rounded up 17 other high officials and officers of the National Government who happened to be in Sian at that time, and put them under virtual arrest. They included Chen Tiao-yuan, President of the Military Advisory Council; Chiang Tso-ping, Minister of the Interior; Shao Li-tzu, Chairman of the Shensi Provincial Government; Chiang Ting-wen, the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of the North-western Bandit-Suppression

Forces for Shansi, Shensi, Ninghsia and Suiyuan; Chu Shao-liang, Pacification Commissioner for Kansu; Chen Cheng, Administrative Vice-Minister of War; Chen Chi-cheng, Bandit-Suppression Commander on the Honan, Anhwei and Kiangsi borders; Chiang Fang-chen, former President of the Paoting Military Academy; Wei Li-huang, Field Commander of the Anti-Red Forces in the North-west; and Shao Yuan-chung, Chairman of the Party History Compilation Committee, who was later killed during the coup.

The grave news became known in Nanking at 3.50 p.m. on December 12, when the Government received a telegram from Fan Sung-fu, an army commander at Tungkwan, transmitting a message from Chang Hsueh-liang from Sian in which the latter reported a mutiny at Hua Ching Chih and the disappearance of Generalissimo Chiang. Later, it was learned that Chang and Yang Hu-cheng, having failed to find the Generalissimo after several hours' fruitless search, sent Fan the above-mentioned telegram.

Half an hour later, Ho Ying-chin, Minister of War, received a circular telegram from Sian which threw further light on the situation and revealed its seriousness. The circular telegram bore the names, in the following order, of Chang Hsueh-liang, Yang Hu-cheng, Chu Shao-liang, Ma Chan-san, Yu Hsueh-chung, Chen Cheng, Shao Li-tzu, Chiang Ting-wen, Chen Tiao-yuan, Wei Li-huang, Chien Ta-chun, Ho Chu-kuo, Feng Chin-tsai, Sun Wei-shih, Chen Chi-cheng, Wang I-cheh, Fan Yao-huang, Tung Ying-ping and Miao Cheng-liu. At least 12 names which appeared in the telegram were forged as the officers concerned did not give their consent to the use of their names, but had, in fact, been made prisoner in Sian.

After referring to the loss of the North-eastern Provinces, and the conclusion by the Powers of new alliances "at the expense of the Chinese nation and race," the circular telegram suggested that the leaders of the Central Government should have taken advantage of the fighting in east Suiyuan to encourage the people and soldiers to start a national campaign of resistance. Instead of doing this, the authorities who are

conducting foreign affairs had still endeavoured to effect a compromise. "As comrades-in-arms for many years," the telegram further stated, "we could no longer sit idle, being compelled to give our last advice to the Generalissimo. We will assume the responsibility for his safety, and at the same time will urge him to reconsider his policy."

Following is the eight-point programme, which the telegram claimed was unanimously advocated by the military and civilians in the North-west:

"(1) Reorganization of the Nanking Government and admission of all parties and cliques to shoulder the responsibility of national salvation.

"(2) Cessation of civil warfare.

"(3) Immediate release of the leaders of patriotic bodies arrested in Shanghai.

"(4) Release of political offenders throughout the country.

"(5) Guaranteeing the people's liberty to hold meetings and organize associations.

"(6) Giving a free hand to the people's patriotic movements.

"(7) Faithfully carrying out the Will of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

"(8) Immediate convocation of a National Salvation Conference."

"This eight-point programme," the telegram explained, "represents our policy for national salvation as well as that of the military and the civil population in the North-west. We hope that you will respect public opinion and accept our programme, thus enabling the country to survive and rectify its past mistakes. With righteousness on our side, we need not look back. All we hope is to realize this policy and to help to serve the country. Whether we have acted rightly or have committed a crime, we leave our fellow countrymen to judge."

Having made the Generalissimo prisoner, Chang Hsueh-liang attempted to lay his arguments before him, but without success. On the first day of his captivity, when Chang

addressed him as "Generalissimo," Chiang Kai-shek retorted: "Since you call me Generalissimo, then you are my subordinate. To-day you can treat me only in one of two ways. If you recognize me as your superior officer, you should immediately escort me back to Loyang; otherwise you are a rebel. If I am in rebel hands, then you can immediately kill me. Besides this there is nothing more to be said."

Upon receipt of the dramatic news, the Central Government at 11.30 o'clock on the same evening called a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee and the Central Political council, and at both meetings resolutions were unanimously passed providing that H. H. Kung was to act as President of the Executive Yuan, that the number of the members of the standing committee of the National Military Council was to be increased from five to seven and that Feng Yu-hsiang and the members of the standing committee were to be responsible for the affairs of the Council. Ho Ying-chin was to take charge of the movement of troops; Chang Hsueh-liang was to be deprived of all positions and referred to the National Military Council for punishment, and all of his troops were to be turned over to the Council for control and direction. Dr. Kung and Madame Chiang had rushed from Shanghai to Nanking the same night by express. The following day, a mandate was issued dismissing Chang Hsueh-liang from his post as acting Commander-in-Chief of the anti-Communist forces in the North-west and from all other appointments, and the National Military Council was ordered to take disciplinary action against him.

Bewilderment and indignation swept over the country when it became known that the Generalissimo had lost his freedom in Sian. The telegraph offices were swamped by indignant protests to Sian from political and commercial organizations and leaders throughout the country demanding the immediate release of the Generalissimo. It was not alone the people of China—who had just been rejoicing over the nearest approach to national unity reached since the establishment of the Republic—who were so suddenly plunged into

dismay. Europe and America turned from the consideration of their own grave problems to watch, with anxiety and sympathy, the developments of the tragic situation in China.

The outstanding feature of the situation was that public opinion was solidly behind the Government. Despite the fact that the statement of Chang Hsueh-liang and his associates on anti-Japanism might be expected to win wide-spread support, since large elements of the population had been restively demanding an anti-Japanese war, even these patriots looked askance upon the *coup d'état*, taking the attitude that internal disruptions only defer the day when China can face Japan as an equal.

Once the news of the detention of the Generalissimo was confirmed, the next question that occupied the minds of the people was whether he was still living. The painful anxiety was increased by reports issued by the Japanese news agencies and papers in China that the Generalissimo had been assassinated. Telegrams from Chang Hsueh-liang on December 13, however, clearly indicated that the Generalissimo was safe. In his message to Dr. Kung, Chang said: "I love the Generalissimo as much to-day as eight years ago. I assume full responsibility for his safety and will not allow any injury to be done to him." In his message to Madame Chiang Kai-shek, he declared, "All my life I have not once proved myself ungrateful. I can swear this before Heaven. Please do not feel anxious about the Generalissimo."

On the third day, Chang informed the Generalissimo: "We have read your diary and other important documents, and from them have learned the greatness of your personality. Your loyalty to the revolutionary cause and your determination to bear the responsibility of saving the country far exceed anything we could have imagined. You have blamed me in your diary for having no character? I now really feel that this may be so. Your great fault is that you have always spoken too little of your mind to your subordinates. If I had known one-tenth of what is recorded in your diary, I would certainly not have done this rash act. Now I know very clearly that my former views were wrong."



**Madame Chiang Kai-shek at Hangchow planting a peach tree seedling sent across the Pacific in a Clipper plane.**



Ever since his youth, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has kept a diary in order to cultivate the habits of consistency and self-correction. For the past 20 years he has never omitted to make an entry for a single day. Unfortunately, several volumes of his diaries were lost during the vicissitudes of the East River campaign in Kwangtung. Besides important daily events and his remarks on books he has read, the diaries also record his own questioning of himself as to whether he was too rash in temperament, too severe in dealing with his subordinates, and similar self-examination.

Upon his discovery of his Chief's magnanimity and benevolence toward him and his officers, Chang Hsueh-liang felt that his responsibility for the safety of the Generalissimo became greater than ever. More and more he realized that the office of the Pacification Commissioner where the Generalissimo had been living was not a safe place. He had already spoken to the Generalissimo on the subject the preceding day, but the latter refused to move to new quarters, saying that he would prefer to die in an official headquarters than elsewhere, as befitting his official rank.

In the meantime, Mr. W. H. Donald, a close friend of the Generalissimo and Chang Hsueh-liang, flew to Loyang on his way to Sian. On the evening of December 13, he received a wireless message from Chang Hsueh-liang assuring him of his welcome. The next morning he proceeded to Sian by airplane, and at 5.30 p.m. Nanking received a message from him saying that he had seen the Generalissimo who was well.

With Donald, Chang Hsueh-liang called on the Generalissimo on the afternoon of December 14 and, with his assistance, succeeded in overcoming the Generalissimo's refusal to move to new quarters which were nearer to Chang's residence. Here the Generalissimo was protected by Chang's own body-guard instead of Yang Hu-cheng's troops, who were regarded as untrustworthy. Hitherto he had talked little to Chang about the eight-point programme, but in the new quarters the following conversation between the Generalissimo and Chang Hsueh-liang took place. The Generalissimo told Chang:

Whatever proposals they might have and, however good the proposals might sound, their conduct in effecting the coup was absolutely wrong, and nobody could believe in their sincerity nor support their proposals. The diary proceeds:

"Chang further explained the reasons for their eight proposals and wanted me to consider them. I said I had determined to sacrifice my life rather than sign any document while under duress and had thought over the situation very carefully. At the former place of confinement I had already told him about it; why should he still be unable to understand my position? He should know that although he is able to make a captive of my body, he could never break my will-power. I could not possibly yield on any of these points, nor even listen to their proposals until I am back in Nanking. There was no use for them to talk further.

"Chang said that I was too despotic, and that even as a simple citizen he should have a chance to express his views about the affairs of the nation.

"I told him that I am bearing now the responsibility of the life or death of the nation, and all loyal citizens should obey the orders of the Central Authorities as well as those of their leader. If they captured their leader and tried to compel him to do this or that, could they be still considered as citizens?

"'Besides,' said I, 'you are a military officer, and cannot enjoy the same privileges of a common citizen. All those who try to endanger the fate of the nation are my enemies as well as the enemies of the people. If you want to assume the rights of a private citizen, you should express your opinion in the People's Convention, or the local legislative bodies. In the present political and party system of organization, you can also present your proposals to the Central Authorities. Instead, you have taken part in a mutiny, feel no remorse about your wrong-doing and try to cover up your own tracks by making these so-called proposals. All this is entirely wrong. In short, before I go back to Nanking, there can be no discussion about your terms or proposals.'

"Then Chang asked if, after my return, their proposals might be brought up before the Central Authorities.

"I replied that I would allow them to bring the matter up, but at the same time I must say that I could not agree with their proposals.

"If you do not approve of them," said Chang, "what then would be the use of bringing them up?"

"I said the Party has its rules and its discipline, and I could not decide alone, but decisions must be made by majority vote.

"Chang remained silent for a long while, and then said, 'You, the Generalissimo, certainly have a very high character, but there is one defect, namely, that the Generalissimo's thinking is too old and too much inclined to the right.'

"I asked him what he meant by 'old,' 'too much to the right.'

"He seemed to be unable to reply, but after a while he said that the books I read are such as the writings of Han Fei and Mo Ti\* which are certainly too old.

"I don't know how many new books you have read," said I, "nor what you consider as new books. If you consider Karl Marx's 'Das Kapital,' or books on Communism, as new books, then you may ask me questions about them, and I will discuss them with you in detail. You should know that one's spirit is not new or old according to the books one reads. What you consider as new books I had already read many times some 15 years ago."

"After a long while Chang mentioned another thing as an example. He said, 'You always have in your head such men as Yo Fei, Wen Tien-hsiang and Sze Ko-fa' \*\* and are therefore behind time in your mentality. Why do you insist upon sacrificing yourself for the sake of principles and not think of the possibility of achievements? I think you are the only

\* Two philosophers of the Warring Nations Period.

\*\* All three are well-known characters in Chinese history who sacrificed their lives for the nation.

great man of this age, but why won't you yield a little, comply with our requests, and lead us on in this revolution so that we may achieve something instead of merely sacrificing your life? In our opinion, to sacrifice one's life is certainly not a good plan, nor the real object of a revolutionary.'

"I was surprised at his wrong reasoning, and told him that I considered his words very strange. He should know that revolution meant sacrifice, and not speculation for benefit. Sacrifice and achievement are one and the same thing. Our Leader said that one should undergo the supreme sacrifice if one could not attain one's aim, which shows that he, too, did not consider the two things as different.

"To tell you the truth," I said, "my sacrifice will be my achievement. On the day that I sacrifice my life for the sake of principle, the Revolution will be a success. You have not read the Leader's Lecture on Spiritual Education, in which he said that the country would live when he died, and that it would die if he lived simply for his own sake."

"He confessed that he had not read these statements, and while he could easily understand why the country would perish if our Leader had tried to save his own life, he could not appreciate the meaning of the nation living when the Leader dies.

"I sighed, and said, "You really have not learned the great principles of revolution; hence you commit such serious blunders. If I should try to save my life to-day and forget the welfare of the nation and the question of life and death of the race, or if I become afraid in the face of danger, my character as a military man will be destroyed, and the nation will be in a precarious position. This means that the nation will perish when I live. On the other hand, if I stand firm and would rather sacrifice my life than compromise my principles, I shall be able to maintain my integrity till death, and my spirit will live forever. Then multitudes of others will follow me, and bear the duties of office according to this spirit of sacrifice. Then, though I die, the nation will live. So if anyone wrongly thinks that he can manipulate national affairs by capturing me and endangering my life, he is a perfect fool."

"Chang saw that he could not compel me to do anything, and retired in silence."

Meanwhile, the Lunghai Railway placed 100 trains at the disposal of the military authorities for the transportation of troops to Sian for the rescue of the Generalissimo while the Tientsin-Pukow Railway provided 60 trains. In fact, the military showed most surprising activity; within a few hours of the receipt of the grave news a portion of the Government's troops stationed east of Tungkwan, an important strategic pass, had passed through it and got to the west of Tungkwan and at the same time had disarmed, without resistance, Chang Hsueh-liang's heavy artillery regiment at Loyang. On the same day, Feng Chin-tsai, a subordinate of Yang Hu-cheng, in a circular telegram pledged his loyalty to the Government. This move on his part resulted in the loss of more than 20,000 soldiers to Yang Hu-cheng.

After waiting for three days, Hu Tsung-nan and 170 military officers, not having heard any news referring to the possible release of the Generalissimo, issued a circular telegram urging the Central Government to launch a punitive expedition against Chang and his associates without delay. They felt for the Generalissimo the affection of children for their father. Many of them were his former students at the Whampoa Military Academy at Canton. Nor were the people less anxious for the liberation of the Generalissimo. Prayers were offered in many churches throughout the country for the early return of the Generalissimo to Nanking. Lamas and Buddhists also interceded with Heaven on his behalf. Men went about their business preoccupied and gloomy, and students wept when they discussed the danger to the Generalissimo.

In order to remove any fear that might be entertained by the people of a possible change of the Government policy, the Executive Yuan on the morning of December 15, held a meeting and passed a resolution that, in regard to foreign affairs, the Government would continue to carry out the policy that had been decided previously by the Generalissimo, and

that the bandit-suppression work in Suiyuan and elsewhere would be continued as usual and no relaxation would be permitted. This resolution, together with another decision of the Executive Yuan made two days before to inform the provincial authorities that they should attend to their duties as usual, succeeded in quieting the agitated minds of the masses.

As the fourth day of the Generalissimo's detention was approaching to an end, Donald, who had returned from Sian to Loyang, used the long distance telephone to inform Madame Chiang Kai-shek and Dr. Kung of the safety of the Generalissimo. Fear of the unreliability of reports by telegrams was thus definitely dispelled. Madame Chiang received a telegram from Chang Hsueh-liang, in which he stated that her visit to Sian would be welcome. Despite the efforts of friends to dissuade her, she wished to fly to Sian immediately. Simultaneously, Dr. T. V. Soong, brother-in-law of the Generalissimo, who had just returned from Canton, expressed his willingness to do everything within his power, under the guidance of the Government, to effect the release of the Generalissimo.

While the Generalissimo was living in the new quarters in Sian, he was surrounded by guards, well-armed and vigilant, Chang Hsueh-liang fearing that Yang Hu-cheng's men might try to take the Generalissimo away from his custody. The situation was extremely dangerous, Chang had only 400 soldiers as his bodyguard in the city, and about 6,000 outside, whereas Yang Hu-cheng had eight regiments in the city. Therefore, should there be a fight between these two leaders, Chang would certainly be defeated, and the Generalissimo might fall into more hostile hands.

As no news had yet arrived about the early release of the Generalissimo, the Central Political Council of the Kuomin-tang, at a special meeting on the morning of December 16, decided that Ho Ying-chin should be Commander-in-Chief of the Expedition for the Suppression of Rebels and direct operations against them and that a punitive mandate should be issued. Mandates in this sense were accordingly promulgated. The same morning the Government Armies succeeded in com-

pleting a vast encircling movement of the seat of the revolt. Meanwhile, the Government observation planes brought back the news that heavy troop movements ordered by Chang Hsueh-liang were proceeding. At Nanking a fear grew that Chang might escape with his political prisoners into the trackless plains of Shensi and Kansu, being aware of the impossibility of gaining a victory over the Government forces.

Indicating his anxiety for an early settlement of the impasse and his worry over the failure of the Government to send representatives to negotiate with him, Chang Hsueh-liang sent another telegram to Ho Ying-chin to the following effect: "You people are paying the greatest attention to the safety of an individual, but you are neglecting the principles which we have advocated." Simultaneously the Shanghai office of Reuters, a British news agency, received from Chang Hsueh-liang a telegram in which he sought to justify his position and also to assure the uneasy public that the Generalissimo was safe and in sound health. His telegram to Reuters read:

"An active anti-Japanese struggle is the only way out for China, which is unanimously demanded by the people. To realize this, we continually offered advice, which was firmly rejected by the Generalissimo. We are thus compelled to keep him here to give him the last chance of awakening. As soon as the Generalissimo gives up his fallacious policy and mobilizes an active anti-Japanese struggle, we shall immediately become his loyal followers again and will fight on the first front. Our real purpose is purely for national salvation and there is absolutely nothing personal. This is not a mutiny at all, but a necessary step of really consolidating all the political parties in the country to shoulder the responsibility of national salvation. The Generalissimo is in perfectly good condition and well treated here."

After the issue of a punitive mandate by the Government, Nanking's planes commenced to bomb Hwahsien, on the railway line between Loyang and Sian, and killed quite a large number of Chang's soldiers. For the first time, Chang realized the gravity of the situation. Having failed to get an endorse-

ment of his eight-point programme from the Generalissimo, Chang was at a loss. While Government circles were unanimous in the belief on the morning of December 17, that further delay would be unfruitful and negotiations would be dangerous, towards the evening, in some quarters in Nanking, the situation was more hopefully viewed. The basis for such hope was found in the fact that Chang Hsueh-liang on the preceding day radioed repeated appeals to Nanking to discuss terms of a possible settlement. Another evidence was found in the release of Chiang Ting-wen, one of his distinguished captives, in order to send him to Nanking to start conversations. Chiang Ting-wen left Sian by air on December 17, landed at Loyang late in the afternoon and reached Nanking next day.

Further evidence that Chang Hsueh-liang was anxious to bring to an end a situation fraught with peril to everyone concerned, was supplied by his appeal to Yen Hsi-shan, Pacification Commissioner of Shansi and Suiyuan, to help him out of his difficulties. He sent his secretary by airplane to Taiyuan on December 17, to give Yen the following three assurances: (1) the *coup* was prompted by patriotic motives; (2) he assumed full responsibility for the safety of the Generalissimo, and (3) he was ready to make any personal sacrifice if it were in the interests of the country, even to the extent of accompanying the Generalissimo to Nanking to let the people judge his actions.

Yen wired to Chang signifying his willingness to assist, but before sending representatives to Sian, he required an assurance that his representatives would be allowed to see the Generalissimo without any third party being present. Chang failed to reply, and his secretary waited for nearly 24 hours at Taiyuan. He had finally to return to Sian without Yen's representatives.

Chiang Ting-wen had arrived at Nanking at midnight on December 18, bringing with him an autograph letter, dated December 17, from the Generalissimo to Ho Ying-chin, Minister of War, which read: "I hear that yesterday our aerial force

carried out a bombardment of Weinan. I hope that you will order its immediate cessation. According to the present probabilities, I will return to Nanking before Saturday of this week. Therefore, before Saturday, there should be no fighting under any circumstances and furthermore aerial bombardment should forthwith cease."

Chiang Ting-wen also brought a letter from the Generalissimo to Madame Chiang Kai-shek in which he told her that he was safe and well. The message which Chiang had been entrusted by Chang Hsueh-liang to deliver to the Government asked for suspension of hostilities and the maintenance of the *modus vivendi*. Then Chiang Ting-wen gave an account of the manner in which he came to be chosen for the mission which was still a mystery to Nanking. On December 17, Chang Hsueh-liang saw Chiang Fang-chen, former president of the Paoting Military Academy, in his daily round of calls, and the latter told him that it was useless and purposeless to wait idly for a message from Nanking and suggested sending a delegate to the Capital to start negotiations looking forward to the liberation of the Generalissimo. Chang thought this a good idea, and Chiang Ting-wen, one of the political prisoners, was chosen for the mission. The three of them then called upon the Generalissimo, and he acquiesced in the trip. Before leaving, Chiang Ting-wen inquired whether the Generalissimo wished Madame Chiang to come to Sian and keep him company. The reply was in the negative. When they were alone Chang Hsueh-liang told Chiang Ting-wen that he would welcome the visit of Madame Chiang if Nanking meant peace, but otherwise it would be better for her not to come.

After having listened to the report of Chiang Ting-wen, the Government immediately held a conference at which it was decided that Chang Hsueh-liang should be informed that the Government would never suspend military operations nor negotiate with him, but would instruct the aviation commanders to cease bombing until six p.m. Saturday, December 19. It was also decided that, while no official representative would

be sent to negotiate with Chang and his associates, private individuals or relatives of the Generalissimo who would like to go to Sian in their personal capacity would not be interfered with.

The staff officers at the front were immediately notified that all bombing operations must cease until 6 o'clock on December 19. The majority of Chinese officials interpreted Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's reference to the possibility of his return to Nanking by Saturday, not as an expression of his belief or hope that such would be possible, but as his method of telling Nanking that unless the mutineers had recanted by that time he desired the Government to resort to force, regardless of the danger to his life, to maintain the prestige and authority of the Government.

The hold of the Generalissimo's personality on the popular imagination was never better demonstrated during the seventh day of crisis than by the telegram passing through Peiping for the Central Government from Teh, the Mongol Prince, and Tso Shih-hai, the Chinese bandit who long ravaged the Chinese-Mongol borderlands and who was then allied with Prince Teh in an attack on Suiyuan. They stated that they had declared a suspension of hostilities against Suiyuan, as they did not want a "local dispute" to affect the general China situation. This attitude was taken in spite of the fact that, four days after the Sian trouble, a representative of the Japanese Kwantung Army called upon Fu Tso-yi, Chairman of Suiyuan, and urged him to evacuate the whole of Suiyuan in favour of the Japanese, stating that the Generalissimo was dead and that he (Fu) would receive no more military support from the Government.

During the earlier days of the detention of the Generalissimo at Sian, the Japanese official attitude was none too good, for, simultaneously with the arrival of Chiang Ting-wen at Nanking on December 18, a spokesman of the Japanese Embassy in a Press interview made this declaration: "If strengthening of the Chinese attitude against Japan has been made the condition of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's

release, the situation will become very serious. Naturally this situation is a matter of the most serious concern to Japan. Japan will be extremely watchful of any evidence of an anti-Japanese agreement, or pledges along pro-Communist lines. The Young Marshal used anti-Japanese slogans as a rallying cry, therefore we cannot afford to ignore any Government conciliation with Chang Hsueh-liang on this point."

## CHAPTER XXX

T. V. Soong Opens Negotiations—Arita's Attitude Criticized—Nation In Suspense—Madame Chiang Flies To Sian—Extension Of Truce—Yang Hu-cheng's Fears—A Settlement Reached—Release Of The Generalissimo—Jubilation Throughout The Country—Chang Hsueh-liang In Nanking—Statement By Generalissimo—His Observations To Chang And Yang—Chiang's Resignation Rejected—Chang Hsueh-liang Court-Martialled—Lessons Of The Coup

DURING the seventh day of his detention the Generalissimo read Chinese classics, and his spirits greatly improved according to wireless reports received at Nanking and Shanghai. He even smiled once in a while, but he was still much troubled by his strained backbone.

T. V. Soong, against the wishes of some officials in the Capital, left Nanking for Sian by airplane at 2 o'clock on the afternoon of December 19, the day when the virtual ultimatum to Chang Hsueh-liang was to expire, to seek a way out of the impasse. Enforcement of the ultimatum was again suspended as a result of pressure by Madame Chiang Kai-shek, who was strenuously resisting the official plans to attack Sian. Soong stopped over at Loyang and arrived at Sian at 9.55 a.m. on December 20. He was met by Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng, and they drove to the city together. Chang and Donald accompanied Soong to see the Generalissimo. The two former withdrew to enable Soong to have a lengthy conversation.

Some little distance from Sian, a collision occurred between Chang Hsueh-liang's vanguards and the Government force in the vicinity of Hwahsien. The 28th division of the

National Army succeeded in surrounding two battalions of Chang's troops and disarming them. The Government planes reported that Chang's 106th, 107th, 117th and 129th divisions were advancing eastward. Besides making observations, they distributed a large quantity of propaganda pamphlets inside Sian.

At Nanking there was much resentment at the declaration of Mr. Arita, Japan's Foreign Minister, that the Japanese Government would oppose any compromise settlement of the Sian dispute involving a strong anti-Japanese front. The declaration drew a reply from a Chinese Government spokesman, who asserted that his Government would absolutely refuse to negotiate any political issues with Chang and his associates, and explained that the current negotiations were carried on by individuals acting unofficially and aimed solely at effecting the early release of the Generalissimo.

Not content with the unwarranted declaration made by Arita, the Japanese news agencies and the Japanese Embassy spokesmen insinuated that the Sian affair had been engineered by emissaries of the Soviet Union. Definitely refuting the Japanese allegation that the Kwantung Army had known for six months of negotiations proceeding between Chang Hsueh-liang and Moscow, the Soviet Charge d'Affaires, L. Spilvanek, in the absence of the Soviet Ambassador, on December 20 assured Foreign Minister Chang Chun that the Soviet Government had not had any direct or indirect relations with Chang Hsueh-liang since the Mukden Incident on September 18, 1931. He reiterated the declaration of the Soviet Government to the effect that Chang's revolt impaired China's unity and national strength.

On the afternoon of December 21, the Japanese Ambassador, Kawagoe, called upon Foreign Minister Chang Chun and conferred with him for two hours. The meeting did not in any sense mark a renewal of Japanese pressure on China, but was largely devoted to the Sian crisis. On his return to the Japanese Embassy, Kawagoe issued a statement in which he announced that Chang Chun had expressed gratitude for

Japan's attitude of sympathy during this period of China's domestic trouble. This statement incidentally revealed the fact that the Japanese Government had given heed to the advice of leaders of moderate factions in Tokyo, who had been urging that a harsh attitude at this time of China's helplessness would only further widen the rift between the two countries. The attitude of the officers of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria and of other Japanese troops in North China was entirely different. They had expected to make hay while the sun shines.

Soong, together with Donald, returned to Nanking by the afternoon of December 21. He informed Madame Chiang Kai-shek and Kung that a peaceful solution of the crisis was possible. The situation was still dangerous, however, for the Government forces were drawing nearer to Sian. Nanking continued to refuse to send representatives to that city on the ground that this would mean compromising with rebellion. A panic existed in the Shensi capital, as there were only a small number of Chang Hsueh-liang's troops there when the revolt started, the majority belonging to Chang's ally, Yang Hu-cheng. Yang's men seem to have been an undisciplined lot, as is indicated by the fact that they looted part of the city during the first three days of the revolt. It was never believed that Chang intended to permit bodily harm to be done to the Generalissimo, but the gravest fears were felt as to his ability to control the actions of the unruly elements with which he was associated.

On December 22, occurred the sensational 700-mile flight of Madame Chiang Kai-shek by airplane from Nanking to Sian by way of Loyang, accompanied by her brother, T. V. Soong, Donald and Chiang Ting-wen. Her courageous efforts on behalf of her husband were not surprising in view of the fact that she accompanied him on various war fronts when he was leading the Government forces against the Chinese Communist Armies, or against recalcitrant warlords' troops. It was generally recognized that upon the efforts of these three persons depended the safety of the Generalissimo as well as the

fate of China. If they should fail in their mission it would not only mean the elimination of the Generalissimo and his adherents imprisoned at Sian, but it would positively plunge China into another decade or two of the chaos of civil war. There was, therefore, more at stake than the life of the Generalissimo and the lives of a score of distinguished officials held captive by the rebels. What was threatened was the wreck of all the results achieved by the Generalissimo during the last ten years in his attempts at unification and in building up the powers of the Central Government. The whole nation held its breath in suspense, waiting nervously for the outcome. A pall of gloom settled over Nanking and other cities in China. Entertainments and public functions of all kinds were suspended by common consent of the officials and people. In this air of tense expectation the final chapter of the Sian drama began to unfold.

The distinguished trio left Nanking at 10.30 a.m., landed at Loyang at 2 p.m., and arrived at Sian at 5.30 p.m. Before the flight they expressed the hope that they would return to Nanking before 6 p.m., December 25, together with the Generalissimo. Upon the arrival of Madame Chiang, T. V. Soong and Donald, Chang Hsueh-liang went to the aviation ground and met them. Although herself a powerful figure of the Government, having complete charge of the administration of the air force and consulting daily with her husband on all domestic and international problems, Madame Chiang had gone to Sian, this time, not in the role of a powerful member of the Government, but as the devoted wife intent upon giving the Generalissimo moral and spiritual support. She played that role well. She removed Chang's embarrassment by shaking hands with him. An hour later, she saw the Generalissimo. He asked her why had she come and added that this was a death trap. He then said that in the morning he had known of her coming, because while reading the Bible he came to the 31st chapter of Jeremiah in which it was recorded that Jehovah wanted to work a wonder through the hands of a woman. (It may be mentioned that he reads the

Bible several times a day, and is a genuinely zealous Christian. The public does not realize the important influence exerted by Christianity upon the Generalissimo's character and official career since his conversion shortly after his marriage. Those closest to the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang know that whenever a grave crisis comes they join in prayer for guidance. Generalissimo Chiang and wife make no secret of the fact that for the last few years they kneel together and pray jointly every morning and evening, imploring wisdom and justice for the conduct of their personal and official affairs. Grace precedes their meals. This deep piety is recognized and respected by all members of the Government, even those who are still Buddhists or Confucianists, or who belong to other faiths. Careful observers of his career note a marked change in Chiang's methods and policies since his adoption of Christianity. In earlier years, he believed in the use of force, but latterly has strongly favoured conciliation and the avoidance of bloodshed, and has become more emphatic in his denunciation of venality and corruption in public life. His piety has reached the point where he always carries with him on his train and airplane journeys the copy of the Bible given to him by the late Madame Soong, his mother-in-law.)

Anxious officials of the Government were not notified of the safe arrival of Madame Chiang and her companions until nearly midnight, when word was received by radio from Sian, dated 8.30 p. m. Soong had telegraphed to Nanking on December 23, requesting that a truce be granted for three more days. The request came none too soon, for on the same day the Eastern Route Group Army of the Punitive Expeditionary Forces had captured Siaoyichen, a town 47 miles east of Sian, after an engagement in which 200 rebels were killed. The Government troops were unsuccessfully attacked by Chang's men near Chihshui. At noon they captured Chihshui and then continued the encircling movement with the hope of surrounding Sian. The truce meanwhile, however, was agreed upon, but the Government planes kept Sian under continual

observation. At the same time, foreign officials in China were contemplating immediate arrangements for the evacuation of their nationals from Sian.

From the first day of her stay in the premises with the Generalissimo, Madame Chiang carried on lengthy conversations with Chang Hsueh-liang. On December 24, there were indications that Chang had agreed to let the Generalissimo return to Nanking, but Yang Hu-cheng raised objections on the ground that Chang could rely upon Madame Chiang and Soong for protection after the release of the Generalissimo, but he did not enjoy such influential support. At one time, Chang Hsueh-liang proposed to disguise the Generalissimo and smuggle him out of Sian, but the Generalissimo was emphatic that he would only leave Sian together with Madame Chiang and that openly.

On the same day, the Government at Nanking issued a Mandate announcing the rules and regulations for the organization of the office of the Commander-in-Chief of the punitive expedition against Chang Hsueh-liang and his associates. There was every evidence of serious preparations for a real campaign. Troop and supply trains left Loyang for Tungkwan in increasing numbers. The Lunghai Railway was working to the fullest capacity as fresh divisions were transferred from other provinces to Shensi.

There was no news when Christmas morning dawned. The Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek scarcely had a merry time that day. When they awoke, however, they were surprised to receive the gift of a travelling rug for the Generalissimo and a portable typewriter for Madame from Donald. These unlooked-for presents cheered them up greatly. In the meantime, lengthy conversations proceeded between Chang Hsueh-liang and T. V. Soong, and between T. V. Soong and Yang Hu-cheng, and between them and Madame Chiang Kai-shek. The series of important conversations finally resulted in an amicable settlement, and arrangements were made for departure in Chang Hsueh-liang's airplane.

To the outside world, the release of the Generalissimo was

as unexpected and dramatic as his capture. When he was told of the arrangements made for his departure, he called Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng to his room for instructions. After a lengthy talk on the moral issues involved, the Generalissimo, accompanied by Madame Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong and Donald, motored out to the aviation ground which was heavily guarded by Yang Hu-cheng's men. Yang went to the airdrome to see them off. To make good his undertaking, Chang also boarded the plane to escort the Generalissimo back to Nanking. In doing this he acted against the wishes of the Generalissimo, who regarded the fulfilment of his undertaking as unnecessary. The plane left Sian at 4 p.m., other planes leaving later. Just before dark, it arrived at Loyang where cheering throngs greeted the national leader.

The Generalissimo's first action upon alighting from the plane at Loyang was to issue an order to Government troops on all Sian fronts immediately to cease operations, thereby negativing chances of accidental clashes. After the issue of the order he retired for a long and necessary rest, showing alarming evidences of the great strain that he had endured. His poor health was partly due to the injury to his back and leg which he had received from a fall on the first day of the coup.

By 6.15 p.m., the glad news began to be known in Shanghai, and then spontaneous celebrations on a stupendous scale commenced vociferously in Chapei, Nantao and in both foreign municipalities. Places of amusement, which had suffered a severe depression during the Generalissimo's captivity, suddenly awoke to full life. Feasting and merry-making found much vent. Impromptu processions, carrying banners with such inscriptions as "Long Live Chiang Kai-shek!" and "Long Live the Republic!" marched through the streets. The happy populace rushed about, yelling, singing and spreading by all possible means the news that the country's most important citizen was again safe. All voiced feelings of boundless thanksgiving.

The most handy and noisiest methods were found to be

firecrackers, and within a short time it sounded as though the whole immense city was under intensive machine gun fire. Firecracker shops were caught short of wares by the unexpected demand. The accumulation of paper from exploded firecrackers on Nanking Road, the principal thoroughfare of Shanghai, was so great as actually to stop street car traffic. Additionally, surging crowds at various points along the principal streets got out of hand, completely blocking traffic. Similar scenes were witnessed in other great cities of China as the news flashed over the country.

As Christmas Day neared midnight, the celebration continued at a hectic rate and seemed destined to last into Saturday. In addition to the setting off of firecrackers and the crowds on the streets, individual homes hoisted national flags and turned on all lights, transforming Shanghai from the dark depressed city of the past few days into a brilliantly-lighted, noisy and throbbing metropolis.

On December 26, the Generalissimo arrived at Nanking at 12.15, and he was welcomed by Mr. Lin Sen, Chairman of the National Government, a host of other officials and multitudes of cheering people. Dr. Soong and Chang Hsueh-liang arrived two hours later. Chang stayed at Soong's residence, which was heavily guarded. Upon seeing friends he told them that in accompanying the Generalissimo to Nanking he wished to raise the status of China in the family of nations, to show his support of the Generalissimo, and to await the judgment of the people. Shortly afterwards, he sent a letter to the Generalissimo in which he tendered his formal apology. The letter stated:

"I am by nature rustic, surly and unpolished, due to which I have created an incident, which was at once impudent and law-breaking. I have committed a great crime.

"I have shamefacedly followed you to Nanking in order sincerely to await my punishment by you, punishment befitting in severity the degree of my crime, so that it may not only uphold law and discipline, but also serve as a warning to others in future against repetitions of such a crime.

"Whatever is beneficial to our country, I shall never decline, even if it means death. I beg you to leave aside sentiments of personal friendship, and let nothing hold you back from giving me the kind of punishment I deserve."

On the same day, in response to requests for interviews by newspaper correspondents at Nanking, the Generalissimo gave out the following written statement:

"As I am feeling quite tired after the long air trip, I am not ready to grant any personal interview to newspaper correspondents. My remarks to Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng immediately before I departed from Sian, however, express all that I have to say about the Sian *coup d'état*. Now all questions must be settled by the Central Government.

"Being in supreme command of the Army, I am responsible for the *coup*, because I have failed to maintain adequate discipline in the Army, which I deeply regret. Fortunately, the Central Government asserted its authority, and the civil and military officers all over the country did their best to maintain peace and order, which is a matter for gratification. Also I appreciate gratefully the deep concern of our people at home and abroad as well as that of the Governments, peoples, and newspapers of the friendly nations."

The Generalissimo had referred the correspondents who wished to interview him after his return to Nanking to the observations relative to the *coup* which he addressed to Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng shortly before he left Sian. Fortunately, these observations were recorded by Madame Chiang and are here reproduced in full as they are of profound historic interest and importance as revealing the Generalissimo's tolerance, equanimity and clarity of vision:—

"This *coup d'état* is an act which gravely affects both the continuity of Chinese history of 5,000 years and the life and death of the Chinese Republic, and constitutes a criterion by which the character of the Chinese nation may be judged. Since to-day you have shown due regard for the welfare of the nation and have decided to send me back to Nanking, and

no longer try to make any special demands, or force me to make any promise or give any orders, it marks a turning point in the life of the nation, and is also an indication of the high moral and cultural standard of the Chinese people.

"It is an ancient Chinese saying that a gentleman should correct his mistakes as soon as he realizes such. The present outcome of the *coup d'état* shows that you are both ready to correct your own mistakes, and that is creditable to you as well as auguring a bright future for the Chinese race. Since you are now so convinced by my sincerity towards you that you have the courage to acknowledge your wrong-doing, you are entitled to remain as my subordinates. Furthermore, since you can be so readily converted, it will certainly be easier for your own subordinates to follow suit.

"Formerly, you were deceived by reactionaries and believed that I did not treat the people fairly and squarely and that I was not loyal to our revolutionary ideals. But now you have read my private diary for this whole year, the public and private telegrams and documents numbering some 50,000 words that have passed through my hands during the past two months as well as my plans for the salvation of the nation, and those relating to internal administration, foreign affairs, military affairs, finance and education, numbering some 10,000 words, you must now know that there is not a single word which could condemn me of any self-interest or insincerity on my part.

"In fact, since I took military command and began to take charge of military training, there are two principles which I have always emphasized to my students and subordinates, namely:

"(1) If I have any selfish motives or do anything against the welfare of the country and the people, then anybody may consider me a traitor and may shoot me on that account.

"(2) If my words and deeds are in the least insincere and I neglect the principles and revolutionary ideals, my soldiers may treat me as their enemy and may also shoot me.

"From my diary and the other documents, you can see

whether you can find one word which is to the detriment of the Revolution. If you can find one such word, here I am still in Sian and you are at liberty to condemn and kill me. On my part, I am glad that I have always done what I have taught other people to do, namely, to be sincere and disinterested, and I can say in all confidence that I have done nothing that I need to be ashamed of.

"The responsibility of this *coup d'état* naturally rests with you two, but I consider myself also responsible for the causes which led up to the crisis. I have always worked for the country and always believed that my sincerity and teaching would reach all my subordinates. Hence I have not paid any attention to my personal safety. I have taken no precautions on that account and have, therefore, tempted the reactionaries to take advantage of the situation. Everything has its remote causes. My own carelessness was the remote cause of this *coup d'état* and gave rise to this break-down of discipline, causing the Central Government as well as the people much worry and the nation much loss. On this account, I feel I am to be blamed and must apologize to the nation, the Party and the people.

"A country must have law and discipline. You two are military officers in command of troops, and when such a *coup d'état* has taken place, you should submit to the judgment of the Central Government. I recognize, however, that you were deceived by the propaganda of reactionaries and misjudged my good intentions. Fortunately, immediately after the *coup* you realized that it was harmful to the country and expressed your deep remorse to me. Now you have further realized your own mistake in listening to reactionaries and are now convinced that not only have I had no bad intentions towards you, but that I have always had every consideration for you.

"I have always told my subordinates that, when they make mistakes, their superiors must also be blamed for not having given them adequate training. As I am in supreme command of the Army, your fault is also my fault, and I must ask for punishment by the Central Authorities. At the same

time, I will explain to them that you sincerely regret what you have done. As you have rectified your mistake at an early stage, the crisis has not been prolonged, and I believe the Central Authorities should be able to be lenient with you.

"Meanwhile, you should tell your subordinates how you have been deceived by reactionaries and how I have always had only the welfare of the nation at heart, so that they will not be unduly disturbed over whatever decisions the Central Government may make.

"I have always impressed upon the people the importance of ethical principles and integrity in order to cultivate a sense of probity and of shame, to bear responsibility and to obey discipline. If a superior officer cannot make his subordinates observe these principles, he himself is partly to be blamed. Hence, in connection with this crisis, I am ready to bear the responsibility as your superior officer. On your part, you should be ready to abide by whatever decision the Central Government may make, and your subordinates need not have any fear for themselves.

"We must always remember that the life of the nation is more important than anything else. We should not care for ourselves, although our personal integrity must be preserved in order that the nation may exist on a firm foundation. Our lives may be sacrificed but the law and discipline of the nation must be upheld. Our bodies may be confined, but our spirit must be free. My own responsibility to the country and the Central Government will always be willingly borne as long as I live. That is why I have repeatedly refused to give any orders or sign anything you wanted me to sign while under duress. It is because I consider life or death a small matter compared with the upholding of moral principles.

"My words are not only to be left to posterity, but I want you to understand them so that you will also value moral principles more than anything else. I have said more than once that, if I should make any promise to you or sign anything at your request while at Sian, it would amount to the destruction of the nation. If I should try to avoid danger and submit

to any duress exercised by my subordinates, my own integrity would be destroyed, and with it the integrity of the nation, which I represent. No matter whether it be an individual or a nation, the loss of integrity is tantamount to death itself. For the upholding of these moral principles which I have repeatedly emphasized to the people, I am ready to undergo any sacrifice. If I do not carry out my own teachings, my subordinates as well as the people of the country will not know what to follow and the nation will be as good as destroyed.

"From this *coup* you should learn a definite lesson—that integrity is more important than anything else and that national interests should precede personal ones. If you commit mistakes, do not hesitate to admit them and make corrections. You should bear responsibility for what you have done and should make these things plain to your subordinates.

"Dr. Sun Yat-sen instructed that we must first rebuild the moral fibre of the nation before we can effect a national revival. Honesty, righteousness and love of peace are important moral characteristics of our country. For more than ten years I have devoted myself to uniting the nation, politically and spiritually—for national salvation, honesty and righteousness are of particular importance. I have always tried to carry out my own words. Anything that is beneficial to the country and the people I will do with total disregard of my personal interests. Recommendations of this nature have always been accepted and put into practice.

"The policy of the Central Government for the last few years has been to achieve peace in, and unification of, the country and to increase the strength of the nation. Nothing should be done to impair this strength. During the present crisis, as you engineered the *coup*, you are responsible for bringing about warfare in the country, but as you have expressed remorse, I shall recommend the Central Government to settle the matter in a way that will not be prejudicial to the interests of the nation.

"In short, you now know the situation of our country as well as my determination to save it. I always give first

thought to the life and death of the nation as well as to the success or failure of the Revolution and do not pay any attention to personal favours or grudges. Questions of personal danger or loss are of no interest to me. Moreover, I have had the benefit of receiving personal instructions from Dr. Sun concerning broad-mindedness, benevolence, and sincerity and am not vindictive with regard to things that have passed. As you felt remorse very early, it shows that you know that the welfare of the nation is above everything else. That being the case, you ought to obey unreservedly the orders of the Central Government and carry out whatever decisions it may make. This is the way to save the nation from the dangers it is facing and this is the way to turn a national calamity into a national blessing."

On December 27, the remaining Government officials held at Sian returned to Nanking by airplane but amidst the rejoicing, the sad news was received of the death of the elder brother of the Generalissimo at Fenghua, their native place. The brother became ill immediately after having heard of the detention of the Generalissimo at Sian. He died two days after the release of his brother. This news caused the Generalissimo much grief.

The following day, the Government decided to hold the Third Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang on February 15 to settle a large number of questions which arose out of the Sian affair.

In accordance with his promise to take at least a portion of the responsibility for the Sian outrage on his own shoulders, the Generalissimo on December 29 submitted his resignation from the posts of President of the Executive Yuan and of Chairman of the National Military Council to the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee. Following is a free translation of the Generalissimo's letter of resignation addressed to the Standing Committee:

"During my recent trip to the North-west, the Sian incident suddenly broke out on December 12. My imprisonment

caused grave concern to the National Government as well as to the people. The mutineers had not only violated the discipline of the State but had also shocked the whole world.

"Thanks to the emergency measures taken by the Central Government, the dignity of the State was upheld and the crisis was soon averted, but, in spite of this, the discipline of the State and leadership of the highest military authority had been prejudiced, while the troops and civilians in Shensi had suffered unnecessary losses.

"Since I am leading the military forces of the country, I should set a good example for my fellow service-men. It is apparent that my work failed to command the obedience of my followers; for otherwise the mutiny, which nearly resulted in the collapse of the foundation of the State, would not have occurred. When I consider the matter I cannot free myself of the charge of incompetence.

"I believe that the State should uphold its discipline. Only then could one's responsibility be established.

"Since I was ignorant of such a mutiny brewing and had failed to check it at its outbreak, which resulted in my subordinates taking such rash steps, I had not lived up to the sacred charge thrust upon me. There is, therefore, more reason why I should not stave off the responsibility.

"I sincerely hope that the Central Executive Committee will censure me for my negligence of duties.

"During recent years, both my health and my mind have failed me and I have committed many errors in discharging my duties. I should not have shouldered such a heavy load of responsibilities in the first place. After the Sian incident, I am conscience-stricken and it is no longer fit for me to continue in office.

"I therefore respectfully request the Central Executive Committee to accept my resignation from the posts of President of the Executive Yuan and concurrently Chairman of the National Military Council. I further request the Central Executive Committee immediately to appoint some other competent men to take over my duties, so I may retire from active service and await disciplinary punishment.



The Generalissimo visits a bamboo grove near Chikow  
after the Sian Coup.



"In that case the discipline of the State will be upheld and my conscience may be set at ease."

The Generalissimo's resignation was immediately and unanimously rejected by the members of the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee. He again presented his resignation, but again it was rejected. He was, however, granted a month's leave of absence. A special military tribunal of the National Military Council was held on December 31 to try Chang Hsueh-liang for his leadership in the Sian coup. There was, of course, no defence and the proceedings were short. The tribunal sentenced Chang to ten years' imprisonment and deprivation of civil rights for five years. Clemency for the former Marshal was recommended by Generalissimo Chiang two hours later on the ground that Chang Hsueh-liang's prompt repentance had saved the nation from the loss of strength that would result from a civil war. "The nation is facing a crisis," said the Generalissimo in his petition to the National Government, "and it is in need of competent persons. This official (Chang Hsueh-liang) is experienced in military affairs. Now that he has repented, his talents should not be wasted, but utilized to the fullest extent under close supervision."

While the Generalissimo's petition that generous treatment should be accorded to Chang Hsueh-liang was being considered, the latter was officially transferred to Dr. Kung's residence for custody. The year came to an end. A stock-taking of the Sian affair shows that certain facts emerged clearly out of the crisis. For the Government an additional degree of unity was attained. The capability of the Government under Dr. Kung's leadership to function during the period of a fortnight; its ability to co-operate with the foreign banks to uphold the stability of Chinese currency, and the failure of warlords to take advantage of the opportunity to act against Nanking with Chang and his associates, all indicated the existence of an administration much stronger than that of the previous year.

It was conclusively shown that the country does actually

possess a real degree of unity, as the Central Government at Nanking did not evince the slightest hesitancy in carrying on the burden of government in the absence of the national leader. Its task was made much easier by the rallying to the support of Nanking of regional leaders in all sections of the country. Because of the object lesson that it afforded, the Sian *coup* may possibly be regarded as a blessing in disguise. To the immense satisfaction of the Chinese themselves, as well as the relief of their foreign friends, the Sian affair demonstrated not only the capacity of the Chinese for self-government but also proved that the nation could face a sudden crisis that might have been expected to rock any nation to its foundations.

Another fact that emerged from the Sian affair is that the Generalissimo's personal prestige has been greatly enhanced. The affair was instrumental in causing a spontaneous demonstration of the esteem, and even affection, in which he is held, not only in China itself, but in foreign lands. He was universally hailed as the man who had done most to unify China. Above all, the affair indicated that the Generalissimo has become an established institution within his own life-time in the affairs of his own nation and people—an institution that bids fair to cast its lengthening shadow over the destinies of China for all time to come. The spontaneous celebration of his release, on the part of the masses of the people, showed only too clearly how completely the character and personality of the Generalissimo has gripped the imagination of his fellow countrymen.

Much honour was also reflected upon Madame Chiang. Donald paid a fitting tribute to her rôle in the peace negotiations in these words: "Credit for the liberation of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek should go largely to Madame Chiang, whose visit to Sian was undertaken with a fine disregard of personal danger. Where others might have failed, Madame Chiang succeeded, her personality winning through every difficulty. She rendered the nation a signal service."

It was generally admitted that, during the Sian *coup*,

Madame Chiang was tireless and utterly selfless. She daily received 50 or more callers and emissaries of all factions, and conducted all conferences with remarkable tact and patience.

Besides relieving the tremendous strain on the Government, the return of the Generalissimo and the settlement of the Sian crisis deprived the Japanese militarists of North China of an opportunity further to increase their pressure for the autonomy of the five provinces of North China, which they had been doing to the best of their ability since Chang Hsueh-liang's coup. It was to avoid Japanese urgings for a declaration of independence that Sung Cheh-yuan announced that he was ill for a few days and confined himself to his home. The general fear in Peiping was that, in the event of the Generalissimo's death, an independence declaration in the North would have resulted. Sung, however, was one of the first to telegraph felicitations to the Generalissimo.

## CHAPTER XXXI

Generalissimo In Seclusion In Fenghua—Leniency To Young Marshal—Negotiations With Yang Hu-cheng—Yang Disinclined To Compromise—Government Troop Concentration Continues—Generalissimo's Letters To Yang—Rebels' Extravagant Demands—Chiang's Patience Exhausted—A Practical Ultimatum—Yang Weakens—Another Sian Revolt—Wang I-cheh And Others Murdered—Settlement Finally Reached—Third Plenary Session—Parleys With Reds

GENERALISSIMO Chiang, on January 2, 1937, left Nanking for his birthplace in the Fenghua district of Chekiang Province. Immediately upon his arrival, he paid his respects to the mortal remains of his elder brother who had died on December 29. Thereafter, he went into strict seclusion at a spot not far from his mother's grave. While there he took a complete rest, at first neither receiving calls nor reading telegrams or letters addressed to him. The fact that the Generalissimo was able to leave the Capital and dissociate himself from active politics at this critical juncture was a clear indication of returning normalcy. The absence of reactionary repercussions began to convince even the most sceptical that the Generalissimo was quietly re-establishing his authority in all fields.

The question of the ultimate fate of Chang Hsueh-liang was taken up when the heads of the Government met on January 4. The Generalissimo had recommended that the fact that he had repented and released his leader before serious fighting had occurred should be held as a mitigation. This magnanimous appeal was effective, and on the following day a mandate was issued by the Government rescinding the

sentence upon Chang in so far as it related to the term of ten years' imprisonment. No mention was made in the mandate about the loss of civil rights, and this part of the sentence consequently remained effective.

Although the Generalissimo was nominally enjoying a much-needed rest from the strain of public business, his counsel and leadership were urgently needed. In the first frenzy of enthusiasm over his release, it had been forgotten that the situation remained extremely dangerous. Yang Hu-cheng was still in control at Sian. He had been lightly censured by the Government, being merely ordered to remain at his post and obey the orders that he received from Nanking. He made no difficulty about remaining at his post but soon evinced a strong disposition to obey no orders but his own. The seclusion of the Generalissimo had to be invaded in order to obtain his instructions. He was visited by a number of officials including T. V. Soong and, later, by Chang Hsueh-liang.

While negotiations were proceeding with Yang Hu-cheng, Wang Ching-wei returned to China after spending almost a year in Europe receiving special treatment for the injuries that he had sustained when an attempt was made to assassinate him towards the end of 1935. It was hoped that, pending the assembling of the Third Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in Nanking in February, matters at Sian could be arranged so that there would be no need for the Government to take punitive action. The Communists, however, seemed to have gained control over Yang Hu-cheng, and he showed a strong disinclination to compromise. A speech by Wang Ching-wei, denouncing the Communists, may have had the effect of stiffening his attitude. It is, by the way, remarkable that three of the foreign-owned daily newspapers in Shanghai, after the release of the Generalissimo, hinted at the possibility, not to say desirability, of making peace with the Chinese Reds in the North-west. This might be taken, not as support for the Communists, but as an indication of a desire to see China genuinely united and

strengthened to resist foreign aggression. It was obvious, however, that before anything could be done in the way of compromise, the Reds would have to abandon their Communist ideology. In any event, the problems raised by the Sian revolt were far from being completely solved by the return of the Generalissimo to Nanking and the nominal punishment inflicted upon Chang Hsueh-liang. Yang Hu-cheng was evidently in two minds. Thus, while shortly after the first of the year, he released 17 of the Government planes which had been seized at Sian, he still kept possession of 13.

Negotiations with Yang Hu-cheng proceeded slowly, and it became necessary for the Generalissimo, notwithstanding the poor state of his health, to exert his influence. Representatives of Yang went to see him at Fenghua, and in addition Yang had previously sent him long telegrams which revealed real or pretended misunderstanding. On January 10, the Generalissimo sent Yang a letter in which he replied to Yang's demand that Chang Hsueh-liang should be sent back to Sian and pointed out the path of duty which Yang should follow. This part of the letter may be quoted:

"Concerning Chang Hsueh-liang's movements, I repeatedly endeavoured—and in your presence—to dissuade him from leaving when he insisted upon doing so on the day of my departure from Sian. I did so, fearing that his presence in the Capital would render it more difficult for public opinion to feel better disposed towards him. It was after several delicate readjustments that he was granted a special pardon, but the decision of the State Council to place him under 'surveillance' is still in effect. Once the question of discipline is evoked, immediate amelioration through personal mediation becomes difficult. All this Han-ching quite understands, so he does not desire to go back immediately to Shensi. If you give me time, I will certainly devise some method whereby he can still have a chance to work for the Revolution in response to his patriotic promptings. You and your military associates need not worry or act impatiently, otherwise I and Han-ching will be handicapped.

"As for the concern you have expressed over the Central forces pressing westward, I can assure you that not only will I carry out my peaceful intention but the Central Government will also dispose of the Shensi and Kansu affair mainly through political reorganization. Nothing will be done to lead to an armed conflict. The fact that troops are now stationed along the Lunghai Railway is due to the extreme perplexity of our fellow countrymen in connection with the Shensi and Kansu conditions. You and your associates have not yet accepted either private counsels or Government orders. Organizations such as the Provisional Military Affairs Commission which you established in Sian remain unchanged. The Provincial Government has not yet been restored to its original status in accordance with the mandates of the Central Government. Propaganda is still carried on in the same absurd and childish way as it was during the Sian crisis. The suspicion consequently arose that Government orders have been disobeyed and that measures of separation and autonomy are under contemplation. As a result, the people in general take an apprehensive and suspicious attitude toward the trend of the Shensi and Kansu affair. In order to relieve their anxiety and maintain the general situation, the Central Government is compelled to take preventive measures. What is expected of all of you is simply to accept the orders of the Central Government; there is always room for discussion in regard to the concrete details respecting military rehabilitation and other matters.

"Your telegrams also inform me of the extreme indignation of various commanders. As a matter of fact, you and your associates should put yourselves in the position of the Central Government and should, above all, accept the will of the people for the guidance of your actions. At present, it is most urgent that you should relieve the public of its doubts and anxiety, and give evidence that you will by no means launch a separatist or autonomy movement, or destroy the unity of the nation.

"For the purpose of showing your sincerity and preventing

the public from misjudging you, you should first unhesitatingly obey the orders of the Central Government, thereby convincing the public of your sincerity in upholding the nation and completing the Revolution. Secondly, you should announce the abolition of all the organizations that have come into being since December 12, reform the publicity work, and prevent it from reverting to what it became during the days of the crisis. Thus a new outlook will result, which will help to dispel the doubts of the people and ease the tension of the populace and soldiery in Shensi.

"As you put the nation before anything else by coming to a resolute decision and enabling me to return to Nanking, so should you now immediately take the national situation and the Shensi and Kansu conditions into practical consideration. It must be borne in mind that the people of Shensi and Kansu, whether military or civil, could not exist if separated from the rest of the nation. Nor could the Central Government afford to lose Shensi as the foundation of national defence. The Central Government without Shensi could not build up the State, while Shensi without the Central Government could not continue its existence and development. Both should, therefore, be determined to direct their efforts to gain peace and unity, to restore normal conditions and to decide a new starting point for future endeavours. When the Central Government and local administrations become harmonious, there will be nothing that cannot be amicably settled. As we all desire to help to save the nation, we ought to consider all matters thoroughly on the basis of actual facts, and ought not to be swayed by prejudices or circumstances."

The Generalissimo then made a man-to-man appeal to Yang. He reminded him of the high expectations that he (Chiang) had entertained of him since 1929 and the warm interest with which he had followed his career. Yang and he alone knew how the Central Government had turned its attention to Shensi and had strained every nerve to bring about the reconstruction of the province as an essential part of national defence. They had been so closely associated in

those things that they alone could understand and appreciate them thoroughly. On both personal and public grounds he wished Yang to put confidence in him and give definite evidence of his genuine desire to allay the suspicions of the public and put an end to the existing anomalous state of affairs. Only in that way could he reassure the public and convince it of his (Yang's) true patriotic motives.

Delay, he pointed out, was dangerous and national unification would be jeopardized unless Yang soon showed an accommodating spirit. If things came to an impasse, the first province to suffer would be Shensi, and the good name and honours that Yang had won would be sacrificed. For the sake of the country, for the sake of Shensi and for his own sake, he (Chiang) exhorted him to reflect and follow the right course.

This comradely appeal did not meet with the response that it deserved. The Generalissimo's pledge that the Government intended to abide by the decision to seek a peaceful settlement and show the utmost generosity provided the troops of Yang and Chang reposed confidence in the Government and obeyed orders, was misinterpreted. Knowing the Generalissimo's opposition to civil war, the recalcitrant generals at Sian seemed to regard this as a favourable opportunity for pressing new demands upon the Government. Accordingly, they precipitated a new crisis by sending four demands to Nanking, calling for: (1) the legalization of the Red Armies, the official recognition of garrison areas for them in Shensi and Kansu and the official cancellation of the Government orders for a punitive expedition against the Communists; (2) cessation of all civil wars, preservation of the nation's man-power for resisting aggressors and a possible war against Japan and, meanwhile, the return of Chang Hsueh-liang as Pacification Commissioner of Shensi and Kansu with supreme control of the military affairs of both provinces; (3) hereafter the re-organized former Manchurian Armies, Yang Hu-cheng's Army and the Communist forces to be responsible to their own commanders, who would have power to appoint and dismiss officers without reference to Nanking; (4) the National Govern-

ment must hereafter furnish these three forces with ample military expenses and also first class equipment.

To open the eyes of the Sian rebels as to how they were regarded in the country, the Nanking Government removed the ban that had been placed upon criticism of Chang Hsueh-liang in the Press of the country. The result was that the pent-up editorial wrath found a sudden explosive outlet and the correspondent of the "New York Times" noted that "arrows of scorn and public ridicule are falling in a shower upon the forlorn person of Chang Hsueh-liang." But Yang and his associates still remained obdurate.

They continued to procrastinate, and the Generalissimo, quite naturally, lost patience. In a long letter to Yang, dated January 19, he adopted a much stiffer tone than in the letter of January 10. He bluntly said that, after all the talk by Yang of his desire to end the existing anomalous state of affairs, he had learned from Yang's representatives that he and his associates adhered firmly to their own ideas, without paying any attention to the realities of the situation or the needs of the country. They were willing to accept their appointments from the Government, but wished to make a "special area" of the North-west and thus further disintegrate the civil and military administration. They were working on a separatist scheme and undermining national strength.

Their demands that Central Government troops should not be stationed west of Tungkwan and Hwahsien and that the provincial Armies should be given autonomy, meant in reality that the Central Government was asked to abandon the North-west, said the Generalissimo. If that were agreed to, the North-west would go the way in which the North-east had gone. Harping on the release of Chang Hsueh-liang might be considered as an attempt to embarrass the Government, as his return to Sian was impossible in the circumstances. The Generalissimo went on to point out that the Government could not think for a moment of abandoning the North-west. The total amount invested by the Government and private concerns there in the last three years, he continued, had exceeded

\$100,000,000. The extension of the Lunhai Railway further to the west had been undertaken, and provision was being made for a number of branch lines in accordance with the plans of national defence already laid down. These undertakings would never be abandoned and would be carried through by the National Government whatever the obstacles.

He further pointed out that, although Yang and his associates demanded that the Government should adopt a positive foreign policy, at the same time they demanded that the Central Government should be expelled from Shensi Province, the base of national defence. When the question of the survival of the nation was at issue, the crime of impairing national defence was far greater than that of imprisoning the Generalissimo. If those responsible did not immediately put themselves in the right they would be condemned by the whole nation, and they could not escape the censure of history in the ages to come. Reverting to the question of the return of Chang Hsueh-liang to Shensi, the Generalissimo pointed out that Chang himself did not desire to return, but was anxious for a speedy ending of the deadlock. He had dealt with this matter in his previous letter, and he hoped that this impossible demand would not be pressed to the embarrassment of himself and Chang Hsueh-liang.

Successful resistance to a foreign aggressor was dependent upon the country being unified, the Generalissimo pointed out. The establishment and maintenance of a separatist regime would utterly defeat unification. There would no longer be a unified will, a unified Government and a unified military command, without which the repulse of a foreign aggressor, he said, was hopeless. The present demands were tantamount to requiring that Shensi and Kansu should attain a special status, and that the Central Government should relinquish its defence construction and its rear military base. He asked, how did they propose in such circumstances to resist the enemy and save the nation? While they outwardly professed obedience to leadership, they were actually forming an autonomous government and working against unification.

The North-west, the Generalissimo continued, was the cradle of the Chinese race, and the entire nation was whole-heartedly intent upon laying there the base of national revival. The nation would not tolerate the region being affected by Red and other deteriorating influences. They should ponder this well. Otherwise, he said, he (Yang) and his associates, though using the name of patriotism and national salvation, would place themselves in the position of being injurious to the State, detrimental to the racial life and willing to be considered enemies of the nation. How could they permit this to happen?

The conclusion of the letter deserves quotation in full:

"The conscientiousness of the Central Government as exemplified since the Sian incident in carefully conserving national strength and in employing various tactful means as it faced this delicate situation, is well-known to the world. If you are really prudent enough to look after yourselves and patriotic enough to work for the nation, you should frankly cease your misconduct in order to prove your sincerity; accept official orders tacitly as well as overtly; abide by the arrangements of the Government, and restore the North-west to the normal unified conditions. At the same time, the Central Government, whose sole object is to save the groundwork of national defence from impairment and to uphold its orders in respect of unification, will naturally dispose of you and your associates and the troops under your command in a way suitable to all of you. Nor will the Central Government overlook your patriotic motives. If you do otherwise, you will be insisting on making a farce of national affairs and misleading the country by your misbehaviour. I cannot bear to harbour such a foreboding, but I do not wish any longer to bandy words with you.

"Being on sick leave, I am not officially on duty. If you and your associates should prove yourselves stubborn in your actions, I will not henceforth give any advice on the North-western question and not even on the future movements of Han-ching. Thinking of our friendly feeling, intensified

through years of adversity, and also of the critical situation in which the nation should not make a further mistake, I have once more offered my views and this is my last advice. Whether it will be taken or disregarded, is entirely for you and the former North-eastern generals to decide."

This stiffening of the attitude of the Generalissimo had a marked effect upon Yang Hu-cheng and the more sensible of his associates. They recognized the cogency of his arguments. Moreover they were becoming increasingly aware that the whole country was opposed to the attitude that they had adopted and would hold them responsible if civil war should supervene. Even from quarters not over-friendly to Nanking they had not received support, and they began to shrink from the edge of the precipice that they had so confidently approached. They, therefore, agreed to the Government's proposal that the parleys should be continued at Tungkwan with Ku Chu-lung, who was in command of the Government forces. It was agreed that a military commission of ten officers, representing both sides, should supervise the withdrawal of the forces of Chang and Yang, while the Government promised to furnish one month's food for the soldiers. By January 25, it was announced that they had accepted the Government's terms.

The Government troops had not been idle during the truce. They had utilized the time to perfect plans for a punitive expedition if it became necessary. The spearhead of the Nanking forces was at Tungkwan. The morale of the troops was high, and all units were keyed up for an offensive against Sian. The Generalissimo's own Forty-sixth Army, under the command of Fan Sung-pu, was at the front. All railroad sidings from Loyang to the furthest advanced lines were crowded with tanks, armoured cars, field guns, modern ambulances and other equipment. The Generalissimo's Army had been in possession of much of this equipment for the last three years, wrote the correspondent of the "New York Times" at Tungkwan, but this was the first time that it had assumed the extreme forward positions in any Chinese campaign. "The

military results of this campaign," continued the correspondent, "amaze military experts, particularly the Japanese. On the shortest notice, China's Army repaired many miles of roads that efficiently met all military requirements, while radio, telegraph and telephone communications were extended across hundreds of miles of frozen plains at the shortest notice."

The parleys at Tungkwan between the delegates of the Sian rebels and Ku Chu-tung resulted in the decision of the recalcitrant officers to obey Government orders but, on February 1, it was reported that the officers of Yang's Army had violated the settlement plans by making fresh demands. They still wanted the Young Marshal back. There was a flare-up on February 2 and, during a mutiny of the radical elements of Chang Hsueh-liang's Army under the leadership of Sun Ming-chiu, Wang I-cheh, commander of the Sixty-seventh Army and one of the trusted lieutenants of Chang Hsueh-liang, was killed in his sick-bed. Three colonels of Chang's Army were also slain. Fortunately, the mutiny was quickly suppressed before the mutineers could carry out their full plans. It appears that they had contemplated a general massacre.

By February 5, it had been confirmed that all of Chang Hsueh-liang's Armies had withdrawn from Sian. There had previously been pillaging in the city by Yang's soldiers. Their alleged patriotism by which they explained the Sian *coup*, did not prevent them from looting the banks of Sian of a sum known to be in excess of \$9,000,000 before they retired. Government troops entered Sian on February 8, and the occasion led to great rejoicing and celebrations on the part of the people. The entire nation heaved a sigh of relief as the loyal forces of the Government appeared to have full control of the delicate situation in Shensi.

Though recuperating at Fenghua from the physical effects of his Sian imprisonment, the Generalissimo, as has been seen, found it necessary to use his personal influence to bring the

Sian revolt to a conclusion. At long last, on February 2, he visited Hangchow to have an X-ray examination made of the injury to his back, caused by the fall at the time he was attempting to escape from the Sian rebels. On February 9, he arrived by air in Shanghai to visit a bone specialist in order to have a brace made for his back. Medical experts told the Generalissimo that he had retarded recovery from his injury by his activity and by receiving visitors. On February 14, he flew to Nanking in preparation for the Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee, plans for which he had already discussed with Wang Ching-wei at Fenghua on January 24.

The Third Plenary Session of the Fifth Kuomintang Central Executive Committee duly held its inaugural meeting at Nanking on February 15, 1937. More than 200 members and reserve members of the Central Executive Committee and of the Central Supervisory Committee were in attendance. Wang Ching-wei, Chairman of the Central Political Council, delivered a stirring keynote address in which he emphasized that the foremost question confronting the nation was the recovery of the lost territories. The stabilization of internal conditions following the peaceful liquidation of the Sian revolt was urgently necessary, he said, so that the national defence programme worked out by the Central Government in recent years would not receive a setback. He hoped that the Communist-suppression campaign might be brought to an early consummation and also that the Principle of the Livelihood of the People would be enforced by the promotion of the People's Economic Reconstruction Movement.

On February 17, a Government mandate was issued restoring civil rights to Chang Hsueh-liang, who had been deprived of them for five years as a part of the punishment for the *coup* at Sian in December. This step was taken in accordance with the recommendation of the National Military Council of which the Generalissimo is Chairman.

At the afternoon meeting of the Plenary Session on February 19, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek presented his petition to be allowed to resign. He insisted that he still held

himself responsible for the Sian *coup*. This was the third time that he had submitted his resignation in connection with the Sian affair. The Plenary Session seemed more or less to be taken by surprise, but they quickly rallied and unhesitatingly rejected the petition. Simultaneously, they unanimously passed a resolution urging the Generalissimo to remain ■ the helm of the Chinese ship of state and to steer it safely out of the present crisis.

The Generalissimo made a verbal report on the Sian *coup* and presented to each member of the meeting a copy of a pamphlet wherein he recorded the day to day happenings from the day of his capture on December 12 to the day of his release on December 25. The session accepted his report and passed a resolution commending him for his great courage and inspiring personality, factors which eventually were responsible, as the resolution stated, for bringing Chang and Yang and their associates back to their better senses.

One of the main problems facing the Plenary Session was that raised by the Reds in the North-west, who at this time were showing some evidence of a change of heart as well as a desire to resume allegiance to the National Government. A telegram from the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was placed before the meeting in which the latter organization pledged: (1) that the Communist Party will discontinue its efforts to overthrow the National Government by force; (2) that the Soviet Government in China will be renamed the Chinese Republic Special Area Government and the Red Army will be renamed the National Revolutionary Army which will be under the direct control of the Nanking Government and its National Military Council; (3) that the People's Three Principles will be fully carried out within the area under the Special Area Government; (4) that the Communists will discontinue the policy of confiscation of people's land. In return the Reds demanded that the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee agree to carry out the following policies: (1) to stop all civil fighting and concentrate national resources against foreign aggression; (2) to

guarantee freedom of speech and release of all political offenders; (3) to convene a meeting of all parties, factions and armies for national salvation; (4) to complete, as quickly as possible, all preparations to resist Japanese aggression; (5) to improve the living conditions of the people.

The Plenary Session closed on February 20. A lengthy manifesto was issued later, in which a strong stand was taken against the Communists. It was thought, however, that a way would nevertheless be left open for a negotiated peace with the Reds, a peace in which the latter would, on their own initiative, forego a considerable part of their original programme in return for certain practical benefits conferred upon them by the Government. No radical change in the Government's policy was expected, and it was assumed that a long period of negotiations would follow, while in the meantime there would be a complete cessation of military activity on both sides.

Near the end of March, an important military conference was held by the Generalissimo at Hangchow and among those attending were Generals Yu Hsueh-chung and Yang Hu-cheng. These two generals received instructions from Chiang regarding the disposal of their forces. By April 20, the North-eastern troops had all been transferred from Kansu and Shensi to the provinces of Honan and Anhwei. Yu was appointed Pacification Commissioner of Kiangsu. Yang himself resigned his position as Pacification Commissioner of Shensi and the resignation was accepted by the Executive Yuan on May 4. Thereafter, he made preparations to go abroad.

While the internal problem of the Communists and the North-eastern troops was under discussion, a move of international importance was taken by the Government on March 20. This was the appointment of Dr. H. H. Kung, Vice-President of the Executive Yuan and concurrently Minister of Finance, to the post of China's Special Ambassador and Chief Delegate to the Coronation of King George VI and Queen Elizabeth of Great Britain, which was to take place on May 12. Prior to Dr. Kung's departure on April 2, Generalissimo Chiang flew

from Hangchow to Shanghai, where he, with Madame Chiang, gave a tea party in his honour and later visited him at the head office of the Central Bank of China. On this occasion, Chiang declared that in the history of the Chinese Republic none had worked with such self-devotion and success as Dr. Kung.

Ever since the morning of December 12, 1936, Chiang had been suffering from a wrenched back. Although his health was improving rapidly, he needed a lengthy rest. On April 1, the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang granted him a further two months leave of absence. With Chiang, the President of the Executive Yuan, on sick leave, and Dr. H. H. Kung, its Vice-President, on the point of sailing for England as the head of the Chinese delegation to the British Coronation, Dr. Wang Chung-hui, successor of Chang Chun as Minister of Foreign Affairs, was named acting President of the Executive Yuan. Chiang spent most of the holidays at Chikow, where he attended the memorial service of his elder brother Chiang Shih-hou.

When his leave of absence drew to its close, Chiang left Nanking for Kuling aboard the gunboat Chungshan. Upon his arrival there on May 27, he announced his resumption of office. He immediately opened the summer training institute for army commanders and called a conference of intellectual leaders to discuss questions of national importance.

## CHAPTER XXXII

**Chiang Kai-shek And The Communists—Early Distrust Of Soviet Advisers—National Government Denounces Communism—Reds Take And Lose Canton—Russian Advisers Implicated—Military Strength Of Reds—Anti-Communist Campaign In Kiangsi—Government Reverses—Chiang Orders General Offensive—Japanese Invasion Assists Reds—Chiang Resists War Pressure—Communist Threat To Nanchang—Government Air Force Distinguishes Itself—Reds Repentant**

IT WILL thus be seen that Chiang Kai-shek's life during the last decade has been truly full of events. Nothing, however, absorbed more of his time and his energy than the campaign against the Communists who at one time were as serious a menace to the nation as the Japanese aggressors. This makes it necessary to give a connected account of the events leading to the Communist campaigns, the progress of the campaigns and the obstacles which prevented their more speedy success, as well as of Chiang's untiring efforts to seek a solution of the Communist problem by peaceful means such as the regeneration of the lives of the people, economic reconstruction and rural reforms.

From the outset Chiang Kai-shek was no great admirer of what was known as the "Soviet orientation" as he did not believe that Communism, as practised in Russia, was suitable for China. In that he was, to a certain extent, supported by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, but the latter did not realize that the Communists sought to bring China under the domination of Moscow. Chiang early saw through their plans, and endeavoured, but unsuccessfully, to convince Dr. Sun of this.

After Dr. Sun's death, Chiang was in a quandary. He had already been in conflict with the Soviet advisers and the Communist wing of the Chinese Nationalist Party, and, in combination, they determined to overthrow Chiang and the Kuomintang, but, if he were to take immediate action against them, the cry was certain to be raised that he was recreant to the policies of the late Leader. If he did not take action, ruin was likely to overtake the country.

Chiang, however, made up his mind that, when the time came, he would risk the charge that he was disregarding Dr. Sun's wishes, and take steps to remove the Communist menace to his country. He was soon given the opportunity. There had been trouble with the Communists at Canton earlier, but they threw off all disguise even before the Northern Expedition had left Kwangtung in 1926. The differences, as has already been seen, developed into an acute crisis that led to a definite break with the Communists in 1927. The intrigues to involve Chiang in complications with foreign Powers only served to strengthen his determination to get rid of the subversive elements which were reaching for supreme power in China regardless of the means employed.

Immediately after its organization at Nanking on April 18, 1927, the new Government issued a proclamation denouncing Communism and ordering a purification of the Army and the civil service. In the meantime, Wang Ching-wei and other Kuomintang leaders at Hankow continued their efforts to maintain co-operation with the Communists. On June 1, (as already related in Chapter X) Wang learned from the Indian Communist, M. N. Roy, the contents of a telegram of instructions from Moscow to himself (Roy) and Borodin relating to their political tactics in China, which the latter had attempted to conceal from Wang. This message showed clearly the intention of the Communists to dominate China. Roy had wrongly estimated the power of the Kuomintang, but Borodin understood that revealing the contents of the message would lead to a break. Wang and his associates did actually come to a final break with the Communists at

Hankow on July 15 by proposing their expulsion from the Kuomintang.

After this, the Communists started a reign of terror in Kiangsi. Without warning, the Twentieth Army under Ho Lung and Yeh Ting's division of the Eleventh Army withdrew to Nanchang in Kiangsi. On July 30, they declared their independence, and set up a Revolutionary Committee. Banks and exchange shops in Nanchang were looted, and sections of the city were set on fire, but troops under Chu Pei-teh arrived in time, defeated the Communists under Ho Lung and Yeh Ting and pursued them into Kwangtung.

Towards the end of 1927, the Communists began establishing local Soviet "governments" in different parts of China. Soviet groups were formed at Hoifung (Haifeng) and Lukfung (Lofeng), and at the former place the first "Congress of Soviet Workers, Farmers, Soldiers and Urban Proletarians" was held on November 7.

On December 11, the Communists led an insurrection at Canton and in a few hours made themselves masters of the city. It was, however, re-occupied by troops of the Central Government two days later, but the brief insurrection had cost 15,000 lives and caused material losses, estimated at \$50,000,000. The Russians were involved in the Canton insurrection, and this led to the cancellation of the *exequaturs* of all Russian Consuls throughout the country.

Military operations subsequently conducted by the authorities at Canton and Swatow drove the Communists from Hoifung and Lukfung and put an end to their so-called "Government of Hailofeng" in February, 1928, thereby liquidating the Communist movement in the province of Kwangtung.

A renewal of internal dissensions in China at this time gave the Communists a golden opportunity to establish their party, to organize an army of considerable size and to Sovietize extensive areas, particularly in Kiangsi. The serious agrarian situation in that province, as well as local misgovernment, contributed to a rapid growth of their movement. By

the beginning of 1929, there were, perhaps, as many as 100,000 Communist Party members. By the spring of 1930, many of the western *hsien* (districts) of Fukien had organized their own Soviets. In the summer of the same year, the Communist Army captured Changsha in Hunan and held the city for ten days.

Immediately after the quelling of the Feng-Yen revolt, the National Government turned its entire attention to the Communist menace, which had been steadily growing more threatening in the central provinces of China. At the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, held at Nanking from November 12 to 18, it was decided that the Communists and bandits in China must be completely suppressed.

On December 6, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek left Nanking to open the campaign. Prior to his departure, he issued a circular message to the people of Hupeh, Hunan and Kiangsi. In this he explained that the campaign was for the purpose of clearing the provinces of small outlaw bands as well as large Communist hordes. He hoped that a death-blow to banditry would be struck and general peace and order assured. As the people had long been victims to Communist extortion, the Government had given orders that the bandit-suppression forces should be entirely financed by Nanking, and they had been ordered not, on any account, to raise funds from the people among whom they were stationed. Special measures were to be taken for the relief of those who had suffered from Communist excesses. The Government, he announced, would attempt to restore to their homes persons who had been driven away.

The people in return, the Generalissimo emphasized, should give whole-hearted adhesion to the Three People's Principles, support the Kuomintang and assist in every way in the final suppression of the Communists. To accomplish the latter object they should form volunteer corps. The Generalissimo concluded his appeal by insisting that they should take an active part in the efforts that were being made on their

behalf, and that they should not be content to be mere observers.

The Generalissimo reported the capture of Tungku on December 19 by Government troops under Kung Ping-fan. Tungku had served as the "Soviet Capital" of the Communist "Government" organized by Chu Teh, Yeh Ting, Ho Lung and other Red leaders. More Red strongholds were captured later.

Returning to the Capital, where his presence was urgently needed, the Generalissimo left the 18th division, under command of Chang Hui-tsan, to continue the expedition. Chang, having allowed himself to be lured away from his base, was surrounded by the Communists. His division was annihilated, and he was captured and executed by the Reds. The 50th division, which followed the 18th, narrowly escaped a similar fate.

A second expedition was organized in February, 1931, consisting of three divisions under the command of Ho Ying-chin, the Minister of War. Ho's army entered the mountainous regions of Kiangsi, but was unable to accomplish much owing to the elusive tactics adopted by the Reds. They avoided engaging in battle with Ho's superior forces, retreated into the inaccessible mountains or, in some instances, dispersed their forces to reassemble later at a distant point. In addition, they resorted to surprise attacks, using sometimes for this purpose infiltrations of Communists in plain clothes. In view of these tactics of the Reds, the Generalissimo decided upon mustering a larger force for the campaign.

On June 7, the Generalissimo left Nanking for Kiangsi to take charge of the campaign. On the eve of his departure, he issued three statements, one to the Army, another to the people and a third to the farmers of the Red-infested areas, in each statement dealing with the menace of the Communists. Arriving at Nanchang on June 22, he immediately made various military appointments. A political committee was created to reorganize and rehabilitate the devastated areas recovered from the Reds.

On June 30, the Generalissimo ordered the opening of a

general offensive against the Communists, which was carried out simultaneously from different directions. In two days, the Reds, after a series of desperate battles, were forced back to their political centre at Tungku where they were encircled. On July 2, he left for the Fuchow front in order to be in a position better to direct the campaign. The defeated Communists began to flee to the mountains on July 9, and on July 17 Tungku again fell to the Government forces. Three days later, another important city, Shihcheng, was taken, while the main units of the Reds retreated to their stronghold at Juikin.

After a brief lull in the fighting, the campaign was resumed in full force in September. The neighbourhood of Tungku was cleared of the Reds. Six corps of the Red Army tried to reach Yutu, the new seat of the "Soviet Government" in Kiangsi, but were intercepted by the Nineteenth Route Army at Kaohingsu, where the Reds lost 2,000 men and three commanders. The left wing of the bandit-suppression Army reached the suburbs of Hweichang in the extreme south-east of Kiangsi, while the Eighteenth Army entered Juikin on September 13.

The invasion of Manchuria by the Japanese Army brought the campaign against the Communists to a sudden halt. Despite the diplomatic fiction to the contrary, there was now virtual war existing between China and Japan, and the National Government was obliged to transfer troops to other localities to meet the threat of foreign invasion—a threat which soon developed into an actuality in the city of Shanghai and its vicinity, where the Nineteenth Route Army and the Fifth Army met the Japanese forces in battle.

The Reds in Kiangsi seized the favourable opportunity that was created for them by the Japanese to take the initiative with their large armies, estimated by the Reds themselves as numbering close to 230,000, and reconquered some of the territory they had lost. It is probable that the Reds would have been completely cleared out of Kiangsi before the end of 1931 but for the changed situation brought about by the action of the Japanese Army in the North.

What had given to the Communists a still better chance to stage a "come-back" was the resignation of Chiang Kai-shek, forced upon him by the politicians in the South-west in December. He did not rejoin the Government until March 7, 1932, when he was appointed by the Central Political Council to the chairmanship of the National Military Council, which concurrently carried with it the position of Commander-in-Chief of the National Army of China. After his resumption of the most important military post in the land, Chiang devoted one month of his time to devising means for national defence against Japanese aggression. It was not until April 12 that he was able to give his attention exclusively to the anti-Communist campaign again. On that day, he called a military conference of the leaders operating in the Communist-infested provinces at Kuling in Kiangsi.

By April 28, the Generalissimo was in Hankow where he made his headquarters for the direction of a more vigorous campaign against the Reds in Hupeh, Honan and Anhwei. The Red forces in these provinces were shortly afterwards completely routed, and their strongholds at Kinkiachai and Sintsi on the Hupeh-Honan border were captured. They were forced to retreat and a part of their forces fled to the north-west, entering the province of Szechwan.

Additional conferences were held at both Kuling and Hankow at which the Red situation was discussed. It was realized by this time that the Communist problem was not entirely a military one. The Generalissimo declared that it was only 30 per cent. military and 70 per cent. economic. As Chairman of the National Military Council, he announced after these conferences that it had been decided to follow the plans adopted by a great Manchu statesman a hundred years before. According to his instructions, each *hsien* was to organize its own civil volunteer corps of 500 men, while the Government would choose certain of the elder gentry of the *hsien* as the leaders of these corps. The men were to receive military training from instructors appointed by the National Government, which was also to supply their fighting equipment.

Defence plans were worked out for each group of five *hsien*. The provincial authorities were to build motor roads connecting various important strategic districts, thereby solving one of the major difficulties in the Government's campaign against the Reds. A scale of rewards was offered for the capture of the Communist commanders.

In the month of August, Wang Ching-wei, President of the Executive Yuan, resigned and, simultaneously, the whole Cabinet relinquished office. Amidst his anti-Communist operations, Chiang Kai-shek was called upon to use his influence in persuading Wang to remain in office and his Cabinet colleagues to withdraw their resignations. One of the reasons which had prompted Wang to resign was his dissatisfaction with Chang Hsueh-liang in North China. Chiang had to use gentle means of persuasion to secure Chang's resignation in order to satisfy Wang.

Despite these political squabbles, the National Army under the direction of Chiang Kai-shek was literally chasing the Communists hither and thither. The tactics of the Reds were to flee before the superior forces of the Government. Taking what they wanted from the people, they were not troubled by problems of transport and supply as were the troops of the Government. The Reds, suppressed in one quarter, would frequently, by assuming the guise of simple peasants, again appear at some point which their sources of information had revealed as a weak spot in the defences of the National forces. In spite of such tactics of the Reds, the Government troops scored notable successes.

As a part of the measures to prevent the constantly recurring necessity of suppressing the same bands over and over again, the Generalissimo worked out definite methods of dealing with them. Leaders of the Reds against whom the evidence was clear were to be executed. Others who could obtain guarantees from three elders of their clan or village certifying that they had been coerced into joining the Reds were placed under surveillance by the local authorities. Still others, who professed a willingness to turn over a new leaf

but could obtain no guarantors, were organized into labour battalions and assigned to areas behind the front for labour on reconstruction projects, for which they were paid.

Near the end of October, when the anti-Communist campaign was in full swing, Han Fu-chu in Shantung began to show signs of dissatisfaction as a result of a dispute between him and Liu Chen-nien. Han submitted his resignation, which meant, of course, more trouble for the National Government. Prompt steps taken by the Generalissimo to meet any situation which might arise led Han to reconsider his attitude and, on October 26, he announced his willingness to stay at his post in accordance with the wishes of the National Government. Thus the anti-Communist campaign was in no way affected.

The hope of an early termination of the campaign in the central provinces of China was voiced by the Generalissimo at a reception given at Hankow on December 4 to the members of the inspection party of the National Flood Relief Commission who were visiting the areas recovered from the Reds. After expressing his appreciation of the foreign assistance given to flood refugees, he said: "In spite of foreign aggression and internal dissension and in spite of floods and Communists we are able to cut through a road to get us out of all difficulties. We have not yet emerged from the crisis, but we believe that the end is in sight and we are confident of our ability to lay a firm foundation for the nation."

On December 10, 1932, the Generalissimo returned to Nanking to attend the Third Plenary Session of the Fourth Central Executive and Supervisory Committees, which opened at the Capital on December 16 under his chairmanship. At this Plenary Session, he submitted a detailed report on the campaign. The report showed that success had crowned the efforts made owing to the simultaneous employment of political and military measures, which included the initial step of ordering the provinces to effect thorough-going internal reforms. By the rehabilitation of ravaged areas, and by educating the people along lines calculated to promote clean

living and right thinking, much confidence on the part of the inhabitants, according to the report, had been created such as had not previously existed. For the promotion of the welfare of the people and the carrying out of reforms in the recovered territory, ■ Committee of Party and Civil Affairs was organized, contributing greatly towards a close co-operation of civil, military and Party authorities.

The military measures had been carefully prepared in the light of past experience, the report pointed out, and at Hankow a Bandit-Suppression Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters was established with nine departments. Referring to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the report admitted that it had caused a temporary suspension of the campaign and even later continued to affect it. Nevertheless, operations were resumed with vigour at the end of June, 1932, and in four months these had resulted in the complete defeat of well-organized Communist forces under such leaders as Hsu Hsiang-chien and Kuang Chi-hsun, whose Army numbered 70,000 men with 50,000 rifles; Ho Lung and Tuan Teh-chang with 40,000 men and 20,000 rifles, and Kung Ho-chung, known as the Red Commander-in-Chief, with 20,000 men and 10,000 rifles.

The Commander-in-Chief's report continued that unfortunately the Communists were extremely mobile, using airplanes, motor boats and launches; at certain strongholds they had established workshops and schools with even an arsenal at one town; they avoided fighting in the open wherever possible, and were favoured by the excessive heat of the summer. Though the Reds depended on guerilla tactics, they could not avoid being rounded up by the encircling movements of the Government troops. Intensive fighting took place in many localities, which resulted in the Reds being killed by thousands, their strongholds captured, two of their airplanes, named "Marx" and "Lenin" being taken at Sintsi the centre of Red activities, together with two gunboats both of which were called "Lenin," and large military stores at Hunghu. In conclusion, the report indicated that the remain-

ing Communists, who had escaped to the hills in Honan, Hupeh and Anhwei, were being relentlessly pursued. In the territory that had been recovered by the Government a thorough house-cleaning was being effected. Optimistically, the report suggested that no further military campaign would be required in these three provinces.

The year 1933 commenced with an attack by the Japanese on Shanhaikwan which eventually led to their occupation of Jehol. Taking advantage of the critical situation in North China which prevented the Generalissimo from fully focussing his attention on the campaign, the Communists attacked the 5th division under Chou Hun-yuan towards the end of January, but they were held in check by the Eighteenth Army under Chen Cheng and the Twenty-sixth Army under Sun Lien-chung. On January 30, the Generalissimo arrived in Nanchang whither commanding generals from various armies and divisions on the front were summoned for orders. After instructing Liu Ho-ting and Sun Lien-chung to round up the forces of Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung in the early part of February, he turned his attention again to the Jehol situation.

A hurried trip to Paoting in Hopei was made by the Generalissimo on March 6, and four days later Chang Hsueh-liang resigned. This left the Generalissimo in supreme command in the North, and on March 26, he returned to Nanking where he conferred with Sun Fo and Wang Ching-wei. After seeing to it that Wang resumed his duties as head of the Executive Yuan, he left Nanking for the anti-Communist campaign on April 4, arriving in Hankow on the 5th and in Nanchang on the 6th. His presence was needed there. The 52nd, 59th and 37th divisions of Chen Cheng's Eighteenth Army had been routed by the Communists under Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung. The remaining Government forces seemed to have lost their fighting spirit, and the Reds quickly advanced to Sinkan, 80 miles south of Nanchang. By the time Chiang arrived at the front, heavy fighting was going on at Changshuchen, only 45 miles from the capital of Kiangsi.

Realizing the seriousness of the situation, the General-

issimo had sent the crack 87th and 88th divisions to the front before leaving the National Capital. This action in itself was sufficient testimony to the gravity of the Communist menace, for the Generalissimo, like all good commanders, always keeps some of his best troops in reserve. Incidentally, this practice has laid him open to criticism from civilians, who have charged him with discrimination in keeping his favourite divisions in the rear and sending other units to the front, but it was Chiang himself who ordered these personally-trained units of his to the front as a part of the Fifth Army to oppose the Japanese in the Shanghai War, and he now took the same divisions into Kiangsi to meet the Red menace, as the time had again come to use his reserves.

The Reds were actually planning to capture Nanchang. They were ready to march upon the provincial capital by three routes, the eastern Red Army under Fang Chih-min and Shao Shih-ping, the western under Kung Ho-chung, and the southern of 100,000 men under Chu Teh. Speaking of the situation at the time, a special correspondent of the "North-China Daily News" wrote: "The people of Nanchang became very apprehensive and were ready to evacuate in case either Changshu, 180 *li* south of Nanchang, or Fuchow, 170 *li* south-east of Nanchang, fell into Red hands. Fortunately Chiang Kai-shek came in time to stir up the fighting spirit of the Government troops and put a stop to the Communists' advance. No doubt Chiang's arrival with the 87th and 88th divisions saved the provincial capital ...." The critical situation in Kiangsi was quickly ameliorated.

During the summer of 1933, careful preparations were made by the Generalissimo at his headquarters for the resumption of operations on a larger scale against the Communists. The plans included, not only a military drive on the Reds but a "mopping up" of the dispersed Red units after their defeat as well as the rehabilitation of the recaptured areas. Nanchang, the base of the anti-Communist drive, was strengthened by additional military units; armoured cars, tanks and military supplies were moved up to the front; three

specially constructed airdromes provided bases for aircraft to assist in the campaign, and a special Peace Preservation Corps of 2,000 men was created. The drive was to have started in September, but there was delay as the Generalissimo insisted that the preparations should be thorough and nothing left to chance. The National Army leaders were confident that the greater part, if not all, of the Red area in south Kiangsi would be in the hands of the Government by Christmas.

The Reds at this time were estimated to have a man-power of no less than 500,000 men, of whom some were professional soldiers. The majority of them, however, were simple peasants who were forced to fight for a cause of which they had only the most hazy conception. Against this vast horde, the Generalissimo mustered a force of 150,000, certainly fewer in number than the Reds, but better-equipped and trained and more conscious of what they were fighting for.

Airplanes played an important role before the campaign started by bringing in photographs of the Red area. These showed that the Reds under Chu Teh were not relying on a main line of defence, but had placed machine guns in such positions as to cover the principal points of vantage. The difficulties facing the Government forces in the mountainous country were enormous, and the lines of communication were often no more than narrow stone paths with countless flights of steps that led through the passes. It was difficult for the planes to locate the main bodies of the Reds, for they had learned to conceal themselves in the daytime in the scrub timber with which the countryside abounded.

As a part of his preparations for the drive against the Communists, the Generalissimo issued in September a lengthy proclamation in which he promised that all persons who had been induced to join the ranks of the Reds either by coercion or by cajolery and who had not undertaken any important duties for them would be treated with leniency in order that they might have an opportunity of turning over a new leaf. The persons entitled to this lenient treatment included ignorant

persons who had joined the Reds blindly; those who had been coerced or enticed into joining; those who had been compelled to join them in order to preserve life and property; retired soldiers, unemployed vagabonds and impoverished farmers, who, due to the difficulty of obtaining legitimate means of livelihood, had been forced to throw in their lot with the Reds; those who had been induced to join by their near relatives or kinsmen; those who, though educated and in possession of intellectual powers, had been deluded by the Communists; those who, having unwittingly succumbed to the wiles of women Communists, were compelled to join the Reds, and those who, though having rendered some services to the Reds in the bandit-districts, were, however, in subordinate positions, or had been compelled to render such service by coercion.

In order that persons of these categories, who had renounced their connection with the Reds, might be converted into useful and law-abiding citizens, the Generalissimo caused to be established a provincial reformatory whose main function was to give these penitents a proper education and training in some useful art or profession. Treatment for the penitents as administered in the reformatory was of a very diversified nature, being adapted to the character, weaknesses or other special conditions of each individual.

The Generalissimo also issued a monograph on the methods of bandit-suppression as employed by some of the most famous military leaders in the Manchu Dynasty which he had compiled during his leisure time and copies of which were distributed among his commanders for their information. Having made an exhaustive study of the works and memoirs of such famous generals as Tseng Kuo-fan who fought the Taipings and Tso Tsung-tang who reconquered Sinkiang, he had become convinced that profitable lessons might be drawn from their experiences.

The monograph is divided into five chapters, dealing among other things with the system of *pao-chia* (or mutual guarantee, that is, a system whereby the inhabitants of a

village are held jointly accountable for the misconduct of any of its members), the system of militia, which was responsible for the success of Marquis Tseng Kuo-fan against the Taiping rebels, the storage of surplus food stuffs, bandit-suppression expenditures, and methods of offence and defence against the bandits. In a brief preface the Generalissimo said that the methods used by these leaders might still be followed with profit at the present juncture.

Throughout September and October, the preparations continued. He instructed his troops to refrain from making any advance until they were sure that they could hold their line if attacked by the Red forces. Fortified positions and miles of blockhouses were constructed along the entire Government front. Towards the end of October the Reds advanced upon Wanhsien, but the city was relieved by the 5th division of the Twenty-first Route Army. They were also active in the upper valleys of the Yangtze, and captured several cities on the east border of Szechwan. The loss of a number of strategic points in eastern Szechwan on October 21 aroused the anger of Generalissimo Chiang. He despatched a strongly-worded telegram to Liu Hsiang, Commander-in-Chief of the anti-Communist forces in that province, ordering the arrest of Liu Chen-hou, commander of the Twenty-third Army, who had fled with his bodyguard from Sutting when the Reds made a surprise attack on the place.

The Generalissimo finally launched his well-prepared campaign against the Communists. In a fortnight, two important victories were won on the eastern border adjacent to Fukien. The first battle was the severest and lasted for more than ten days. The final engagement, that decided the issue, was fought at Tzeki, a small city right on the border of Fukien, surrounded by high mountains on three sides. The Government troops advanced from the north, the only accessible side, and subjected the Reds to heavy bombardment both by artillery and by bombing planes. The Reds were badly beaten, losing between 7,000 and 10,000 killed. The remnants of the routed First, Third, Fifth and Seventh Army

Corps of the Reds scattered into the surrounding mountains pursued by bombing squadrons. Terrified by the defeats, the Reds shifted their "Soviet Government" from Juikin to Hwei-chang in south Kiangsi.

After these two victories, Government planes making reconnaissance flights over the infested areas, dropped anti-Communist literature among the Reds, urging them to surrender, promising them good treatment and offering them rewards for the delivery of their leaders.

From north-west Kiangsi came reports of the complete destruction of the Communist branch government at Tama-shan, which had been isolated for a long time. A sudden surprise attack by the division under Kuo Ju-tung caught the Communists unprepared and they were routed, leaving behind them as they fled large quantities of military supplies.

On November 20, another pestiferous revolt had broken out, this time led by a combination of military leaders and politicians in Fukien. This revolt was sufficiently serious to interfere with the campaign for the suppression of the Communists by causing a division of forces, though by no means stopping it. The interruption thus afforded prevented the Government from achieving its full objective in the campaign against the Reds by the end of the year. Nevertheless five major successes over the Communists had been won in eastern Kiangsi. Miles of blockhouses covered the countryside; Red leaders had been caught and executed; the blockade method and the persistence of the Government forces were plainly wearing down the resistance of the subversive elements. Most important of all, rehabilitation in the reconquered areas was following up victory on the field of battle.

## CHAPTER XXXIII

Preparations For "Final Push" Against Communists—General Drive Launched In Four Provinces—Capital Of Communist Government Captured—Flight Of Communists To Szechwan, Kweichow, Yunnan, Shansi And Shensi—Distinguished Services Of Special Movement Force—Co-operation Of Kwangsi In Harassing Communists—Defeat Of Red Leader Hsu Hai-tung—Communists Fraternizing With Chang Hsueh-liang's Troops—Their Readiness To Surrender To Government After Sian Trouble

THE anti-Communist campaign of 1934 was a continuation of the operations against the Reds, which started in 1933. The same tactics, which were employed extensively in the previous year, namely, the building of public roads, the construction of blockhouses and the enforcement of the economic blockade against the Reds, were continued, as the Generalissimo's plan involved an encirclement of the Red-infested area, and ultimately a reduction of the territory in which they committed their depredations. Reports received from Nanchang on February 7 showed that the Government's effective tactics were surely destroying the Reds in Kiangsi. A week later, an important Communist centre in Hupeh was captured. Losing their strongholds at Yungsin and Suichwan in western Kiangsi, the Reds made a desperate attempt to capture Kiukiang, but were beaten off with heavy losses.

The main efforts of the Generalissimo during the early part of the year, however, were concentrated upon preparations for the "final push" which was scheduled for April. By this time his forces had been largely augmented and numbered

no less than 300,000 men. The additions included the South Route Anti-Red Armies of six divisions led by Chen Chi-tang, the Canton military leader whom the Generalissimo had at last persuaded to recognize his obligations to the Central Government. Chen's forces were to be used against the Reds by two routes in accordance with the instructions of the Generalissimo. Other additions included 20,000 cadets of the temporary military academy organized by the Generalissimo at Lushan. Air depots had been increased, located along all parts of the front line and a modern air force of 150 fighting, scouting, pursuit and bombing planes, piloted by young aviators, assisted in the campaign.

There was, however, some delay in achieving important results due to the slowness of the Southern leaders to accept proposals for co-operation, but these difficulties were finally eliminated at a conference on June 23-27 between military commanders representing the Central Government and those of the South. As a result, commands and movements of the Government forces in Kiangsi, Fukien and Kwangsi were correlated and concerted. A general anti-Red drive was launched simultaneously in the provinces of Hupeh, Hunan, Kiangsi and Fukien in the later part of June. It was followed by the quick capture of various Communist strategic towns in southern and eastern Kiangsi. On July 18 another conference was held, attended by various commanders in Kiangsi who were given three months by the Generalissimo to clean up the Reds in their respective areas.

The Reds in Kiangsi had been reduced in the month of July to the dire straits of fleeing, hiding and guerilla warfare. A considerable number of them succeeded in breaking through the Government's blockade into Fukien, where they occupied Yungan, Yuki and Tatien, but the Government troops soon halted their advance and retook several important districts, forcing the Communists to flee to western Fukien. By the end of August, the Communist grip on northern Fukien collapsed, and the Government troops were advancing upon the Red strongholds in south-western Fukien.

In the beginning of September, Government troops took Hingkwo in southern Kiangsi, and in October 2,000 Communists surrendered after their defeat at Nanfeng. In a speech at Sian, during his tour of the North-west, the Generalissimo revealed that by the first part of October the Reds, who had formerly controlled 70 *hsien* in Kiangsi, then held but six. He estimated that, at this time, 50,000 Reds still remained at large in Kiangsi and Fukien. The end of the Red menace in these districts, however, was clearly in sight. The Generalissimo told his hearers that the Communists were now surrounded by the joint Government forces of Kiangsi, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Fukien and Hunan. As a matter of fact, he asserted, the Government forces could take the remaining Red districts any time they wished, but the high command desired to continue its policy of road-building and blockhouse construction so that there might be no possible chance for the Reds to come back.

The Generalissimo's predictions were quickly verified, for, on November 9, Changting was captured and the Government troops concentrated at Hingkwo for the final round-up. On the 10th, Juikin, the Capital of the "Communist government" in Kiangsi, was taken, and the remnant Reds fled towards the borders of Hunan, Szechwan and Kweichow. On November 13, Ho Chien took command of the Government Armies in order to effect the final annihilation of the fleeing Reds. A great demonstration was held in Nanchang on December 3 to celebrate the success of Generalissimo Chiang's campaign. More than 50,000 persons participated in a lantern parade.

When the forces under the command of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek were relatively small, as in the days of the old 1st division organized from the Whampoa Cadets, there was no special difficulty in bringing about a high state of discipline among them, but when the number of men under his orders began to run into the hundreds of thousands, the difficulties of enforcing his commands throughout all units naturally became greater. It was this situation, for the most part, that led the Generalissimo to organize the Pieh Tung Tui or Special Movement Force, consisting entirely of officers, with

one main corps and five subsidiary groups and numbering 24,000 men. The organization has sometimes been referred to as the Generalissimo's O. G. P. U., but the comparison is not a fair one. It more nearly corresponded to a combination of the intelligence section and of the military police, such as are to be found in all modern armies, although there were certain special duties assigned to this corps that made them a distinctive unit peculiar to the National Army of China.

The main duties of the Pieh Tung Tui were: (1) secret service work; (2) rounding up of stray bandits and Reds; (3) the capture of army deserters; (4) enforcement of the blockade (against the Communists); (5) to search travellers and arrest suspects; (6) to supervise the military postal system; (7) to assist the Army generally; (8) to see that the troops behaved themselves and did not molest the farmers and common people; (9) organization and training of the masses, and (10) to help the people and see that they got a fair deal.

Being an instrument to make effective the orders of the Commander-in-Chief himself, the organization was directly responsible to him, through its commander, Kang Chao-min. Because of its special nature, officers in the National Army as high in rank as division commanders were subject to the orders of the Pieh Tung Tui. When soldiers captured a place, they were not allowed to roam about and appropriate whatever they wished as was formerly the case under the *tuchun* system, for the Pieh Tung Tui exercised careful supervision and saw to it that military law was strictly upheld. Inasmuch as the members of the force often operated in *mufti*, they had offenders at the disadvantage of not knowing when their illegal actions were being observed. Those caught violating the rules were promptly dealt with. In this way, the Generalissimo was able to reduce to a minimum the cases where clashes occurred between troops and civilians, for the Pieh Tung Tui, while not a terrorist organization, made itself feared by evildoers.

In its work, the Pieh Tung Tui co-operated with the local authorities whenever it was possible to do so, although at times

it might find it necessary to act independently of them. During their efforts to cleanse the recovered districts of undesirable elements it was found that mischief-makers congregated in houses of ill-fame, gambling and opium-smoking dens. These places were promptly suppressed and their inmates, in many cases, driven out of the district.

The activities of the organization thus far mentioned are mostly those of a military police nature, but in addition they played a leading rôle in all sorts of emergency situations. Where roads were urgently needed, the Pieh Tung Tui managed somehow to get them built, largely by securing the co-operation of local authorities. The care and feeding of refugees was another of their duties and in this connection they established food kitchens in cities where gruel was distributed gratis. They even helped the farmers with the gathering of their crops in cases where the peasants were short-handed because of labour commandeered for road-building.

Another of the manifold duties of the Pieh Tung Tui was that of opening schools in the recovered areas. Under the Red regime, schools in the devastated districts had gone from bad to worse but, as a part of the programme of recovery, schools were opened as soon as possible under the directions of the Pieh Tung Tui. For instance, in Fuchow, with a population of less than 30,000, twenty primary schools were opened with 3,000 pupils under its guidance. As soon as efficient teachers could be found or trained the organization withdrew and left the work of education to the local authorities.

Under the leadership of the Pieh Tung Tui, 11 health clinics were opened and no less than 70,000 people received free treatment or medicine. In addition, this efficient corps of officers took the initiative in giving the people instruction in matters of sanitation and cleanliness.

Another duty of the corps was the consideration of complaints from the people. Most of the complaints were made against village, town or *hsien* elders who, greedy for money and extended authority, had oppressed the people in various ways. When complaints were lodged, investigations were

made and upon conviction the offenders were fined not less than \$250 and given prison sentences ranging from one to three years. In case public funds were embezzled, the guilty ones were made to disgorge their ill-gotten gains; were fined ■ similar amount for public works; and the oppressive gentry and corrupt officials in general were sternly dealt with. In cases of disputes between the people, the Pieh Tung Tui frequently acted as a mediator in bringing about an amicable settlement of the controversy.

The more specific military duty of the Special Movement Force was the training of local militia units. When all the Reds had been cleaned up in a place, a member of the Pieh Tung Tui was placed in charge of the volunteers to give them suitable training for ■ period of three months. More than 300,000 men of these local units were given such ■ rigorous training that they proved entirely trustworthy for the tasks assigned to them.

Other special military duties included the use of some of the Communists' own tactics by sending members of this special corps in plain clothes behind the lines of the Reds where they stirred up trouble, distracted the attention of the Reds, and thus enabled surprise attacks to be carried out by the regular troops. In addition, when the regular forces had recovered a piece of territory, the members of the Pieh Tung Tui saw to it that the stragglers and dispersed Reds were "mopped up," so that they were unable to make attacks from the rear as they formerly did.

While the members of this force were all officers, they were not highly paid, the rank and file receiving only \$12 a month. All of them were educated men, some of them graduates of higher primary or middle schools while others were graduates or former pupils of the Whampoa Military Academy at Canton, the Central Military Academy in Nanking, or the Officers' Training Institutes. The members were required to take a special oath to act justly and to deal fairly in and with all things. The Generalissimo had inspired the Pieh Tung Tui with some of his own Spartan ideals of service and self-

sacrifice. Referring to their hardships, one officer of the organization put it that they had been "eating bitterness" with the people, but their sacrifices had not been in vain, for the people of Kiangsi appreciated what had been done for them by the Generalissimo's special corps.

In an interview with newspaper correspondents at Nanking on November 29, 1934, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek stated that vigorous methods of suppression of the Red menace would be carried on until the baneful influence of the Communists in the country was completely stamped out. The people in the former bandit-ridden area were already beginning to look with hope to a new era of peace and security, he declared. Speaking of the campaign in Kiangsi, he said:

"Communists have been marauding the province of Kiangsi and neighbouring territories for the last six or seven years. At one time, out of 81 *hsien* in Kiangsi, at least two-thirds were under their oppression. Only 26 *hsien* had not been overrun by them.

"It is appalling to record that some 6,000,000 people have been rendered homeless and driven into exile and suffering, while 1,000,000 innocent victims have been slaughtered in cold blood by these ruthless raiders. In addition, a large proportion of the population of Kiangsi Province are suffering from continued malnutrition and have been reduced to almost unbelievable living conditions as a result of the Communist regime. They are still dying in large numbers, despite all relief efforts made by the Government. It is impossible to compute even the approximate value of the property destroyed.

"The strong hand of executive authority, complete reorganization of the Army, co-operation between the Government and the people, and economic planning for the future have, however, all combined completely to rid the province of this terrible menace. The adjoining province of Fukien is rapidly being cleared of scattered remnants of the Communists, most of whom are attempting to flee westward. They are, however, being checked and surrounded at several points by units of the National Army.

"Looking back over these terrible years, one is forced to the conclusion that Communists are inhuman. Words are totally inadequate to convey to outsiders what our people have suffered. They have not merely been deprived of the bare necessities of life, but in desperation many of them have joined these fanatics and become brutalized.

"As the Nationalist troops forced their way into bandit-controlled territory, they discovered that sections of the people had developed a hardened conscience and insensibility to shame, while the vast majority had succumbed to melancholy. For this I find it hard to forgive the Communists. With the pendulum swinging backward, the whole population has revolted against such savagery and outrages. The people are responding enthusiastically to the Government's programme of recovery and reconstruction and are now very hopeful.

"The people of Kiangsi province are naturally industrious and sober. Nature has endowed them richly. In normal times, the province has an abundance of rice, tea, lumber, coal, wood-oil, tobacco, and paper, in addition to the famed pottery of Kingtchhen. More than half of these wonderful old pottery kilns were at one time destroyed by the Communists. Amidst insuperable difficulties, but aided by the Government's plan for rural reconstruction, the people are now returning to their homes and industrial pursuits.

"With the sun and sky once more visible and with well-organized village defence corps to protect them, the people are developing a sense of hopefulness and security. Out of this welter of bloodshed and social turmoil has emerged a vigorous New Life Movement which is permeating the life of the nation. Officials are putting into practice the spirit of service and feel a moral obligation to better the lot of the people.

"If the officials and people of Kiangsi continue to co-operate in creating a new Kiangsi, who can foretell its portent? Personally, I am convinced that the fate of a nation lies entirely in the hands of its people. If every Chinese citizen from now on can be motivated by a true sense of patriotism,

and can be inspired to pay the price of working ceaselessly toward one goal, out of these years of poignant suffering will emerge a strong and united China.

"People everywhere are asking: How far is the Government prepared to go in the suppression of the Communists prevalent in other provinces? The answer is this. Vigorous methods of suppression will be adopted in all the provinces where armed forces are opposed to law. The National Army will continue its work until abiding tranquillity prevails in the land."

In response to many telegrams received by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as Commander-in-Chief of anti-Communist forces congratulating him on the success of the recent campaign over the Reds, he issued on December 9, 1934, a long statement to the Press pointing out the significance of the mass support to the National Government during the national emergency then existing as well as during the Government's campaign against the Communists. The following is a summary of the message.

Taking the recent victory of the Government forces in the anti-Red campaign as a thought for comment, the Generalissimo made it clear to the people of China that the Red menace had been rooted out by 70 per cent. political measures and 30 per cent. military measures, but it was the intangible force of mass support which had provided the real strength of the Government.

In view of the fact that the people throughout the nation were celebrating the victory of the anti-Red campaign on December 10 in conjunction with the opening of the Fifth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, the Generalissimo explained in his statement "the underlying meaning of the celebration of anti-Communist victory."

In his opinion, instead of celebrating the anti-Red victory, the celebration should be for the victory of the Chinese people. It was through the co-operation of the people and the uniformed men that the suppression of the Reds was possible:

"It is oneness of spirit on the part of the people and the entire nation that we need in order to pull the country through whatever obstacles we may face. The intangible force of oneness in spirit and co-operation is far stronger than any material strength," he emphasized.

He further pointed out that, if the people would support the National Government in its dealings with internal problems and foreign issues whole-heartedly, he had no doubt but that its programme would meet with ultimate success.

Based on this idea, the Generalissimo hoped that, at this juncture, when China's immediate problems were still ■ legend to many, the people would back the Government in its work of national salvation.

In conclusion, he did not conceal the fact that the Red remnants were still seeking to penetrate Szechwan and Kweichow, but he was certain that, with the collapse of the main strongholds in Kiangsi and Fukien, the waning influence of the Reds would cause no great trouble in the future.

The campaign against the Communists in 1934 ended in favour of the Government in the central provinces of China where the power of the Reds was completely broken, especially in Kiangsi where formerly they had been in almost complete control. There still remained remnants of the Red marauders in Hunan, Hupeh and Anhwei, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek issued orders in February, 1935, that these were to be disposed of before April. At the same time, he gave instructions regarding ■ basic plan for reconstruction and pacification work in the areas that had been devastated by the Reds.

The bulk of the Communist forces had fled before the Armies of the Generalissimo into Szechwan and Kweichow. At the beginning of 1935, the Generalissimo formulated plans to pursue still further the demoralized Reds and complete their extermination. On March 1, he held a conference at Hankow with T. V. Soong and H. H. Kung in order to arrange for the financing of the expedition. Immediately thereafter, he departed for Chungking, Szechwan, where he arrived the following day. The Generalissimo at once set to

work to unify the command of the anti-Red forces in Szechwan, Kweichow and Yunnan under himself. The plan of campaign largely involved the use of local troops, but with the finances of the military expeditions under the strict control of the Commander-in-Chief's headquarters.

On April 6, the Reds were defeated in battle in Szechwan and their leader, Chu Teh, was reported killed, although later some doubt was raised as to the truth of the report of his death, but the campaign now developed into a continuous flight of the Reds away from the stronger forces of the Central Government. An appreciation of the difficulties of meeting the tactics of the Reds had by this time come to be realized by those who had given their attention to the problem. A short editorial in the "North-China Daily News" compared the activities of the Reds in Szechwan with those of the Boer leader in South Africa against the British, showing what an immensely difficult problem the British forces faced despite their superior equipment and greater numbers in suppressing a few thousand Boers under De Wet. The editorial comment closed by suggesting that Generalissimo Chiang was showing all the doggedness of Kitchener, who led the British to ultimate victory in South Africa and that, if all of Chiang's generals and troops had the same qualities, everything would soon be well.

By April 13, Generalissimo Chiang was able to announce in a telegram to Wang Ching-wei that the backbone of the Communist strength in Kweichow had been broken. He also continued his purging of officialdom in Szechwan as well as of the military. He had already disposed of Tien Sung-yao, one of the inefficient generals of Szechwan, and he now got rid of Chen Shao-wei, an undesirable official, and appointed Hsieh Lin in his place as Commissioner of Finance.

The plan from now on was to keep the Communists on the move, thereby sapping the morale of their guerilla force, for the initiative had definitely passed to the Government troops. The Generalissimo at this time had the satisfaction of being able to obtain the co-operation of the Kwangsi authorities for

the policy of harassing the Reds. This policy continued throughout the summer months with great success.

On August 14, Generalissimo Chiang returned to Nanking, but before doing so he issued a circular telegram to the people of the frontier regions of Sikang, Tibet and Kokonor urging them to take up arms against the Communists. The temporary headquarters of the Generalissimo in Chengtu issued memorial badges bearing the words "Be reverent to your Fatherland" to the residents of that city, who returned to reclaim their native districts from the Reds. The prescription of capital punishment for military and Government officials found guilty of manufacturing morphia was reiterated in another order.

After a few days spent at the National Capital, Generalissimo Chiang proceeded to Sian, Shensi, where he assumed the concurrent post of Commander-in-Chief of the Bandit-Suppression Forces in the North-west, with Chang Hsueh-liang as Deputy Commander-in-Chief. He established field headquarters in Ichang in addition to those he had already organized at Chengtu and Wuchang. The new headquarters were to have charge, under the directorship of Chen Cheng, of the campaign on the Hunan-Hupeh-Szechwan border. The Generalissimo's trip to Sian was occasioned by the invasion of Kansu by the Reds. It was also reported that another important body of the Communists was heading towards Shansi and Ninghsia from northern Shensi with the reported ultimate aim of capturing Hami, an important city in Sinkiang.

By the beginning of October, the Reds had for the most part been driven out of Szechwan and the principal scene of their activities now shifted to Kansu and other provinces of the North-west. But the hungry Communists stripped bare the districts through which they passed in their flight, eating up, it is claimed, even the stray dogs which had formerly been numerous in the interior.

On October 15, the Generalissimo was in Taiyuan, Shansi, where he conferred with Yen Hsi-shan regarding the Communist menace that now threatened the North-west. Just

before his departure for the National Capital, he gave an address at the weekly memorial services at the Taiyuan Pacification Headquarters, in the course of which he stressed the necessity of meeting the treacheries of the Reds by the exercise of prudence, and their falsehoods with the truth.

One of the last measures of Generalissimo Chiang in 1935 in his campaign against the Reds was the issuance of a stern order to Liu Hsiang and other ranking commanders of the anti-Red forces in Szechwan, in which punishment was threatened for neglect of adequate defence measures against the Communists on the part of those responsible. There would be a strict application of martial law governing such matters, he warned them in his order.

When the Communists were dispersed in the campaign of 1935, large bands of them retreated into the inaccessible mountains of Szechwan. The mutual jealousies and discord that had long existed between the different sections of the provincial troops made the position of the Reds in Szechwan comparatively secure except where they were confronted by the troops of the Central Government. The Generalissimo had in the previous year made Herculean efforts to put down the oppressive militarism of the province, but he realized only too well that his work was incomplete.

One of the more important Red leaders, Hsu Hsiang-chien, had established a rendezvous in the high mountains between Szechwan and Sikang Provinces, whence he sent forth secret emissaries to spread their propaganda in the Chengtu plain. Early in the year 1936, one of his battalions defected and the Government troops rushed through the opening left in his line. As a result, Hsu suffered a serious reverse, losing four of his chief officers besides several thousand rifles and large stores of food.

Hsu and his Red Army then made for the North over bad roads, leaving in their wake terrible suffering and destruction. Reaching the hills opposite Kwanhsien, he pushed his men further northward and towards the west. At one time it was rumoured that they were as near as eight *li* to the capital of

Sikang. Fortunately, these defeated Reds, though inflicting serious hardships on the people, failed to capture any important centre.

In the latter part of February, Communist troops under Hsu Hai-tung advanced into the western part of Shansi and established contact with Communist soldiers under Mao Tsetung in Ilonan Province who were on the move northward, their objective being the capture of Taiyuan, the capital of Shansi, where they hoped to set up a Soviet republic. Yen Hsi-shan, Pacification Commissioner of Shansi and Suiyuan, immediately arranged for the defence of his province. On March 12, a victory over the Reds was reported in a battle about 25 miles south-west of Fenchow, the Reds suffering a loss of 3,000 killed and wounded and 300 captured while the provincial forces lost 500 killed and wounded.

The operations of the Reds in the western half of Shansi at no time amounted to a really serious menace, although it proved a source of embarrassment on account of the way in which the Japanese played the matter up, magnifying the dangers of the situation out of all proportion to the actualities. The authorities were throughout fully competent to meet the Red situation.

Lack of communications had given the Reds a chance to wreak havoc for a short time in Shansi. On March 23, Government troops under Sun Chu engaged in a fierce fight, as a result of which the Communist stronghold at Shihlowchen in western Shansi was captured, this being their most important centre. On the same day, a severe engagement was fought at Shihkow, and when dusk came the Communists disappeared into the hills with the Government troops in pursuit. Chungyang, an important town, fell to the Government troops.

According to Kao Kuei-tzu, commander of the 84th division fighting Communists in Shensi, the Reds in that province at the beginning of April numbered 20,000, but only half of them were properly armed. The largest band of Reds consisted of 3,000 under Liu Tzu-tan. The number of Govern-



The Generalissimo with General Yen Hsi-shan, Pacification Commissioner of Shansi and Suiyuan.



ment troops in Shensi was ten times as great, the main difficulty facing the Government forces being the problem of supplies and transportation.

Despite the fact that the Government troops were actually engaged in annihilating the Reds in Shansi and elsewhere, enemies of the National Government started the absurd rumour that there was a secret understanding between Generalissimo Chiang and the Red troops. It was urged that the Reds were used merely as a pretext in order to bring Shansi fully under the control of the authorities at Nanking, the province for more than 20 years having been principally under the rule of Yen Hsi-shan.

Early in April, the Shansi troops relieved Hungtung in southern Shansi, thereby ensuring the safety of certain foreign missionaries whose alleged peril had caused much alarm among foreigners. By this time it was apparent that the Red peril in Shansi was well on its way towards liquidation. From now on, it was primarily a matter of cleaning up Red remnants, but the victory was not won without fighting. Local military authorities at Taiyuan estimated that the Reds since their invasion of Shansi had lost 4,000 killed and 7,000 wounded. Minor victories culminated finally in the defeat of Hsu Hai-tung and his forces at Kangningchen in north-west Shansi in the early part of April. The Reds fled. Much to the disappointment of the Japanese, the Red menace dwindled to small proportions, though they continued to use it as an excuse for pressure in North China. A stiffened attitude of Generalissimo Chiang towards these aggressions, according to a Domei (Japanese) despatch of April 11, was alleged to be the result of closer friendship between Moscow and Nanking. The same message declared that Ho Ying-chin, Minister of War, had been appointed Chairman of the Shansi and Suiyuan Provincial Governments, citing this as evidence of the growing domination of Shansi by the Central Government. All these reports were untrue. As a matter of fact, a good understanding between Yen and the Generalissimo existed, and the latter issued in April a message of appreciation for the bravery

and self-sacrificing spirit with which the Shansi troops had met the onslaughts of the Communists.

There was also some fighting between Yunnan troops and the Reds north of Kunming. The Generalissimo had stationed eight divisions and 15 military planes in Yunnan Province, and it was expected that these would be used in clean-up operations against the Reds. The Yunnan troops won a victory in the latter part of April over the remnant Reds under Hsiao Keh and Ho Lung on the eastern bank of the Putu River.

While various offshoots of the Red Army spread in different directions, the main body, comprising possibly some 50,000 men, gradually entrenched themselves in the sparsely settled country comprising most of northern Shensi, some districts of Kansu east of the Chingsuho and north of the Sian-Lanchow highway, and the south-eastern corner of Ninghsia east of the Yellow River and below the Great Wall. The extent of their occupation of Ninghsia was limited as they received a smashing defeat on the banks of the Yellow River at the hands of Government troops under the command of Hu Tsung-nan, which recovered Tungsincheng in southern Ninghsia from the Reds. The Communist troops seemed to realize the futility of their struggle, so they established a provisional capital of the so-called Chinese People's Soviet Republic at Paoan in north Shensi and thereafter they sought to make themselves secure by propaganda and negotiations.

In October of 1936, there were rumours that the Communists were ready to surrender to Nanking. The Japanese situation in respect to further aggression in the North was such that a number of Kuomintang members was not averse to taking them into the Government fold. In a speech at the Loyang branch of the National Military Academy on November 1, 1936, the Generalissimo declared that the extermination of the Reds was essential for national reconstruction, but at the same time he let it be known that he was willing to be lenient towards those who repented and did not let themselves be manipulated by outside forces to the detriment of the nation.

In the meantime, the Reds had been busy with their pro-

paganda among the troops of Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng. Taking advantage of the strong anti-Japanese sentiment among the former Manchurian troops, they, by assuring them of their eagerness to fight with them against Japan, seem to have succeeded in sapping the morale of the North-easterners so far as any opposition towards themselves was concerned. It was this condition that lay in the background of the Sian mutiny in December, although the Reds themselves did not desire the elimination of the Generalissimo. Nor did they show any wish to exploit his imprisonment, for they rightly reasoned that they would be blamed by the nation for any misfortune that might come to him.

It was the attitude of the Reds at this trying period that later seemed to work somewhat in their favour. The Reds were now willing to acknowledge the supremacy of the National Government and to abolish such titles as the "Chinese People's Soviet Republic" and the "Chinese Soviet Army," substituting instead less objectionable designations. There exists a prospect of an arrangement being made that would terminate the anti-Communist campaign, but the final solution depends upon the true repentance of the Communist leaders and their genuine surrender to the Government.

## CHAPTER XXXIV

Genesis Of New Life Movement—Inauguration Ceremonies In Kiangsi—Great Popular Enthusiasm—The Eight Principles—Addresses By The Generalissimo—Example Of Germany And Japan—Revival Of Ancient Virtues—Honour Paid To Confucius—Manifesto To The Nation—Future Of The Movement—Great Aid In Opium Suppression—Generalissimo Publishes Monograph

SO MANY references are made throughout the two volumes of the Biography to the New Life Movement, one of the instruments forged by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to combat the Communists and make China a modern nation, that the movement warrants a separate and full treatment in order that its significance may be properly understood. The New Life Movement, originated by the Generalissimo in 1934, with the enthusiastic assistance of Madame Chiang, has been likened by Dr. Chu Chia-hua, former Minister of Communications and now Chairman of Chekiang, to the Renaissance in Europe, but its genesis proved once again the justice of the dictum that great effects spring from small causes.

In February, 1934, the Generalissimo when motoring back to his headquarters at Nanchang, observed a schoolboy behaving in an unbecoming manner in the street. The incident made a deep impression upon him, and started a train of thought as to ways and means of improving the life of Chinese people in general and that of Chinese youth in particular. Generalissimo Chiang concluded that he had perceived one of the main causes why the Chinese people have been backward. As a result he ordered his subordinates to organize a movement to correct the faults of the people.

It is hardly correct, however, to speak of Chiang's "originating" the New Life Movement in consequence of an accidental observation. In truth, the movement was the natural culmination of his entire life, beginning with his own home training. It should be remembered that ■ was Chiang Kai-shek who succeeded in inspiring something of the spirit of the English "roundheads" in the Whampoa cadets that enabled the Northern Expedition to be a success. The sight of a school-boy misbehaving merely galvanized thought into action.

It might be well also to recall in this connection Generalissimo Chiang's New Year message at the beginning of 1930 entitled "Fidelity and Sense of Honour as the Foundation of the Party and the Government," in which he complained of the moral degradation of the people and called upon the nation to rise from its complacent stagnation. Then, again, there is Chiang's speech on domestic reform of December 15, 1932, when he denounced corruption and inefficiency, and declared: "We must set our own house in order before we can successfully resist outside aggressions."

The New Life Movement in China was inspired by the needs of the times, but it is also a reflection of the moral fervour of its founder's own life.

The inauguration of the movement took place on February 19, 1934, at ■ public meeting at Nanchang, when Chiang addressed a mass meeting of 50,000 persons. On this occasion the Generalissimo again referred to the rigid training which he had received in his childhood. In contrast with his own boyhood training, he referred to an incident in his Fukien campaign. One day he found at Kienow a boy of less than ten years of age smoking a cigarette on the street. He made it a special point to see the boy's parents and reproach them for permitting such behaviour by their son. It is related that the Generalissimo's attitude, when it became known in Kienow, caused a great diminution of the smoking habit among juveniles in that city.

In the inaugural speech, the Generalissimo laid great emphasis upon knowledge and virtue as the foundation of

national greatness. He illustrated his point by reference to the speedy recovery of Germany after her defeat in the Great War. Already, he pointed out, Germany has ceased to pay the war indemnities imposed upon her by the victors, and she is well under way to a complete abrogation of the unequal treaties forced upon her. As a contrast, the Generalissimo called attention to the condition of China in respect to the matter of unequal treaties. Generalissimo Chiang also made reference to the Spartan-like discipline which the Japanese had imposed upon themselves and bluntly told his audience that the Chinese might copy many habits of the Japanese with gain to themselves.

To accomplish the things achieved by Germany and Japan, the Generalissimo urged the necessity of training leaders for China's renaissance—for that is what the New Life Movement proposes to be, a renaissance or rebirth of the Chinese nation. He pointed out that this would take time and that results could not be expected too quickly, but if a sufficient number of leaders are trained, he emphasized, it will be easy to reach the masses of the people at a later date.

Generalissimo Chiang advocated in his speech a revival of the virtues taught by the Chinese sages, namely, *li*, meaning a regulated attitude of mind as well as the heart; *i*, meaning right conduct in all things; *lien*, meaning clear discrimination, especially in matters of honesty in personal, public and official life; and *chih*, meaning real self-consciousness, that is, integrity and honour. He pointed out that these teachings of the sages have always been the foundation of the nation, although present-day conditions may require that a new interpretation be given to them. He declared that Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the late Party Leader, had recommended the teachings of ancient sages as involved in these four terms which ultimately became the catchwords of New Life.

At the beginning of the New Life Movement, it was announced that eight principles had been drawn up for the guidance of the movement as follows:—

“1. Regard yesterday as a period of death, to-day as a

period of life. Let us rid ourselves of old abuses and build up a new nation.

"2. Let us accept the heavy responsibilities of reviving the nation.

"3. We must observe rules and have faith, honesty and shame.

"4. Our clothing, eating, living and travelling must be simple, orderly, plain and clean.

"5. We must willingly face hardships. We must strive for frugality.

"6. We must have adequate knowledge and moral integrity as citizens.

"7. Our actions must be courageous and rapid.

"8. We must act on our promises, or even act without promising."

There was at the start a tendency towards a multiplicity of rules in connection with the movement. Each collaborator seems to have been a willing contributor of his quota of what he considered the Chinese people needed to improve their morals and their manners.

From the beginning of March, more than 200 groups of students were trained and sent out to lecture to the public, and in addition 13 lecture stations were established in Nanchang where leaders of the new movement daily gave mass lectures. The response to these preliminary efforts was so gratifying that steps were immediately taken to extend the scope of the work. Emphasis was laid upon orderliness, cleanliness, simplicity, diligence and propriety. Pamphlets were issued and distributed to the people giving instructions in the New Life Movement. All civic and religious organizations were invited to co-operate in promulgating the principles of New Life.

On March 11, a gigantic mass meeting, at which 142 organizations were represented and 100,000 were present, was held in Nanchang for the purpose of inaugurating the movement on a national scale. The meeting was presided over by Hsiung Shih-hui, the Governor of Kiangsi, and the chief speakers

were Generalissimo Chiang and Cheng Shih-kuei, Commissioner of Education. In the course of his speech Chiang declared that, if the Chinese wished to be a strong nation, they should follow the principles of the New Life Movement.

An importunate cameraman, carelessly dressed and of slovenly appearance, had been disturbing the meeting by running about in the endeavour to get pictures from different angles. The Generalissimo asked the audience to have a look at this man. He had an up-to-date machine in his hand, but his appearance and manner showed that he was, nevertheless, one of the products of the old life from which the New Life Movement was trying to rescue the nation. That man, Chiang pointed out, was one for whom the mottoes of the new movement—orderliness, cleanliness, etc.—had little or no meaning. It may be assumed that the cameraman had no "face" when he backed into obscurity after this stern public censure. The inborn kindness of the Generalissimo is well known, and he can have taken no pleasure in the incident, but as an orator he could hardly fail to appreciate the dramatic possibilities of extending the finger of scorn to a "terrible example" so opportunely at hand of what he sought to overthrow.

As part of the New Life programme for Nanchang, a special effort was made on March 17 to put the city in a spick and span condition, and on the following day a huge lantern procession passed over the wide thoroughfares of the city before a throng of not less than a hundred thousand people. Carried by the marchers in the procession were banners inscribed with the slogans of the new movement: "Be prompt," "Don't crowd; keep in line," "Don't spit," "Be neat," "Cleanliness prevents sickness," "Kill flies and rats; they breed disease," "Avoid wine, women and gambling," "Politeness and obedience smooth the way." These injunctions and others of a similar nature were displayed by gorgeous dragons, glittering pagodas and other illuminations borne aloft in the gathering darkness of the streets of Nanchang. On this occasion, it was revealed that representatives

of the nine neighbouring provinces were present at Nanchang to discuss the new movement with the Generalissimo, and devise ways and means of spreading it throughout the entire country.

The New Life Movement launched by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek met with an instant response in provinces other than Kiangsi. It seems that the exact psychological moment had been chosen for the movement to make its appeal for a better life, for within 30 days after its inception reports came from all over the country regarding its organization in various important cities. The movement was officially launched in the National Capital, Nanking, on March 17 at a large meeting attended by Wang Ching-wei, the President of the Executive Yuan and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Shih-chieh, the Minister of Education, Chu Chia-hua, the Minister of Communications, and other distinguished officials. At Peiping, the inaugural meeting for the promotion of New Life was held on March 18 with a presidium consisting of Huang Fu, Ho Ying-chin, Chiang Monlin and Cheng Sheh-wu.

On April 16, the movement was inaugurated in Ichang; Yangchow signalized its adhesion by a monster meeting and parade on May 5, and on the latter date a meeting of 30,000 was also held at Kaifeng, at which Liu Chih, Chairman of the Honan Provincial Government, made the principal address. Even dissident Canton came into line, but they added a contribution of their own by setting a \$50 maximum expenditure for wedding ceremonies. Chen Chi-tang was said to have been inspired by the movement to such an extent that he decided to take a more parental view of the lives of the people under his jurisdiction.

To assist the movement in the revival of ancient virtues, the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang on May 31 decided to designate August 27 as a National Holiday in honour of the birthday of Confucius. Elaborate ceremonies were held on the newly designated holiday, at which Wang Ching-wei made a lengthy address.

On June 9, mass meetings and parades were held in Hang-chow to introduce New Life, and by July 10 the movement was reported in full swing in Kuling, Kiangsi, where smoking was not permitted in public. During their tour of the North-west in October and November, 1934, the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang laid great stress on New Life principles in their public addresses and personal talks with leading officials. Perhaps the most important aspect of this tour was the assembling at big centres—starting from their arrival at Sian—of all foreign missionaries and enlisting their aid. At each place committees of missionary and New Life Movement representatives were formed to carry on work to help the people. For instance, at Sian and Lanchow anti-opium clinics were established; at Kaifeng treatment of trachoma was provided for, and similar work was undertaken in Suiyuan, at Kalgan, Taiyuan and other cities. In fact, the introduction of New Life to the North-west seems to have been one of the main reasons for the extensive air journey that took Generalissimo Chiang and his party to Kansu, Suiyuan, and other important provinces in that remote section of the country.

To stress the importance of the preservation of China's past cultural heritage, a movement complementary to the New Life Movement was started to prevent the loss and destruction of numerous ancient relics. Wang Ching-wei and Chiang Kai-shek issued a joint telegram to the nation on November 30, appealing for concerted action and efforts to preserve old Chinese relics and historical landmarks in the country.

"To look back to past civilization is the best way to improve present day trend of thought," the telegram stated, "and what has been handed down to us from a civilization of 5,000 years is the crystallized result and handiwork of years of pioneering experience."

The message went on to explain the recent actions of the Government in establishing a Central Historical Relics Preservation Commission in July with many famous scholars as

members. Specific recommendations were also made to make more effective the work of preservation.

During 1934, the New Life Movement had its greatest results in the province of Kiangsi which had been so badly ravaged by the Reds. Generalissimo Chiang's programme of social regeneration by individual character building made real progress, because the citizens of Kiangsi realized that they were living under the best government that they had yet known. They quickly became reconciled to the idea that they must alter minor personal habits as a part of the price of their new found benefits, as well as observe other measures of the New Life Movement. It was in Kiangsi that the Generalissimo had the first opportunity to put his ideas into effect. He declared: "We ought to reconstruct society by extraordinary means instead of merely sitting down and waiting for the process of natural evolution. It is the gigantic task of the New Life Movement to wipe out the backward conditions of society by a wild storm and to supply the community with vitality and the right spirit by a gentle breeze."

By the end of the year, even the most sceptical were convinced that the New Life Movement was more than a mere gesture of the sort that Chinese leaders are too often guilty of making. The "North-China Daily News" stated approvingly: "The New Life Movement, adopting appropriately the treasured maxims of China's greatest sage, seeks to leaven the lump with the yeast of vivid self-discipline. Those who teach have themselves to be taught, and it is to the credit of the Generalissimo that, in his own special department of the administration, he is essaying the valuable task of imbuing his officers with the spirit of self-sacrifice and devotion."

On February 19, 1935, the anniversary of the founding of the movement, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek outlined his plans for the year. Of paramount importance, he declared, was the consolidation of the directing forces in the headquarters of the New Life Association in Nanchang. The main work of promotion should not be entrusted to one class, he urged, but be regarded as the concern of the Party, political, military,

and educational circles combined. Of the four groups, the Generalissimo announced, the educators and students should play the leading roles in 1935, and set an unimpeachable example to the rest of the nation. They should volunteer to be the standard-bearers in this movement for the rejuvenation of the Chinese race, he urged, and broadcast to the country the slogan: "We do our part."

He explained that this should be the natural tendency because of the greater degree of enthusiasm, buoyancy and energy to be found in the bosoms of the rising generation than is the case with their elders. The youth of the nation mean business, suggested the Generalissimo, but at the same time he cautioned them that the movement consists of more than posters and slogans, for these must be backed up by actual work.

Generalissimo Chiang expressed the hope that a national psychology of voluntary public service would be developed. It was his belief, he stated, that the spirit of service for others should be strongly instilled in the minds of the students by their teachers, while the latter in turn should look to the school principals and college presidents for guidance. In conclusion, the Generalissimo suggested that a record should be made every month of the students' daily conduct so as to qualify them by this method of criticism for the rôle they were expected to play in connection with the New Life Movement during 1935.

The following day, Generalissimo Chiang issued a manifesto to the nation in which he stated that the aim of the New Life Movement is to make the Chinese people militaristic, productive and artistic, but he cautioned the people that he did not propose that the Chinese nation should be armed to the teeth for war. Rather, he assured them, he had in mind that the nation should foster a spirit of discipline, obedience, solidarity and calmness, as opposed to the undesirable habits of disorganization, irresponsibility and perfunction. Commonplace as the movement might seem, the manifesto declared, it is nevertheless an effective remedy for the present

situation in China. Orderliness and tidiness were emphasized as preliminary essentials to the success of such a movement. Though progress had been made in the past year, much still remained to be accomplished, according to the message.

The movement had not made much headway in the province of Szechwan, but on March 24 it was formally inaugurated at Chungking by the Generalissimo himself. Addressing a large gathering of officials and the public, he extolled all forms of manual labour and exhorted everybody to exert himself for the salvation of Szechwan. During their tour of South-western China in April and May, in both the provinces of Kweichow and Yunnan, the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang did a great deal to advance the movement.

In order to facilitate the direction of the movement, Generalissimo Chiang, when called to Nanking to assume the Presidency of the Executive Yuan toward the end of 1935 after the attempted assassination of Wang Ching-wei, in his capacity as President of the General Association for the Promotion of the New Life Movement, decided to move its headquarters at Nanchang to the National Capital. An appropriate celebration of the second anniversary of the movement was held at Nanking under the direction of the National Headquarters. Shanghai joined the other great cities of the country in the observance of the occasion.

Though the progress made in the second year of the movement did not measure up to the expectations of its founder, yet it may be recorded that the movement was organized in 20 provinces, in 1,100 *hsien* and in 12 railway administrations. In addition, there were three municipal New Life organizations, and overseas there were three branches in Japan and Korea and six in Java and Malaysia, while some of the Chinese shipping lines had taken up the movement among their employees towards the close of 1935.

The work of the movement in its second year was reviewed on its second anniversary, February 19, 1936, in a statement issued by the Generalissimo. Making no attempt to conceal his disappointment, he declared that the results,

despite the fact that the movement possessed no less than 100,000 workers, were not satisfactory. Generally speaking, he added, the accomplishments for the last year compared unfavourably with those of the first year of the movement. It was true that posters, slogans and handbills on the tenets of the movement were to be seen everywhere, but the concrete results, complained the Generalissimo, were not correspondingly conspicuous. Even such simple matters as orderliness and cleanliness, he explained, had not made satisfactory progress except in a very few places, and especially were the great urban centres slack in this respect. He admitted that it was not an easy task to change the habits of the people overnight, and he added that his observations were not meant to be ungrateful criticisms. He concluded his message by calling upon the educated class, the upholders of public law and those in high positions in the Government to take the leading part in assisting the people of the nation to realize that the movement concerns, not the welfare of only a few persons, but that of the entire nation. A programme was announced for the third year of the movement, according to which it was proposed to extend the work from the urban centres to the rural districts throughout the nation and also to provide stricter training for New Life workers.

It is opportune at this stage to devote some space to the wonderful impetus that the inauguration of the movement gave to opium suppression. Chiang had become a member of the Opium Suppression Commission in August, 1928, when it was organized. With his usual directness, he declared at an anti-opium conference held in Nanking three months after the commission was appointed: "I believe that opium suppression must first begin within the Government itself, before we can expect to enforce the laws effectively. If you find anyone connected with the Government, who is an offender against the anti-opium laws, ask the Government to investigate the case. The National Government will not attempt to get one cent from the opium tax. It would not be

worthy of your confidence if it should be found to make an opium tax one of its chief sources of income. There are, however, some corrupt local officials who may not properly enforce the anti-opium laws of the Government. The conference should ask the Government to give it power to bring charges against such officials before the authorities."

Progress was so slow that the Generalissimo induced the Central Government to turn over to him, as Chairman of the National Military Council, direction of the work of opium suppression in Kiangsi and other parts of the country where active military operations were in progress against the Communists. From the beginning, he had realized that one of the weakest points in the work of opium suppression was the corruption of local officials. In 1934, he struck at this weak point by issuing an order imposing the death penalty upon traffickers, and the subsequent execution of a Peiping police official and others showed that it was not an idle threat.

In May, 1934, Generalissimo Chiang started a vigorous campaign with a view to exterminating the smoking, sale, cultivation and transportation of opium in Honan, Hupeh, Anhwei and Kiangsi Provinces within a period of six years. In a circular order issued to the various provincial authorities he stated that, although the Government had repeatedly announced its decision to fight the narcotic evil, the results had been almost negligible. He announced that all officials belonging to the military, Kuomintang and Government organizations, who smoke opium, were given three years in which to get rid of the habit. Institutions were established where these drug addicts might go for cures. There were also regulations for the registration of addicts, for strict control in licensed shops of all sales and for control of the growing of the poppy.

The Generalissimo in the previous April had already abolished the so-called Hupeh Special Tax Bureau and established the Opium Suppression Supervisory Bureau instead. This organization was placed directly under the control of the National Military Council and takes its orders from Generalis-

simo Chiang himself. It co-operates with the provincial and municipal authorities in Honan, Hupeh and Kiangsi Provinces in the work of suppression. The Draconic measures advocated by Generalissimo Chiang—especially that of the imposition of the death penalty—excited widespread comment and helped a great deal in emphasizing, not only the seriousness of the narcotic menace but also the fact that those who traffic in narcotics may no longer do so with safety.

During their tour of the North-west both the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang did their utmost to encourage the suppression of opium, particularly in Shansi and Kansu. The Generalissimo in his public addresses repeatedly referred to opium as the greatest curse of China. In his speech at Taiyuan on November 10, 1934, before 1,000 officials and other residents, he declared that it was incumbent upon officials to wipe out the traffic in the next three years. As far as sellers and consumers of morphine and heroin were concerned, he urged that they should be arrested, court-martialled and shot after conviction.

In the course of an address at Hankow on March 1, 1935, Generalissimo Chiang asserted that the six-year plan of the Provincial Headquarters at Nanchang remained the only feasible and effective method for the complete eradication of the opium evil. In the one year since the enforcement of this plan, declared the Generalissimo, heartening results had been achieved in the provinces of Honan, Hupeh and Anhwei, while in Kiangsi and Anhwei no sign of the poppy was now seen. In Kiangsu also, he reported, active efforts had been made, particularly against opium smoking.

At the beginning of April, 1935, additional regulations were issued by the Generalissimo's Headquarters, supplementary to the Anti-Narcotic Drug Regulations promulgated in May, 1934. It was now provided that those who manufacture, traffic in and sell narcotic drugs shall be punished by death, and those who assist in any way in this offence shall be given five to 12 years imprisonment, or a life term, according to the degree of seriousness of the accomplices' part in the offence.

Public functionaries who assist in any way in this offence shall, without discrimination, be given the death sentence.

The new supplementary regulations also provided that buildings used for the manufacture of narcotic drugs shall be confiscated. If the buildings are rented houses, the landlords who fail to report to the police the nature of business engaged in by their tenants shall be given the same penalty as those who assist in the offence.

Beginning in 1937, according to the new regulations, both the principals and accomplices in manufacturing and trafficking in narcotics were to receive the same penalty of death. The private property of those found guilty of this offence was to be confiscated, and from 20 to 40 per cent. of this property given as a reward to those who discover the offenders or succeed in bringing them to justice.

Dealing with those found guilty of using narcotics, the regulations provide that they shall be taken to clinics by force and after treatment they are to be given a minimum of five years' imprisonment. If those who are forced to receive treatment should be found to be using narcotic drugs again after the cure, they are to get the death penalty, while those who voluntarily register themselves for treatment, if found using drugs again after the treatment, are to be subject to a minimum imprisonment of five years. Drug addicts among Party members, administrative officials, military staff men and students are given a time limit for voluntary registration, and, if found violating this rule, are to be given the death sentence.

During his tour of the South-west in 1935, the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang repeated their propaganda work against the opium habit to which they had given their attention in the North-west a few months previously. The officials of Kweichow, especially, came in for a severe castigation, and that issue was one of the principal reasons for a complete reorganization of the Provincial Government there. Of the conditions in Yunnan the Generalissimo also expressed his disapproval. Earlier in the year of 1935, upon his arrival in

Szechwan he immediately gave attention to the drug evil there. Chungking received instructions to close its opium dens, and it was officially announced on March 21, that 1,300 of these sinks of iniquity were closed down in two days.

On May 29, 1935, the Central Political Council at Nanking decided upon the reorganization of the whole of the Government's machinery for the suppression of the narcotics evil in China, and the appointment of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as Inspector-General for Opium Suppression. Existing legislation concerning the suppression of opium and the National Opium Suppression Commission were abolished and new legislation was drafted on the basis of the regulations that had hitherto been promulgated by the National Military Council of which the Generalissimo is the Chairman.

The determined efforts of the Chinese Government under the leadership of the Generalissimo to curb the drug evil began to have noticeable results in 1935, and note was taken of that fact by the Committee of the League of Nations at Geneva on September 24 of that year. On the same day, the Generalissimo at Chengtu issued an order reiterating his previous instructions regarding the registration of all opium addicts. He set January 1, 1936, as the deadline for the completion of registrations and the order stipulated that upon failure to accomplish this result the authorities concerned would be held strictly responsible.

Reports in December, 1935, from Changsha, Hunan, indicated that definite progress had been made there in the anti-opium campaign. So thorough has been the work of the administration that even prominent officials were forced to register and were confined in hospitals along with others. In January, 1936, the Generalissimo issued an order prohibiting absolutely the cultivation of the poppy in six provinces, namely, Kiangsu, Anhwei, Szechwan, Kiangsi, Hupeh and Hunan. The various special administrative commissioners and district magistrates were to be instructed to make personal inspections of the farms within their respective areas to prevent the surreptitious planting of the poppy.

On February 1-3, 1936, an anti-opium conference was held at Nanking, which had been summoned by the Generalissimo. Decisions were reached that the Central Government should enforce the opium suppression regulations at all costs so as to suppress the drug evil within the stipulated time limit of six years; that the Central Government should not alter its six-year suppression plan on account of possible decrease in revenue; and that the people should be urged to back up the Government and co-operate with the authorities so that the ultimate success of wiping out the narcotic scourge in China could be satisfactorily achieved.

It is still too early to say what the results of the Generalissimo's efforts to suppress the opium traffic will be. There should be no attempt to minimize the seriousness and the magnitude of the task that lies before him. The United States of America, it should be remembered, failed in its attempt to suppress the less serious evil of the liquor traffic. With that failure of a more organized nation in mind, one might easily be over-optimistic regarding the final results in connection with the suppression of opium in China, but it is certain that definite and encouraging progress has been made in that direction under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and that the rapid development of the New Life Movement has largely been responsible for that progress.

Obviously no one could be better qualified than the originator to explain the inner spirit of the New Life Movement. In public addresses and manifestoes the Generalissimo had revealed much of what he had in mind, but something more was necessary. Accordingly he found, or made, time to prepare a pamphlet in which he went into detail. This was written in Chinese, but as foreigners were evincing great interest in the New Life Movement it was clearly desirable that an English version should be prepared. Fortunately this task was undertaken by Madame Chiang Kai-shek, and her official translation of the Outline of the New Life Movement by the Generalissimo is given as an appendix to this volume.

The monograph attracted considerable attention, both in China and abroad. The reaction was generally sympathetic. It is important to note that Wang Ching-wei, then President of the Executive Yuan, cast the whole weight of his influence in support of the movement. On one occasion he remarked: "The movement is a key movement for the salvation of the Chinese Republic as well as for the regeneration of the Chinese people. I have a great hope for its growth and progress." Wang Ching-wei also paid a tribute to the intense enthusiasm, but commendable caution with which the Generalissimo had started the movement, and quoted a telegram that the Generalissimo had sent to him, which read: "I am thinking of inaugurating the New Life Movement at Nanchang. When it becomes successful and we have gained experience, we will spread it into other cities. As many phases of our life need reform, we would attempt too much and reap too little if the movement should be launched in different places all at the same time."

"Following the example of Nanchang," continued Wang Ching-wei, "the whole country has unexpectedly begun to inaugurate the movement. This fact bears testimony to the conviction that the New Life Movement is at once an expression of the consensus of opinions in the country and an urgent need for the people. We must work with Generalissimo Chiang with great zeal and care, so much so that the spirit and significance of the movement may be enabled to gain volume and importance as time goes on."

A less sympathetic view was taken by Dr. Hu Shih in an article published in the "Ta Kung Pao." He called the attention of the people to three points. "First, we should not exaggerate the efficacy of the movement. Recognizing what our goal is, let us do our utmost to attain the minimum requirements of a civilized people. Second, the New Life Movement should be an educational, not a political movement. Third, we must remember that the basis of living is economical and material. Many bad practices are the products of poverty-stricken districts." Dr. Hu Shih reminded the pro-

moters of the movement that the first duty of the Government is to enable its people to live—to earn a livelihood. This done, the next duty is to increase their living ability—the ability of earning a living. The last step, then, is to teach them to live a new life.

No doubt this criticism was based on misunderstanding and incomplete information. The Generalissimo had made it abundantly clear that the movement was in no way political. He was, moreover, even at that time preparing plans for the inauguration of what was later known as the People's Economic Reconstruction Movement.

Comments made by American and British newspapers were highly favourable. In the Chinese Press the movement was discussed at greater length and more frequently. So numerous were the references in the Chinese newspapers that too much space would be occupied if lengthy quotations were made, but a selection from the "Min Kuo Jih Pao" will serve to indicate their general trend. "The New Life Movement is primarily a movement for the construction of a new nation. . . . It is not negative, but positive; it does not profit a few, but the whole people; it does not only teach how to live, but also how to create life; it does not only help people to make use of their productive ability and rationalize it, but also implicitly teaches them to strike a new path for production. It does not confine itself to a few metropolitan areas, but spreads to out-of-the-way districts. It may be related to economic reconstruction, educational reconstruction and national defence."

The growth of the New Life Movement has revealed Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, its promoter, as the greatest force for unification that modern China has produced. It has taught those with evil designs upon China that there is a process of rejuvenation going on that they may retard but will never be able to stop. There is no doubt in the minds of foreigners of the value of the movement which the Generalissimo regards as the outstanding achievement of his life. Those foreigners who know the Chinese best believe that, despite the light-headed levity of irresponsible students and

the opposition of Japanese sabre-rattlers, the movement will eventually achieve signal and lasting success.

## CHAPTER XXXV

**Economic Reconstruction Of China—Movement Launched In Kweichow  
—A Backward Province—Programme For Economic Rehabilitation  
—Eight Necessary Measures—Independence Day Message—Positive  
And Negative Objectives—People Should Assist Government—Stirring  
New Year Appeal—Rural Reconstruction—Co-operative Credit System  
—Madame Chiang's Contribution To Both Movements**

PLANS for the economic reconstruction of China were talked of from the earliest days of the Republic, especially after the establishment of the National Government at Nanking in 1927, but, for various reasons, chief among them being the unwillingness of the warlords to give up their own petty personal interests, these plans hardly got beyond a blue print stage. The Generalissimo realized, however, when he launched the New Life Movement, that it would have to be supplemented by a movement for economic reconstruction. An incentive to lose no time in starting this movement was given when he visited Kweichow in March, 1935. The first-hand knowledge that he gained of the appalling conditions obtaining in that backward province led him to make plans for immediate and vigorous action to change things for the better. It was on April 1 at the memorial service at Kweiyang that the Generalissimo launched the People's Economic Reconstruction Movement as a complement of the New Life Movement. In a subsequent Press interview, the Generalissimo explained that its aim was to promote agriculture, improve the quality of farming products, protect mines, assist industry and commerce, further co-operation between capital and labour, build highways, develop communications,

adjust the monetary situation, facilitate the circulation of capital, and accelerate national industrialization. The first step towards the realization of this programme was to abolish exorbitant levies and miscellaneous taxes, reduce or exempt duties on native products, bring about the early enforcement of the new Mining Law and prohibit the reckless issue of paper notes. The Government's action in increasing the capital of the Central Bank of China, the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications in order to stabilize the socio-economic situation, he stressed, was also a phase of the People's Economic Reconstruction Movement.

The interest of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in the economic development of China dates back to the beginning of his public career. As the leading advocate of the Three People's Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, he had long been conscious of the need of improving the livelihood of the people. He played a leading rôle in the establishment of the National Economic Council on November 15, 1931, on which occasion he, as Chairman of the Council, delivered the inaugural address. He mentioned in his speech that the Council was an advisory board, but when the ministerial members of the Council accepted proposed policies, they would, as members of the Government, be in a position to give to them immediate effect. The archives of all the Ministries abounded in schemes and proposals of all kinds. It would be the first task of the Council, he said, to translate into definite action such of the schemes which were selected as being the most urgent, to correlate them with one another, to establish an order of priority and, in essence, to elaborate as rapidly as possible a co-ordinated plan of development for a first period of three years beginning in 1932.

The new movement started at Kweiyang was not intended to replace the functions of the National Economic Council, but rather to accelerate the tempo at which needed reforms were being accomplished. This was to be done, in part at least, by popularizing economic reforms and reconstruction measures in much the same way that the New Life Movement had

popularized a change in the habits of the people in the direction of orderliness, cleanliness and the revival of the ancient virtues of China. According to the experience of the Generalissimo, the New Life Movement went a long way in the rejuvenation of the Chinese people, but still it did not go far enough to rescue the nation. Something more was needed, in his opinion, to counteract the age-long neglect to develop, scientifically and systematically, the economic possibilities of the country. He also realized that too great a burden had been placed upon agriculture by callous militarists and corrupt officials, and the result had threatened national economic bankruptcy. Now that a better National Army had been organized, urged the Generalissimo, the time had come to retrieve the economic errors of the past.

In an interview with a foreign correspondent, the Generalissimo said: "Administrative reform must come abreast of military reform, and both must be accompanied by determined measures to open up the natural resources of the country, establish new industries and teach the people how to better their commercial activities and their farming methods. Reforms must be instituted in many directions, and improvement in agriculture is one of the most vitally needed steps that must be taken towards national recovery. Corresponding attention must be paid to the construction of new railways and the administration of the existing ones upon a purely commercial basis for the benefit of those who desire to move goods and those who wish to travel. The expansion of all means of communication must be a sustained policy.

"In order to educate the public mind as well as the official mind, to understand the vital needs of the time," said the Generalissimo, "the People's Economic Reconstruction Movement has been devised and launched. Its aim is the rehabilitation of China, and its task is to awaken the nation to the vital necessity of advancing from being an almost purely agricultural State to an industrial one. The new policy that should be adopted to realize this must include the promulgation and administration of laws to: (1) develop all natural

resources upon modern lines; (2) improve agriculture according to modern practice; (3) improve the production of raw materials; (4) establish new industries to manufacture raw materials; (5) continually better all means of communication; (6) vigorously undertake afforestation, and river conservancy; (7) guarantee protection to all who invest their money in productive enterprises and labour in connection therewith; (8) provide measures for the harmonious co-operation of capital and labour; (9) encourage investments to liberate frozen or hoarded capital; (10) simplify currency; (11) place all taxation on a scientific basis; (12) do anything and everything necessary along all modern lines to promote the well-being of the nation.

"At the same time modernized mining laws (a draft of which already exists), company laws, factory laws, labour laws, laws for co-operative enterprises, laws governing rural credit, banking and loaning, etc., of a wise and practicable character, and easy of efficient enforcement, must be drafted and administered.

"Thorough-going economic investigation must be conducted in all provinces to ascertain their potentialities and their difficulties."

"If these steps are taken," concluded the Generalissimo, "Communist banditry together with other evils will soon find it impossible to exist, and the people of China can be rendered contented, prosperous and free. The People's Economic Reconstruction Movement will strive towards that end in conjunction with the New Life Movement in order that the salvation of China may quickly be accomplished."

The programme for accelerating the economic rehabilitation of China was entered upon when reforms were instituted in Kweichow. Later, the Generalissimo urged the responsible officials in Yunnan to proceed apace with the industrialization of their province and the development of their natural resources. Upon his return to Chengtu, Szechwan, the Generalissimo turned his attention to river conservancy, essential to economic rehabilitation, and in a circular telegram

issued to the nation, he indicted the slackening of human efforts in checking the onslaughts of nature, such as the great floods that periodically recur in China. Nature, the Generalissimo declared, should not be held entirely to blame for the floods that occur with regularity in China every three or four years, for after all it is not absolutely uncontrollable, and he added that, if river conservancy, afforestation and dyke-building works had been pushed forward to the extent that they should have been, there would not have been such a disastrous flood as that of 1935.

The Generalissimo's telegram called attention to the fact that Kiangsu Province escaped that year's tragedy because of the sustained effort in river conservancy and the close co-operation between the provincial authorities and the people. On the other hand, the message pointed out, the flood in the four provinces of Hupeh, Hunan, Kiangsi and Anhwei left behind a total of no less than 10,000,000 refugees and a property loss of more than \$500,000,000.

Bearing these facts in mind, the Generalissimo urged that the Chinese people should now awaken to the realization that their co-operation was needed in order to fight the deplorable economic conditions brought about by the floods, by the feeding of refugees and by the unfavourable trade balance. In this modern world, the message concluded, the right to existence and prosperity depends on one's ability to conquer the forces of nature and not be intimidated by the obstacles of environment.

To remedy the serious situation that developed as a result of the combined disasters of flood and unfavourable trade conditions, the Generalissimo recommended that emphasis be laid upon the following measures: (1) enforcement of compulsory labour; (2) agricultural development; (3) industrial development; (4) reclamation; (5) regulation of consumption; (6) exploitation of mines; (7) facilitation of transportation; and (8) readjustment of finance.

The Generalissimo admitted that there was nothing new in these measures, but he urged that they, nevertheless, formed

the fundamental steps towards the stabilization of the people's economic status, and he urged that for their successful execution the efforts of the entire nation should be enlisted. Indeed, his programme was one that was largely based upon the recommendations of various experts whose advice the Generalissimo had sought.

In September, 1935, the Generalissimo issued a circular order to the various provincial governments, in which he instructed them to encourage afforestation among the people. Those who possess private gardening facilities, the message urged, should be asked to cultivate saplings for distribution among their neighbours. There was also an admonition as to setting fire to trees on hill-sides and a recommendation that the district magistrate and chief of the *pao-chia* (mutual guarantee organization) be held responsible for forest fires.

In his messages to the nation on the occasion of the Independence Day Anniversary (October 10, 1935) and his New Year Message of 1936, the Generalissimo devoted a considerable amount of space to exhorting the nation to carry forward, not only the New Life Movement but also the complementary People's Economic Reconstruction Movement.

In the interview already quoted, the Generalissimo went somewhat into detail in regard to the economic movement, but the message to the nation issued on National Independence Day, 1935, is still fuller and a quotation will be found interesting:

"Economic disintegration is the basic cause of the poverty of the Chinese people, who have found even their survival in the present century very precarious. The vital problem confronting our country at this very moment, therefore, is how we can avert this economic breakdown and elevate the people to a reasonable standard of living. It is now incumbent upon us to seek a solution of the paradoxical state of affairs in which the resources of the country are being laid waste while the masses are suffering from want, by an attempt to bring about the economic development of the people. It is, therefore, realized that the New Life Movement must be followed

up immediately by a new endeavour known as the People's Economic Reconstruction Movement."

The message explained that the People's Economic Reconstruction Movement and the New Life Movement were part and parcel of each other. The New Life Movement pertained to the race and emphasized the cultivation of the body, of moral and spiritual virtues, while the People's Economic Reconstruction Movement pertained to the people's livelihood, and emphasized productive activity and the material side of life. In a word, the New Life Movement, he said, built up the national spirit and the People's Economic Reconstruction Movement built up the material life of the people. One could not progress without the other. The economic weakness of the people, he pointed out, was mainly the result of ■ lack of harmony between men and object; between men and enterprise; between principles and efforts in production; and among the various departments of production. When the public did not realize the importance of production, he said, producers would fail to get a favourable environment in which to make progress. A universal awakening was absolutely prerequisite to a serious attempt to bring about an economic revival of the people.

While the Government had its duties, the message proceeded, the people must be considered as the main support of the movement. It could not, however, be carried into effect simply by the people who merely depended on propaganda or upon observance of any set of rules and regulations for its furtherance by individual members. In many respects where the law of the nation is concerned, its enforcement relies on the political influence of the Government. Consequently, consolidation of all the efforts of the Government, people, public and private bodies, the Generalissimo stressed, was indispensable to the effective enforcement of the People's Economic Reconstruction Movement.

The objectives of the movement, he pointed out, could be reached on the positive side by: (a) meeting the needs of living through the increase of the total amount of production;

(b) solving the problem of unemployment through the increase of working opportunities; (c) bringing about a balance of trade through the increase of the amount of exports; (d) encouraging productive activities through the guarantee of the safety of investments.

The essentials on the negative side were: (a) to do away with all outside obstacles to production, for example, by the modification of the laws on taxation of productive enterprises and on relations between labour and capital; (b) to do away with all inside obstacles to production, such as lack of methods of scientific management and personnel; (c) to do away with obstacles in the way of the circulation of products by improving means of communications, currency and the transportation system, and (d) to do away with psychological factors detrimental to reconstruction and production, such as ignorance, superstition, conservatism, the neglect of the habits of working and saving, and disregard of economic principles.

The message then outlined the measures to be adopted regarding: development of agriculture; encouragement of reclamation and grazing; development of the mining industry; promotion of conscription of labour; advancement of industries; regulation of consumption; facilitation of transportation, and readjustment of finances. As is generally known, the Generalissimo looks with decided disfavour upon propaganda as a petty political measure, but he firmly believes in its efficacy to promote movements for national improvement. The reference to propaganda in the October 10 message is, therefore, worth preserving: "With the exception of directions on technical lines, which should be given only by specialists or those who have undertaken advanced training, the work of initial propaganda for this movement should be assigned to: (1) students in middle schools or schools of higher grade, staff members of social or educational institutions and the principals or teachers of primary schools; (2) those in charge of Chambers of Commerce, farmers' unions, unions of various export and import trade groups and other organizations; (3) members of the co-operative societies;

senior officers of the Army in various places, and (5) members of the staff of various regional government offices and other self-governing organizations.

"Propaganda work," he continued, "is important for pushing the movement. Various effective methods should be used in the propaganda campaign in order to change the people's attitude of indifference towards production; to rid the people of their superstitious beliefs and the unprogressive idea of 'be idle and satisfied'; to explain the necessity and the programme of economic reconstruction of the country, and the significance of voluntary labour which all people should donate to the programme; to urge reforms in methods of production and management and to give direction on many other matters relative to a sound regulation of production and consumption. This task should be undertaken by a large number of persons. To those bodies who have commenced their activities in promoting the programme of economic reconstruction, directions should be given to solve the difficult problems confronting them."

With regard to the methods of organization and enforcement, he said, it had been suggested that a central organization should be established for their consideration. The mapping out of concrete steps, however, would call for detailed and protracted study. It was to be hoped that all the experts and practical workers interested in economic reconstruction, he urged, would contribute their constructive opinions so that the greatest possible success might be attained by the movement.

On New Year Day, 1936, Chiang addressed another message to the nation. In its earlier part he spoke of the New Life Movement and general matters, but he soon turned to what was then especially in his mind. "Apart from the New Life Movement," the message read, "there is another task which we must start to-day for the purpose of self-preservation and national salvation. This is the People's Economic Reconstruction Movement, which must go together with the New Life Movement."

After elaborating the complementary character of the two movements, the message went on to enumerate the eight points mentioned earlier in this chapter, and continued:

"We should know that our intelligence is in no way inferior to that of any other nation, but, with a larger population than that of any other nation, China should complete the task of economic reconstruction in a shorter period of time than would be needed for any other nation, provided her people can co-operate in their efforts.

"We need not be too much concerned, therefore, with the poverty and weakness of our nation. However, we should take good care that the people's mental and physical strength is properly utilized. The greatest danger is that the people may fail to develop national consciousness, and may not shoulder their responsibilities and may not co-operate for the welfare of the nation.

"In short, in view of the present acute national crisis, the 400,000,000 Chinese should, on the one hand, promote the New Life Movement to build up the spiritual side of our national life and, on the other hand, should enforce the People's Economic Reconstruction Movement to consolidate the material side. Being descendants of the same forefathers, the 400,000,000 Chinese should co-operate in a spirit of sincerity. They should pledge their full support to the Government and concentrate their efforts on national salvation, unmindful of all hardships and dangers. Only in this manner can we put the Three People's Principles into effect and successfully perform the great task of national salvation and rejuvenation. Only in this manner can we call ourselves modern citizens and not feel ashamed before our mighty ancestors and our late Party Leader, Dr. Sun Yat-sen."

Rural reconstruction, which is a part of the People's Economic Reconstruction Movement, has been another effective instrument that the Generalissimo has used to promote the national unification of China. For ten years the movement led a chequered existence, but the Generalissimo galvanized it into activity. In the course of the campaign against the Com-

munists, he realized that one of the most important means of bringing it to a successful conclusion was by improving conditions of life for the farmers, so he studied these conditions, first in the areas that had been recovered from the Communists and then extended his studies to other areas. Under his leadership, methods for the improvement of the welfare of farmers were worked out on a large scale.

Undoubtedly the most powerful weapon which the Generalissimo employed in fighting the Communists was the attention that was given to the well-being of the tillers of the soil who fell easy victims to the Communist propaganda regarding the redistribution of land. First of all, through the National Economic Council and the church bodies, the Generalissimo organized welfare centres where he had been able to demonstrate that rural reconstruction was beginning to meet one of the fundamental national needs. It was noticeable that, when co-operatives offered rural credit on reasonable terms to the debt-ridden farmers of Kiangsi, great numbers of villagers enthusiastically gave their allegiance to the Central Government under the flag of the Kuomintang. In the matter of extending credit, each farmer is given a small loan of from \$12 to \$20, which is sufficient to tide him over the most difficult period of the year. At one time the Generalissimo allotted the sum of \$10,000,000 as capital to carry on farmers' loan co-operatives in three provinces.

The welfare work for the farmers includes free distribution of improved seeds provided through provincial agricultural stations. The Generalissimo also organized what are called special-type education schools with funds from the British Boxer Indemnity Fund and some from the Ministry of Education. He concerned himself with education to the point of calling frequent conferences with the chairmen and the commissioners of education of many provinces.

Womenfolk in rural districts are given practical education such as housekeeping, cooking, care of children, dressmaking, treatment of minor injuries and nursing of the sick. The wants of the rural population in regard to medicine have not

been overlooked. A small base hospital has been established in each *hsien* and clinics are found in every market town and village. For the training of doctors for this social medical work, a large medical school, known as the Chung-cheng (or Chiang Kai-shek) Hospital, was built at Nanchang in Kiangsi. Officials have received strict instructions to give every assistance in improving the economic and social life of the rural population in addition to their ordinary duties. Military officers and civil officials in Kiangsi are trained to study the requirements of the people and ascertain the best means by which the standard of living of the farmers can be improved. When work in these directions seemed to be progressing too slowly, the Generalissimo paid flying trips to various points in the rural districts of Kiangsi, interviewing officials, great and small, complimenting here and reprimanding there and adding his own spirit of enthusiasm for the people's welfare. To him more than any man in China belongs the honour of bringing down to reality the plans for the reconstruction of the nation as laid down by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Those nearest to the Generalissimo are aware that his ears are always open, however busy on other matters he may be, to suggestions how the conditions of the common people in the rural districts might be bettered.

First under the National Economic Council, and now under the Ministry of Industries, similar work of rural improvement is being carried on in many provinces. Rapid development of roads, highways, opening of new railway lines, erection of bridges, installation of long distance telephones and general improvement of all lines of communications and transportation have been systematically pushed by the Generalissimo. In numbers of places, bridges and streets have been called by his name. When his friends from distant places visit him, one of the first questions he asks is how the roads and bridges are proceeding in the territory concerned. He realized long ago that a prosperous China must be a thoroughly modernized China and that slow and inefficient means of transportation and communications can no longer meet the requirements.

Good roads and other transportation facilities are essential to the development of the farming population as they open new markets and eliminate corruption by making it possible for high officials to visit far distant places and discover for themselves the actual conditions.

As early as the beginning of 1933, rehabilitation measures were started in areas recovered from the Reds, particular attention being given to the triangular-shaped district between the Han and Yangtze Rivers near the Hung Lake, which had been a seat of the Red Government and had suffered greatly from Red excesses. Plans were rapidly put into operation, not only to improve local administration and social conditions but to give assistance as well in order to bring about economic recovery.

Simultaneously, the Reconstruction Department of the Kiangsi Government was instructed to carry out the rehabilitation measures in accordance with the programme decided by the National Military Council. This work was considered so important that Generalissimo Chiang sent his own private plane to Nanking to carry Dr. Rajchmann, Dr. B. Borcic and other League of Nations experts to Nanchang, where they arrived in the early part of November, 1933. These experts made a survey of the war-torn districts that had been recovered, after which they drafted a concrete plan for the rehabilitation and reconstruction work of those areas.

The most important feature of the anti-Communist campaign in Kiangsi and the neighbouring provinces that was concluded so successfully was the rehabilitation work which had been carried on under the personal direction of the Generalissimo himself. The value of this work was summed up by the Rev. G. W. Shepherd, who described his experiences in the Red areas in an address at Shanghai in April, 1934. He said: "The Central Government is winning its battle against the Communists to-day, not so much because of its fleet of bombers or its well-equipped and modern-trained Army, but because it is applying a thoroughly constructive programme of rehabilitation.... In other words the Government is out-

doing the Communists on the basis of the old Chinese civilization which the people understand and want. .... Three years ago the situation was not bright, but the whole programme has now been changed and success is being achieved."

In October, 1934, "The North-China Daily News" published a special article from which the following extracts are taken as they give some idea of the important work that had already been done in Kiangsi in the way of rehabilitation:

"It is impossible to make a tour of the province of Kiangsi, without coming away favourably impressed, even enthusiastic, over the excellent work which has been done by General Chiang Kai-shek in the recreation and the rehabilitation of the ravaged districts recently recovered from the Communists. In the development of those desolated areas, and in the organization and education of the masses he has achieved wonders. No one can really understand until he has actually seen the improvements wrought. On every hand there are changes for the better, all of which offer indisputable testimony to the immensity of the task undertaken by the Generalissimo, whose motto, 'Action and less talk,' is being put into practice.

"A visitor cannot fail to be amazed by the transformation that has taken place, especially in the impoverished districts, stripped bare and hungry, since the Generalissimo entered the provincial capital of Nanchang less than two years ago, there personally to direct operations against the Communist-bandits.

"No fewer than 1,800 miles of fine new highways have been constructed at the behest of the new regime, hundreds of schools have been opened on a cheap but efficient basis, the people are living in a state of peace and happiness, such as they have never been accustomed to.....A new railway, which is to branch from Nanchang, will join the two neighbouring provinces of Hunan and Chekiang and bring Nanchang within less than 48 hours of Shanghai by rail."

The article goes on to describe the attitude of the people in the recovered districts and their relief at discovering that they were not to be robbed and otherwise abused by the Government troops as they had been by the Communist-

bandits. "General Chiang is standing no nonsense," declares the writer of the article, "and he looks with unmistakable disfavour on ill-behaviour on the part of his troops, who are strictly forbidden to molest the people, cheat them or take anything from them without paying." Later, it was stated that "any oppressed citizen who makes his case known to the authorities is sure of obtaining justice—a thing unheard of in past days."

Pre-occupied as they are by the stern necessity of earning their livelihood by unremitting toil—literally by the sweat of their brow—the common people know very little of the high officials of the Government. This notwithstanding, men, women and children throughout the provinces have come to believe that Chiang Kai-shek is even more concerned with their personal welfare than with high state problems. That is the reward that he has reaped for his assiduous work in perfecting his dual instruments of national rehabilitation—the New Life and the Economic Reconstruction Movements.

In all these activities he received the most signal aid and encouragement from his wife. From the outset, she proved a tower of strength to her husband in the founding of the New Life Movement. She assumed direction of the Women's Department to begin with, but it was not long before the onus of organizing and directing the whole movement fell upon her shoulders. It was her practical foresight which showed her the immense advantage of utilizing the long experience in interior China of the missionary body in getting the tenets of the New Life Movement translated from words to deeds by the people among whom they laboured. This she began at Sian, in 1934, by establishing a committee formed of representatives of the New Life Movement and missionaries to work for the people, and continued it in numerous other centres. Not only did she thus give a tangible fillip to the New Life Movement but she also gave unquestioned new life to missionary effort by linking it with official work in the interests of the Chinese people.

Prior to this co-ordination of foreign missionary and

Chinese effort on behalf of the people, Madame Chiang had already caught Christian endeavour in the web of Chinese social reform and progress. At Kuling she initiated an exceedingly important movement which has already exerted great influence in China and which will increasingly expand to her lasting credit.

Some years ago, a group of people who were spending their summer vacation at Kuling became academically interested in the questions of the relative values of the principles of Christianity and Communism. Some of these people were missionaries, some were educationalists and some were business men. They studied the question all the summer, and at the last meeting they decided to set down their findings. Madame Chiang Kai-shek was invited to speak at this meeting in view of the fact that she had been in Communist campaigns with the Generalissimo. In her speech, Madame Chiang referred to the driving force and the intensity of purpose of the Communists and pointed out that, if those who professed Christianity were really sincere in their belief and did not merely regard their faith as one of the social amenities, they should prove their sincerity by being willing to put into actual practice Christian principles. Madame Chiang pointed out that the regions formerly occupied by the Communists had been converted into devastated areas and provided an excellent proving ground for the demonstration of the real principles of Christianity. If Christianity would show the people who had survived slaughter, who had been harassed and driven from their homes by the Communists, who had lost all their earthly possessions, that they could find a helping hand held out to them by the Christians, they would realize that Christianity had a real depth of meaning and was really more than a mere social movement. She emphasized that, whatever the shortcomings of the Communists had been, they had the saving grace of taking their vows seriously and spared neither themselves nor their people in carrying them out.

"Is the Christian Church prepared to stand for their principles?" she asked. "If so, it should unhesitatingly plunge

into the work of helping these people in these devastated areas. ■ not, then the only honest thing would be to admit to ourselves that there is nothing to Christianity and confess that we stand defeated by the Communists. I challenge the Christian Church to prove what it is worth by taking up Christian principles seriously in the solution of practical problems," said Madame Chiang in conclusion.

This challenge was readily conveyed to the National Christian Council by some of the members present at the meeting. Churches all over China accepted it promptly, and out of further consideration of the challenge sprang the Kiangsi Christian Rural Service Union for the purpose of putting into effect in Kiangsi Province what may be described as "practical Christianity." This Union has now several branches at work for the help of womankind, education, etc., and is materially assisting in the establishment of clean administration in the interior of the province of Kiangsi. The work of this Union has become a model upon which other rural service unions have been founded.

Madame Chiang was also able to secure the practical co-operation of the National Economic Council of the National Government, for just about this time the Council was interested in opening up the North-west and had plans of completing highways and installing public utilities. Knowing that they had financial resources, Madame Chiang emphasized to them again and again that the farmers constituted 80 per cent. of the population of China and that the Council should assist in the reconstruction work then under way in Kiangsi where former Communist activities had resulted in rural bankruptcy. This appeal finally found response, with the result that there are now 12 rural centres sponsored by the National Economic Council. This does not mean, however, that the work is restricted to these 12 districts, because from all over China groups interested in rural welfare have come to these districts for research and have made use of the experiments to start similar organizations in various parts of the country.

The influence of this application of Christian principles

to the work of rehabilitation in Kiangsi has been outstanding. Magistrates have come to feel their responsibilities in administration, and a system of civil service and the application of such service are now being built up. Efforts have been made to improve farming and animal husbandry, and to utilize raw materials. Prominent in the latter respect is the discovery of a process of making ramie fibre on a commercial basis for linens, fibre for motor tyres, etc.

Madame Chiang was also able to induce the Board of Trustees for the Administration of the British Remitted Indemnity Funds to grant \$250,000 per year for five years for the support of primary schools and the institution of vocational training. The new idea about education that Madame Chiang wished to institute was the use of the hands for the sustenance of the body rather than "white-collar" dependence.

## CHAPTER XXXVI

Characteristics Physical And Mental—Carefully Regulated Regimen—How The Daily Work Is Done—Excellent Physical Condition—Soldierly In Bearing—Directness Of Speech—Loyalty To Sun Yat-sen—Kindliness To Subordinates—A Soldier-Poet—Madame Chiang's Beneficent Influence—Constant Companion While Campaigning—A Wife And A Helpmate—Generalissimo's Modesty And Simplicity—Disposition Toward Ascetism—Contempt For Physical Danger—Moral Courage Shown At Sian

EARLIER chapters have necessarily thrown much light upon the character of the Generalissimo, but they have been mainly records of action. It is desirable that the personality and characteristics of the man should now be considered from every angle, as shown both in private life and in public. There is admittedly a danger, in appraising the character and attributes of a living leader, of writing sycophantically, or, with the desire of avoiding that, of writing with exaggerated restraint. The hope may be expressed that these extremes have been avoided in what follows.

A fair amount of light is thrown upon a man's character by a study of his habits—the routine of his daily life. Of late years, Chiang has become more than ever regular and methodical. Seldom, unless it is unavoidable, does he change his daily schedule. This enables him to get through a vast amount of work and is one important form of the self-discipline to which he subjects himself. His achievements on behalf of the Republic of China would not have been possible had he not adhered to a severe daily regimen.

The Generalissimo usually arises at 5 o'clock in the morning. After spending half an hour on physical exercises, he reads important state despatches, considers plans that have been submitted to him, and evolves schemes for improvements in various fields of governmental activities. He believes that the dawn is the best time for clear thinking. At 6.30 a.m. he takes a light breakfast. Then comes the time for receiving visitors, mostly high staff officers who have called on urgent affairs or who have been summoned for instructions. After 10 a.m. he presides over meetings and attends to his routine work.

He has tiffin about 1 p.m. then taking a rest until 3 p.m. when he resumes receiving visitors, attending to meetings and discussing military plans as well as measures for civic reforms. During his limited spare time, he reads newspapers and magazines or practises calligraphy. At 6 p.m. he goes out with Madame Chiang for a ride or takes a walk. While motoring, he is quick to notice any sign of untidiness on the part of soldiers or inefficiency displayed by policemen as well as anything that calls for improvement in the general conditions in the city. Immediately upon his return home, he calls in the Mayor for reprimand if he has observed litter in the streets or inattention to their duties by the police.

He has his dinner at 7.30 p.m. He often invites senior officers and provincial administrators to dine with him. On such occasions, he serves plain food, wishing to utilize the dinner hour to discuss various problems that confront the Government. After the meal, he spends the rest of the evening in reading documents, telegrams and books. He retires at 11 p.m.

This orderliness of living has been mainly responsible for his physical vigour. His constitution is fundamentally healthy, although undoubtedly the heavy demands of public service for the last ten years have left him somewhat older than his years. His super-abundant energy has for its basis the fact that he had and still has a strong body and great reserves of stamina on which to draw. In fact, it is in part, at least, the

physical powers of the Generalissimo that have enabled him to out-distance his chief collaborators in the work of the Kuomintang since the death of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The great care he has taken of his body under Madame Chiang's supervision contributes to the maintenance of his good health. It is of interest to record that, at the time of his tour of the Northwest in 1934, he entered the Peking Union Medical College Hospital for a complete examination by the specialists. They found him in good physical condition. Though his back was severely injured during the Sian trouble, he quickly recovered from the effects.

In spite of the general impression that he is small in stature, the Generalissimo is 5 feet and 10 inches in height. He is a sturdy and upstanding figure, every inch a soldier. His square jaw and the straight lower lip protruding slightly gives evidence of the determination of his character. His steady eyes conceal a great reserve of fire, and "the gentle smile, which accompanied the exposition of his policy," as one foreign correspondent who had seen him put it, "might conceivably be replaced by an electric fervour in emergencies."

He has a directness of speech, but he is quiet and reserved, and in his conversation does not strive after effect. Another foreign writer, who saw him in 1931, recalls that "when discussing the accusation made against him (his political enemies were particularly active at the time) he gave no sign of irritation, no petulance. His eyes almost lazily swept across the questioner and, yet, revealed a penetration and power of assessment." Modest, unaffected and master of himself—that is the impression which lingers long with his interviewers.

There are many angles to the character of every man, both the great and the near-great, but usually there are certain particular aspects of their mental and moral attributes that enable them to climb to the top and out-distance competitors of their day and age. Let us begin first with the most important quality in the character of Chiang Kai-shek: that of loyalty to the principles and teachings of Dr. Sun Yat-sen,

which he adopted when he was under the latter's personal instruction at the beginning of his public career.

Over and over again, Generalissimo Chiang has asked his fellow members of the Kuomintang and the soldiers under his command to be loyal, not to himself, but to the teachings of the Kuomintang as founded by the late Party Leader. Personal ties count for much in human relations in all countries, and nowhere is this more true than in China. The following of the various warlords after the Revolution of 1911 was a personal following, pledged to the advancement of that particular leader as the one and only acceptable saviour of the country. Personal relations, of course, are by no means a matter of indifference to Chiang Kai-shek, but it is his particular virtue that he has changed the emphasis. His friends and military associates are not asked to accept him as the ameliorator of all of China's ills, but instead they are asked to adhere to the teachings of the departed Leader as embodied in the Three People's Principles.

On the eve of the 18th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Republic and the second anniversary of the country under Kuomintang rule (October 9, 1929), Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, at that time Chairman of the National Government, issued a statement that is more or less typical of his frequent appeals to his people, calling for their adherence to the principles which were laid down by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in order to promote national salvation. The statement was as follows:—

"The people of China to-day are becoming opportunists. They have no ambition to go forward and no sense of justice. All they care for is their own selfish interests. Those of their Government are being ignored. These opportunists struggle for power and privileges, but shirk responsibility. Unless we turn to the right path, the future holds little hope for our country and people, although the imperialists and Communists may not give us any serious trouble.

"Dr. Sun Yat-sen, our late Leader, told us to be wise and brave and to work for the good of the public. To be wise is

not to be opportunists and to be brave is not to deprive others of their rights and privileges. All our endeavours, therefore, should also be for the good of the country and the masses. All faithful members of the Party should not disobey these teachings.

"Some people, however, are using the pretext of 'class struggle' to rob and kill, and that of 'freedom of opinion' to spread rumours and create disturbances. Such behaviour will only bring ruin to our country. Dr. Sun has already laid down general principles for the administration of China. While we want to carry out faithfully his programme, we also must not forget to follow his admirable personality. I hope all good citizens of China will, hereafter, develop their physical fitness, learn to be honest and upright, and carry out the revolutionary programme of Dr. Sun. I trust you and I will all adjust our lives according to the above standards."

It was about this time that it was becoming realized in many quarters that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was of an entirely different type from the regional leaders. Already he had maintained his leadership of Chinese affairs for so long a period as to occasion astonishment among the foreign residents who had been in China for a considerable time and who had thought themselves incapable of astonishment at any ebb or flow that might occur in Chinese politics. Word was being passed around that at last China had a real leader, and foreign observers began to ask themselves the reason. H. Benson-Currie in March, 1930, expressed more than his own sentiments when he wrote:—

"There are several reasons why the great mass of Chinese prefer Chiang Kai-shek as a leader to any of the self-styled 'generals' who have been very much to the front recently. The most important of these reasons had been lost sight of by those who profess some knowledge of Chinese affairs. The success of Nanking is entirely due to its desire to accept the Three Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen as a part of its policy. The famous principles have created an everlasting impression upon the mind of the average thinking Chinese. To him those

principles have become ideals—stepping stones, as it were, to a goal which he, in company with his fellow Chinese, must strive to attain. That is the crux of the whole matter and they are now prepared to settle down and be governed by those who accept the teachings of Dr. Sun Yat-sen as a part of their doctrine."

The view expressed by Benson-Currie stresses the importance of Chiang's loyalty—for he was and still is the outstanding figure of the Nanking Government referred to—to certain principles as involved in the teachings of Dr. Sun as an explanation, in part at least, of his extraordinary success as a leader. It should be noted, however, that his following of the example set by Dr. Sun has not by any means been a servile one. Dr. Sun gave his approval to the *entente* with Soviet Russia and endorsed the co-operation of the Kuomintang with the Communists in China, yet Chiang was the principal leader in the expulsion of Communist elements from the Kuomintang and from the National Government. Not only was that true, but he led the opposition at a time when it meant a serious split in the Party. Others opposed Chiang's action, not because they really liked the Reds, but because they claimed that Dr. Sun had approved of co-operation with them. Later, much to their chagrin, they were forced by the logic of events to join with the Generalissimo in his war on the Communists in China. Chiang himself has at times requested others not to take a pedantic attitude on the teachings of Dr. Sun in regard to certain minor matters, pointing out to them that divergent views are often the result of a difference in time rather than a reflection upon the late Leader's teaching.

It is this quality of loyalty in the character of Chiang Kai-shek that supplies the explanation of his pre-eminence as the present-day leader of China. The Chinese people have accepted the teachings of Dr. Sun Yat-sen as a part of their heritage, and they have accepted Chiang Kai-shek as his principal interpreter.

Notwithstanding the fact that in furthering the mission that had been entrusted to him by Dr. Sun he had to be firm

and severe, Chiang always shows himself to be a man of warm feelings in his personal relations with members of his family, his friends, his colleagues and even his subordinates. One incident which illustrates his tender consideration may well be recorded. Madame Chiang Kai-shek describes a walk she took with the Generalissimo on a New Year's eve in the surrounding mountains during one of the campaigns in Fukien. "We discovered a tree of white plum blossoms, flowering profusely," said Madame Chiang in her account published in the "Forum" ("Fighting Communism in China"). She continued, "What an omen of good luck! In Chinese literature the five petals of the winter plum portend the five blessings of joy, good luck, longevity, prosperity, and (to us most desired of all) peace! The General carefully plucked a few branches and carried them home. When our evening candles were lighted, he presented them to me in a little bamboo basket—a New Year's gift. The plum blossoms had looked graceful and lovely on the tree, but massed in the basket by candlelight they took on an indescribable beauty, their shadows on the wall making clean, bold strokes like those of the great Ming artist, Pa Ta Shan Jen. Perhaps you can see why I am willing to share the rigours of life at the front with my husband. He has the courage of the soldier, and the sensitive soul of the poet."

Similar qualities of warm feeling are displayed in his relations with friends and particularly with those who have been associated with him in various public activities. For example: when the lunar year was about to come to an end in 1934—it was the time for the settlement of debts—he sent a sum of money to a sick friend of his who was thus enabled to celebrate a cheerful and care-free Chinese New Year. It seems almost inconceivable that, with tens of thousands of persons working under him and with numerous State affairs of great weight occupying his attention, he could still remember a sick person and send him this timely monetary gift? Instances of a similar kind are too numerous to mention.

In regard to his dealings with the Whampoa cadets who

came under his influence, his Japanese biographer, Zawada, says:

"Under the hard crust of a solemn demeanour is lodged a gentle heart. Chiang Kai-shek does not want to instil fear in the minds of his men, though they should respect and obey him. He finds his way into their hearts through the fine sentiments of kindness and gentleness. He would say touchingly to them, 'Don't think that I am different from you because of my position as Commander-in-Chief. I am now, as ever, a participant of the People's Revolution, in no way different from you.'

"Chiang Kai-shek greatly endeared himself to his subordinates. As President of the Whampoa Military Academy, he invariably treated his students as his own children. He used to lend money to those who were in straits. He was pleased to officiate at weddings, and even to help the young couples in defraying marriage expenses. Under this benign influence, the young cadets of the Academy were brought up."

The warmth of feeling and the sentiments of kindness and gentleness that have characterized Chiang Kai-shek have largely been due to the influence exercised over him by his mother and his wife. To this day, he still speaks with intense feeling of the former's motherly care. Throughout his public career, he has frequently made visits to his ancestral home in order to pay his respects to the graves of his parents and his forbears. Modern though he may be, in most of his personal actions Generalissimo Chiang is faithful to the traditions of ancient China, especially in the matter of filial piety, upholding both the traditional reverence due to forbears as well as the time-honoured forms of cherishing their memory.

By his marriage to Miss Mayling Soong, Chiang regained, so to speak, the loving care of a devoted woman by which he had been blessed during the lifetime of his mother, but, in addition, he secured a right-hand helpmate of high character, courage, intelligence and knowledge, fully competent to give practical help in any problem, particularly those connected



A domestic scene: The Generalissimo and Madame  
in private life.



with foreign affairs, foreign people, foreign methods of organization or administration, and the utilization of foreign technical experts. From the outset, Madame Chiang Kai-shek threw herself into the task of assisting her husband in the application of his schemes for the betterment of the people, and began to acquire first-hand knowledge of the problems of the people by actual contact with them during her journeys with her husband on his various campaigns and missions. Always those journeys were arduous and full of risk to life and limb. Fortunately for the Generalissimo, his wife never bothered about risks, though the strenuousness of her life and the labours she undertook at length badly affected her health. Even so, she continued travelling with her husband until just prior to his visit to Sian in December, 1936, when he was detained. Illness of a serious nature then compelled her to remain under medical care in Shanghai, but the news of danger to him immediately found her disregarding the advice of doctors; facing a tremendous problem at Nanking and eventually flying into the dangers at Sian in order to be by her husband's side and assist in his release. What she was able to accomplish by her brains and her grit is strikingly revealed in the account of this episode in her life which she wrote, to accompany the extracts from her husband's diary, under the title of "Sian—A Coup d'Etat."<sup>1</sup>

Courage and character similar to that shown in this incident, which stirred both China and the world, have invariably been exhibited by Madame Chiang in the performance of what she regarded as her duty in assisting her husband. Not only is she described by those who know her as a remarkably efficient housewife, but as one exhibiting that same efficiency, plus great tenacity of purpose, in every sphere of endeavour where she has elected to put her hand. When it was decided to give educational facilities to the children

<sup>1</sup> "Sian—A Coup d'Etat" by Madame Chiang Kai-shek, with "A Fortnight in Sian," being extracts from a Diary, by Chiang Kai-shek. Published by the China Publishing Company, Shanghai.

whose fathers sacrificed their lives for the Revolution, Madame Chiang assumed responsibility for the organization and administration of a school at Nanking. It now stands as a monument to her and is remarkable both for its planning and for its efficacy in attaining its purpose.

She has devoted all her physical and mental powers to the service of the nation. For example, Madame Chiang came to the assistance of her husband in a strenuous sphere of national importance by undertaking the reorganization of the Commission on Aeronautical Affairs, or, in other words, the Air Force. As Secretary-General she began and carried on labours which any man would have been justified in shirking, and has been proceeding with it for over a year at this time of writing, despite great obstacles and long absences from the Capital.

To these highly practical and technical national responsibilities she adds innumerable others, from the chairmanship of the Association for the Prevention of Blindness and other social activities to the personal direction of all foreign contacts which her husband is constantly making, either by correspondence or interviews. Crowning it all, she is ever obliging in writing articles when requested by magazines and newspapers, in making addresses and in seeing those who have legitimate problems of national importance to discuss. This incessant activity entirely deprives her of all those social and other recreations and distractions cherished by most women and is a serious drain upon her health and her strength. Madame Chiang, however, carries on undismayed, marching side by side with her husband, consecrated, as it were, to the nation, and this could not be more forcibly demonstrated than it was when she boldly braved the dangers confronting her husband when his life was in jeopardy at Sian. In all the provinces that Madame Chiang has visited she has left behind on the minds of all whom she met a clear-cut impression of a devoted, able woman working in company with her husband with inspiring zeal and great singleness of purpose for the welfare of the people in China.

Despite the fact that her health was bad in the summer of

1936, she accompanied the Generalissimo on his trip to Canton where he went to dispose of the problems raised in connection with the bloodless rebellion of the two Kwang provinces. Her visit to Hongkong for medical attention bore valuable fruit for China, for she was able to lay the foundation for better relations between Hongkong and Canton and arrange for the visit of the Governor and Lady Caldecott to Whampoa to meet the Generalissimo. This visit may have far-reaching consequences in the cementing of the friendly relations between China and Great Britain.

Attainment of a position of eminence in China is usually signalized by a marked change in demeanour and in manner of living. Foreign correspondents who visited regional warlords in the early years after the Revolution were struck by the magnificence of their mansions and the splendour of their retinues. A warlord or other prominent personage did not consider that his importance was properly emphasized unless he was surrounded by pomp and pageantry. One correspondent who visited Chiang Kai-shek at Canton in 1926 expected to find him in similar surroundings. Instead, he found that he was received in an unpretentious building in which a sparsely furnished bedroom served also as Chiang's office. Although Chiang had already become Commander-in-Chief of the Revolutionary Armies, he was wearing a plain uniform without any badge of rank. In manner he was modest, almost diffident. When asked for some account of his career, Chiang wrote down a few Chinese characters, which the interpreter explained meant: "Born in Chekiang Province; educated at the Paoting Academy and in Japan; with Dr. Sun Yat-sen since the Revolution." That was all. It evidently never occurred to Chiang that the outside world was beginning to take an interest in him as a potential Man of Destiny.

The simplicity, modesty and lack of display shown by Chiang Kai-shek on this occasion have been characteristic of his whole life. It is not an affectation on his part to impress

foreigners and still less so to impress his own people who, it must be confessed, are more or less given to ornate and, at times, purposeless display; it is a real attribute of the man himself. The trappings of a magnificent *yamen*, the fanfare of trumpets, and the lines of bowing henchmen have no appeal to this Spartan-like leader of China's Armies, whose demeanour sometimes reminds one more of a Buddhist monk than that of the leading soldier of China.

Undoubtedly, Chiang Kai-shek is strongly inclined towards the life of an ascetic. Not only does he preach a doctrine of self-denial to his fellow countrymen, but he actually practises it in his daily life. He uses neither tobacco nor spirituous liquors, nor even the mild stimulants, tea and coffee. Sometimes he drinks grape juice. He has publicly expressed his admiration for the character of the Japanese *samurai*, particularly in respect to their frugality and abstemiousness. The custom of the Japanese of making their morning ablutions in cold water struck his fancy when he was studying in Japan, and he similarly begins his day.

It may be assumed that Chiang got his original bias in the direction of a simple, frugal life from the teachings of his mother, who was a devout Buddhist. His military training, particularly that at Tokyo, further directed his attention towards a self-disciplined and self-denying life, while his contact with Dr. Sun Yat-sen gave a permanent trend towards simplicity and modesty after the example set by the late Party Leader.

It is, in fact, the simple things of life that appeal to Chiang Kai-shek. His idea of a holiday is a trip into the mountains. That he is a lover of Nature is well-known to all his friends. When a correspondent visited him at the Buddhist temple on the top of a mountain near his native village, Chikow, it was a waterfall that he was anxious for him to view. Again and again, he reverted to the subject of the waterfall.

Chiang is courageous. This is admitted even by his enemies. Friends who once climbed mountains with him were struck by his contempt for danger. They were descending a



After the Sian Coup: The Generalissimo and Madame at Chikow.



steep slope which led to a valley thousands of feet below. They preferred to walk, as the gradient was so stiff that they did not care to take the risk of riding in sedan chairs, but Chiang was not daunted. He rode the whole way in a chair borne by two coolies. When they arrived at the foot of the mountain they asked him why he had put himself in such peril. He answered tersely: "No one has ever fallen. So there is little danger."

He possesses more than mere physical courage—a quality common to all races and nations. He has the rarer attribute of moral courage. He showed this at the time when he visited the tomb of Dr. Sun Yat-sen in the Western Hills near Peiping shortly before the outbreak of the Feng-Yen rebellion. "This move was one of singular bravery," says a foreign writer, "for General Chiang was now in enemy territory . . ." Again, Chiang showed his strength of character at the time of the Tsinan Incident in resisting the unanimous desire of his soldiers to launch a counter-attack on the Japanese and wipe them out.

His moral courage was strikingly demonstrated during the Sian trouble. Before going to Sian, he had been warned of the inadvisability of his proceeding to that city on account of the dissatisfaction of the officers of the North-eastern Army engaged in the anti-Communist campaign. When he was staying in the vicinity of Sian and daily conferring with these officers, he was again warned by his intelligence service that it would be dangerous to remain continuously at Hua Ching Chih but he paid no heed to these warnings. During his detention in the city of Sian he defied death and steadfastly held to his decision that, although his body had lost its freedom, his spirit remained free. One quotation from his diary kept during that period will be sufficient to indicate the extent of the moral courage the Generalissimo possessed even at a time when death stared him in the face.

"Later, after having been admonished by Donald, Chang sent Huang (Colonel J. L. Huang, who had gone to Sian with Donald) in to see me, but before we met I was cautioned not

to say anything else except that I was well in order to appease my wife's anxiety. He wanted my remarks to be of the same vein as the telegraphic message they had sent out. I made no replies, and when Huang came, I wrote the following note to my wife:

"As I have made up my mind to sacrifice my life, if necessary, for my country, please do not worry about me. I will never allow myself to do anything to make my wife ashamed of me, or become unworthy of being a follower of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Since I was born for the Revolution, I will gladly die for the same cause. I will return my body unspotted to my parents. As to home affairs, I have nothing to say further than that I wish you would, to gladden my spirit, regard my two sons, Ching-kuo and Wei-kuo, as your own children. However, you must never come to Shensi.

"After writing the letter I read it aloud several times for Huang's benefit so that even if it should be intercepted, Huang could verbally carry the message to my wife."

The Generalissimo's admonition to Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng prior to his departure from Sian, which is printed in Chapter XXX, explained why he did not yield to pressure. He said: "If I should try to avoid danger and submit to any duress exercised by my subordinates my own integrity would be destroyed, and with it the integrity of the nation, which I represent. No matter whether it be an individual or a nation, the loss of integrity is tantamount to death itself. For the upholding of those moral principles which I have repeatedly emphasized to the people, I am ready to undergo any sacrifice. If I do not carry out my own teachings, my subordinates as well as the people of the country will not know what to follow and the nation will be as good as destroyed."

No more sublime example of moral courage than this is to be found in recent Chinese history.

## CHAPTER XXXVII

Strong Religious Sentiment—Conversion To Christianity—Eloquent Good Friday Message—Value Of Faith In Human Affairs—Philosophy Of Action—Avoidance Of Specialization—A Great Universalist—Both Energetic And Persistent—Reliance Upon Analysis To Meet Crises—Comparison With Other Leaders—Many-sided In Character And Attainments—Consideration For Others

CHIANG is religious, leading a Christian life consistently even before his formal conversion to that faith. "Judging from his daily life," according to an extract from a letter of a friend who had accompanied him to the front during the war in Honan, "one cannot but admit that long ago he was a Christian in spirit. Shortly before his departure for the front, Madame Soong, a pious and respectable lady of honour and age, gave him a Chinese edition of the Bible, requesting him to read it, no matter how busy he might be. The General accepted it with thanks and promised to read it every day. While at the front, even when under artillery fire, one could always see this copy of the Bible on his desk, beside piles of official papers. What was more praiseworthy, General Chiang not only kept the Bible, but read it regularly. Long before he was baptized he had already acquired the habit of praying at length."

On October 23, 1930, at Shanghai he became a member of the Christian Church, being baptized by Rev. Z. T. Kuang, D.D., pastor of the Young Allen Memorial (Methodist) Church, at the home of his mother-in-law, Madame Soong. The ceremony was a simple one. Prayers were offered and the

Chairman of the National Government was asked whether it was his sincere desire that he should become a Christian, to which he replied in firm tones that it was, after which Pastor Kuang sprinkled the water over his head and welcomed him into the Church. His conversion to Christianity took place three years after his marriage to Miss Mayling Soong. It is an indisputable fact that he became a Christian because of the influence of his mother-in-law and his wife. Being a devout Christian herself, Madame Chiang would naturally do everything within her power to help his progress in that direction.

Chinese Christians were naturally enthusiastic about the conversion of the Generalissimo to Christianity, and quite proudly pointed out that his adoption of the Christian religion was entirely due to Chinese influences, which they hail as a proof that Christianity has at last become an indigenous religion of China. As for foreign Christians in China, at the time, they hailed the event of Chiang's joining the Methodist Church with a certain amount of scepticism, making an inevitable reference to Feng Yu-hsiang and his alleged back-sliding from the Christian faith. Some individuals were even of opinion that it was a political move, but this was manifestly absurd. It was not a popular action on his part. In fact, when the Generalissimo arrived in Hankow two months after his adoption of the Christian faith, there was an editorial in a Chinese paper which vilified Christians, though not mentioning him by name.

There is one factor in the conversion of Chiang Kai-shek to Christianity that seems to have been overlooked by all commentators and that factor is that he was brought up under religious influences, his mother being a devout adherent of the Buddhist faith. Students of comparative religion have repeatedly pointed out the striking analogies between the teachings of Buddhism and those of the Bible, particularly, of the New Testament. The influence of the Generalissimo's mother on his life is unquestioned, and her moral instructions to her son left him no great distance to go in the acquisition of the Christian faith. Long before Christianity became a potent

factor in his life, he had acquired a largely ascetic view of life under the influence of Buddhist philosophy. With this trend of mind, reinforced by family influences and the example of the late Party Leader, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who was also ■ Christian, his mind proved a fertile field for the reception of the ethical and spiritual teachings of Jesus Christ.

The effect of Christian teachings on his mind and heart could be no more strikingly revealed than in his own message of Good Friday, March 26, 1937, to the Eastern Asia Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church at Nanking. Because of its importance in such a study as this Biography, it is given in full:

“Without religious faith there can be no real understanding of life. Faith in the cause of revolution is not unlike religious faith. Without faith, human affairs, both great and small, are difficult of achievement.

“Often when face to face with opposition and possible danger, we mortals are prone to retreat and to abandon our work half-way. Such lack of confidence in ourselves is often due to the absence of strong religious faith.

“I have now been a Christian for nearly ten years, and during the time I have been a constant reader of the Bible. Never before has this Sacred Book been so interesting to me as during my two weeks’ captivity in Sian. This unfortunate affair took place suddenly, and I found myself placed under detention without having a single earthly belonging.

“From my captors I asked for but one thing, a copy of the Bible, and in my solitude I had ample opportunity for reading and meditation. The greatness and love of Christ burst upon me with ■ new inspiration, increasing my strength to struggle against evil, to overcome temptation, and to uphold righteousness.

“I am indeed grateful to all my fellow Christians who continually offered prayers on my behalf, and I am deeply conscious of the strong spiritual support for which I extend my hearty thanks to all Christians and to which before you all to-day I testify that the name of God may be glorified.

"Many virtues of Christ I cannot possibly enumerate. Today being Good Friday I merely wish to explain some of the lessons I have derived from the trials of Christ. His utterances from the Cross are our spiritual inheritance. Entreating forgiveness for his enemies, He cried, 'Father forgive them for they know not what they do.' Truly great is the love of Christ. In all my meditation I found these thoughts recurring and providing me with rich spiritual sustenance.

"To illustrate, I am going to recount some of my experiences at Sian. Before I went to Shensi on my second trip, I already was conscious of the perverted thoughts and unusual activities in the Army there. I had previously received reports of the intrigues and revolutionary rumblings that were threatening to undermine the unity of the State.

"My immediate associates tried to persuade me to abandon the journey but I replied: 'Now that our country is unified and the foundation of the State established, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armies has the responsibilities for the direction and enlightenment from which he dare not withdraw. Furthermore, I have dedicated my soul and body to the service of the State, and there can never be any consideration of my personal safety.'

"According to the record of the New Testament, when Christ entered Jerusalem for the last time He plainly knew the danger ahead but triumphantly, on an ass, He rode into the city without anguish, without fears. What greatness! What courage! In comparison, how unimportant my life must be! So why should I hesitate?

"My fondness for my troops always has been as great as love between brothers and this love drew me into the heart of the rebellion. Such disregard of danger in face of duty caused deep concern to the Government and worried the people and for this numerous prayers have been offered by Christian friends. In the midst of it all, my understanding increased and my love multiplied.

"Following my detention my captors presented me with terms and demands, with tempting words of kindness, with

threats of violence and torture, and with public trial by the 'People's Front.' On every hand I was beset by danger, but I had no thought of yielding to the pressure. My faith in Christ increased. In this strange predicament, I distinctly recalled the 40 days and nights Christ passed in the wilderness, withstanding temptation, His prayers in the garden of Gethsemane, and the indignities heaped upon Him at His trial. The prayers He offered for His enemies upon the Cross were ever in my thoughts.

"I naturally remembered the prayers offered by Dr. Sun Yat-sen during his imprisonment in London. These scenes passed vividly before me again and again, like so many pictures. My strength redoubled to resist recalcitrants with the spirit of Christ on the Cross. I was preparing to make the final sacrifice at the trial of the so-called 'People's Front.' Having determined upon this course of action, I was comforted and at rest.

"Following the settlement of the Sian affairs, the rebels, knowing their unwise and treasonable actions, naturally were afraid. Remembering that Christ enjoined us to forgive those who sin against us until 'seventy times seven' and upon their repentance, I felt that they should be allowed to start life anew. At the same time I was greatly humbled that my own faith had not been of such quality as to influence my followers and to restrain them.

"Ever since, when training cadets and launching expeditions, I have repeated to my followers these two principles: (1) on detecting the slightest selfishness on my part or discovering plans contrary to the interest of my country and people, any one may accuse me of guilt and put me to death; (2) should my words and actions betray the lack of truth and good faith or indicate the departure from the revolutionary cause and principle, any one of my subordinates may take me for an enemy and put me to death. I honestly believe that these two sayings were prompted by sincerity and grew out of my religious faith. They are in line with the spirit of love of Christ and the forbearance and magnanimity of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

"The life of Christ reveals a long record of affliction and constant persecution. His spirit of forbearance, His love and His benevolence shine through it all. No more valuable lesson has yet come to me out of my Christian experiences.

"Dr. Sun Yat-sen was a Christian and the greatest thing he received from Christ was love—love for the emancipation of the weaker races and for the welfare of oppressed peoples. This spirit remains with us and reaches to the skies. I am an ardent follower of the Revolution and although my faith in Dr. Sun at the outset did not appear to have any religious significance, it was similar to a religious faith. For this reason I have become a follower of the Revolution based on the *san-min-chu-i*.

"To-day I find I have taken a further step and have become a follower of Jesus Christ. This makes me realize more fully that success of revolution depends upon men of faith and that men of character, because of their faith, cannot sacrifice their principles for personal safety under circumstances of difficulty and crisis. In other words, a man's life may be sacrificed, his person held in bondage, but his faith and spirit can never be restrained. This is due to the confidence brought about by faith.

"On this Good Friday these reflections are ours. For such is the importance of faith in revolution and faith in religions.

"What I have just said represents my spiritual conception of Good Friday, interspersed with a few facts out of my own experiences. I offer them as testimony and not in any sense to exalt my own worthiness and achievements. I take this opportunity to extend my greetings to the Central Conference of Eastern Asia of the Methodist Episcopal Church and to express my thanks to Christians everywhere for their earnest and continued prayers on my behalf."

Chiang Kai-shek is energetic. Western critics, who have lived for a time in China, often accuse Chinese political leaders of being long on words and short on action, to borrow the diction of the Stock Exchange. There is a measure of truth

in this, but the rule cannot be applied to some of the Chinese generals who, whatever their faults may be, are in a few cases men of considerable energy of character. So it is seen that in respect to this particular quality Generalissimo Chiang is not without competitors among his contemporaries, but it is certain that there is not one of the numerous generals who have risen and fallen since the Revolution in 1911, who can match him in swift decision and immediate action.

This quality in the character of the Generalissimo has often been commented upon, for it is as conspicuous as his principles and his modesty and simplicity. J. O. P. Bland, writing on the subject of "Chiang Kai-shek's Adventures" in 1928, referred to him as the man of "push and go." Similarly, a writer in the "New York Times," declared:

"General Chiang's particular genius is speed of thought and action. In his movement upward he outdistanced opponents and competitors by thinking weeks ahead of them and acting when they had just begun to think. In a country like China, where men are accustomed to write long essays on what should be done, the man of action is as important as he is rare." Later, the writer added: "Chiang Kai-shek discovered what so few Chinese politicians and military men have learned to this day—that time matters; that speed is an element both in government administration and in warfare."

Stepanoff, a Soviet military adviser, in a report to Moscow declared that the strong points of Chiang were his ability to make quick decisions and the rapidity with which he put his decisions into effect. To illustrate his speed of thought and action, Stepanoff made the following citation: "On March 20, 1926, the labourers in Canton struck and organized a strike committee and demonstrated on the streets. At that time there were many Soviet advisers and political directors, whose power was great. There were Communist Party members in the Kuomintang, but without consulting the Kuomintang he disarmed the strikers and halted their movement. The Soviet Russians then knew that they were not using Chiang, but that Chiang was using them as tools." Later, Stepanoff told how

Chiang anticipated a counter-attack by his political opponents by declaring on May 15, 1926, at a meeting of the Central Executive Committee that Communism was not suitable for China.

Not only does Generalissimo Chiang himself believe in getting things done quickly, but he insists that others should follow his example. At the weekly memorial service at the State Council Building in Nanking on December 3, 1928, as mentioned in an earlier chapter, he expressed his dissatisfaction at the slow improvement made by the National Government since its reorganization two months previously. "Before I left on the inspection tour three weeks ago," he told his audience consisting of officials and Kuomintang leaders, "I thought that during my absence a few of the important measures of the Government would be carried out, but upon my return I find that many things are still pending. This seems to indicate that we have not improved in our efficiency."

In 1934, the Generalissimo's ire was aroused by what he considered the feeble efforts of authorities of the principal Yangtze provinces to prevent the floods and droughts which had visited this formerly prosperous area in recent years. He issued what amounted to a telegram of rebuke to those responsible.

When he had the Communists well beaten in 1934, he declared in an interview to a Press representative at Kuling: "I am a strong believer in action rather than words, hence I have not granted any interviews to the Press for some months past." It was intimated that he preferred to achieve a definite goal rather than to expound his hopes of what he wished to accomplish.

The persistence of the Generalissimo in carrying out his plans has come to be recognized. An editorial in the "North-China Daily News" said: "It is not enough to satisfy the Generalissimo that he himself should be persistent in his display of energy. He would have others do likewise." In a powerful speech before the entire body of the cadets of the Central Military Academy and a large gathering of military commanders from various parts of the country at Nanking on

November 26, 1934, Chiang, in his capacity as President of the National Military Council, urged the students and the Army leaders to strive hard to regenerate the country and develop it into a strong power in the world. He appealed to his listeners by quoting the famous saying from the celebrated statesman and strategist, Chu-kuo Liang of the Han Dynasty, "To toil yourself and exhaust your energy for the country until you reach your death."

There can be little doubt that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has worked out a regular philosophy of action upon which he not only bases his own life, but also seeks to influence the life and actions of his contemporaries. In this respect, he is fully in harmony with the pragmatic instincts of the Chinese people. What could be more useful than Chiang's advice: "A man should go about his business with firm determination. If he judges amiss, let it go, for it is better to judge amiss and act than oscillate and not know what to do." Even in the Western countries, not all men of affairs have discovered that the secret of successful administration is in getting things done promptly rather than in being always 100 per cent. right. Chiang Kai-shek lends himself exclusively neither to idealism nor to materialism; rather he finds the meaning of life in action and preaches that a man should make himself fit for action. He seems to say: "To do is to be," as Rudolf Lotze, the German philosopher, puts it.

Chiang's philosophy of action can be presented in his own words, as follows:

"Our late Party Leader used to say that spirit and matter are inseparable. He defines spirit very clearly as anything that is not matter. There has never been a more exact definition of spirit. We should, therefore, admit that in the universe there is spirit besides matter. The existence of spirit, once admitted, presupposes the existence of mind and idea. That mind and idea may be construed as knowledge or conscience. The important point is that knowledge or conscience should be rendered complete, that is, put in practice. To put in practice or realize knowledge or con-

science means to act on the late Leader's tenet, 'While to know is difficult, to do is easy.' In this way will knowledge or conscience not become nothingness, nor will the doer become an empty idealist or a mechanical materialist. Our attitude toward philosophy, therefore, should neither be materialistic nor idealistic. In the universe, regardless of age or circumstances, there is only one word 'action,' and it is creative. So the idea that 'to know is difficult and to act is easy' forms the centre of our philosophy of life. In other words, we must consider the philosophy of action as our philosophy of conduct."

Generalissimo Chiang never shows a disposition to push himself in the foreground nor a desire even to refute misrepresentation unless it is flagrantly contrary to fact. The most striking example of this was afforded by the Shanghai War in 1932. As has been related previously, he played quite an important part in the war, and his friends urgently requested that he should permit the facts to be published. He emphatically refused permission, and it was not until much later, when General Tsai of the Nineteenth Route Army, during a trip to America, made the most outrageous charges that he had not been given support by Chiang against the Japanese, that he permitted the true facts to be made public. The main reason for Chiang's refusal to grant such permission before was his unwillingness to have anything said or done to mar the excellent impression that the foreign correspondents had succeeded in creating on behalf of the Nineteenth Route Army, even though this meant some neglect of the credit due to the Fifth Army which bore the brunt of the fighting with the Japanese. He realized how important the issue was to Chinese morale when Chinese nationals at last realized that they were able to stand up to the Japanese in a knock-down fight. As for his own part in getting reinforcements to Shanghai as well as his suggestions to the leaders of the Nineteenth Route Army, which, if followed, would have insured an even better showing for Chinese arms, he was willing that all this should be overlooked if it would help the interests of China. Loyalty to the principles to which he had dedicated



**The Generalissimo amid the scenic beauty which he loves.**



his life came first with the Generalissimo and his genuine modesty of spirit and lack of vanity made his self-denial an easy task.

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek possesses an analytic mind. The skill with which he has extricated himself from difficult situations, emerging from each new crisis that threatened to overwhelm him with greater prestige than ever, has been frequently commented upon. Not only has he found a ready solution for the most difficult problems of domestic politics, but in the matter of foreign relations he has shown an equal skill in analyzing the situation and meeting it in a way creditable to himself and to the nation which he represents. To mention only two instances, both the Nanking Incident of 1927 and the Tsinan Incident of 1928 redounded to his credit as a result of his appraisal of each emergency as it arose and the skill with which he handled them. The first affair gave Chiang standing among foreigners in China, many of whom had previously been hostile to him as the leader of the Northern Expedition. The second event demonstrated to the world at large his ability both as a diplomat and as a statesman. In each instance it was the skill of Chiang in analysis that enabled him to hit immediately upon the right response to the sudden emergency.

This capacity of Chiang Kai-shek to make a correct analysis of events led him to break with the Communistic regime under the domination of Borodin at Hankow ahead of other leaders of the Kuomintang, even at the cost of a Party schism. Those other leaders, as we have seen, belatedly acknowledged the necessity of a break with the Reds and followed the example that Chiang had set.

His discernment, due to his analytical mind, led to frankness which on more than one occasion has been appalling to his friends as well as foes. That is not to say that he is lacking in tact, when the occasion calls for delicate handling of a situation, but behind his tact lies an iron resolve. There is, for instance, the occasion of a Northern provincial leader whose attitude and loyalty towards the National Government

at Nanking became doubtful. A special emissary was despatched to the wavering leader and Chiang said to his messenger before leaving, "Ask him if he wants to go down in history as a traitor to his country?" "Be sure," he added, "that you repeat every sentence just as I say it to you. Make him understand that he must support the National Government under all circumstances. Tell him that, if he is driven out of his province, I will reward his loyalty by providing him with a new province." The warlord to whom Chiang sent this message is not noted for his lofty virtue, but he decided not to risk the wrath of one who had sent him such a plain-spoken message.

Genuine power of analysis is so unusual a characteristic among human beings as to make a marked man of the fortunate possessor of such a quality. Plato said, "He shall be as a god to me, who can rightly divide and define." It is a quality that seems to be innate in a few gifted men, but if the quality is inborn, perhaps the attribute of a balanced soul, it will reveal itself in the life and actions of the man himself as well as in the words with which every man, willingly or otherwise, unconsciously delineates his own character.

It has been said that great men admire in other great men the qualities that they themselves possess. This perhaps explains why Chiang Kai-shek has often referred to the teachings of Confucius as expounded in the "Ta Hsueh" (Book of Great Learning). In an address at Nanking on January 6, 1936, he particularly quoted two passages from the ancient classic in which basic importance was assigned to the power of analysis. The first reads:

"In order to propagate virtue to the world, one must first rule one's country.

"In order to rule the country, one must first rule one's family.

"In order to rule the family, one must first regulate one's body (meaning moral training).

"In order to regulate the body, one must first regulate one's mind.

"In order to regulate the mind, one must first be sincere in one's intentions.

"In order to be sincere in intentions, one must first increase one's knowledge.

"In order to increase knowledge, one must first analyze things."

The second quotation expresses much the same idea as the first and reads:

"A man's knowledge is increased after analyzing things.

"His intentions become sincere after his knowledge is increased.

"His mind is regulated after his intentions are sincere.

"His body is regulated after his mind is regulated.

"His family is ruled after his body is regulated.

"His country is ruled after his family is ruled.

"The world is pacified after the country is ruled."

Among those who achieve high distinction in the affairs of men mainly by their own efforts, there are two kinds, great universalists and great specialists. The latter class is by far the most common, and consists of those who have developed a high degree of excellence in some particular line. They have attained their expertness ■ the expense of development of their other qualities or abilities. They seldom reach the front rank of great men. That is left for the universalists who attain excellence, not in one particular, but in many. It is to this class that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek belongs.

The world at large may think of Chiang as the Chinese general who has revolutionized warfare in China. Chiang himself, however, reckons his military successes by which he brought under the sway of the Central Government at Nanking ■ huge tract of territory and an immense population as ■ matter of minor importance. It is the New Life Movement and the People's Economic Reconstruction Movement that he counts as his real achievements. The aim of the Generalissimo is not to conquer territory and make the nation strong militarily, but to bring about a complete reconstruction of his people, psychologically, physically, morally, spiritually, and

materially. His aim is not a petty one of achieving a high degree of excellence himself in some tedious particular.

At the present time, Generalissimo Chiang asks nothing better than to be let alone in order that he may devote his full time to the reconstruction of the nation. If he concerns himself with military affairs, it is due to the compulsion of circumstances rather than to his own inclination. Road-building, river conservancy, irrigation and canals, bridge-building, tree-planting, improvement in agriculture, opium suppression, elimination of illiteracy, reform of administrative procedure, elimination of "graft" and "squeeze," improvement of both public and private sanitation, a higher development of artistic appreciation among the masses, educational reform, reform of public and private morals, improving breeds of cattle—these are a few of his interests that he is actually playing a leading role in promoting. His attention to military efficiency and the reform of China's Armies, is only one item among many others.

The many-sidedness of Chiang Kai-shek makes it possible to compare him with other great men—with Napoleon Bonaparte in respect to his energy of character, with Dr. Sun Yat-sen in respect to the political theories which he upholds, with the sages of ancient China in respect to the virtues and moral teachings which he urges upon his fellow-countrymen. In the end, however, he resembles no one else so much as himself. Great men of the first rank are never duplicates of each other. The many-sidedness of their character and attainments is a guarantee that no two of them will be alike.

There are times when Chiang Kai-shek reminds one of an English gentleman with his consideration and thoughtfulness for others, as on the occasion in a campaign in 1925 when Chiang was compelled to spend a night in the open air on a hillock, with a Russian adviser. The morning found the cape which a soldier attendant had spread over the body of the Commander-in-Chief, resting on the adviser's person, placed there by Chiang himself, according to the story as related by the Russian. There are times when he reminds one of

the Japanese *samurai* when one thinks of his frugality, his self-denying habits and his loyalty to Dr. Sun Yat-sen, but surely he is a Chinese scholar of the best tradition in his exposition of the Great Learning, in his fondness of classical allusions in his speeches, and in his preachings of the moral life. At other times he is the American social reformer *par excellence* in the zeal with which he prosecutes the campaign against the opium evil, and he is German in his thoroughness, Roman in his sense of justice, and Greek in his love of beauty. The list might be almost indefinitely extended. His asceticism, however, suggests, not that of the Hindu who makes a virtue of self-mortification in the act itself, but rather is it the asceticism of genius. "Genius is always ascetic," says Emerson, "and piety and love."

The many-sidedness of Chiang is perhaps his most important attribute of character, but without his other qualities he might have been no more than a "jack-of-all-trades." Superimposed upon this fundamental stratum of his nature, we find loyalty, modesty, simplicity, energy and power of analysis. As a result, he has become the outstanding leader in modern China.

## CHAPTER XXXVIII

Chiang's Successful Unification Of China—Imaginative Quality Of His Mind—Examples Of Statesmanship—Rejection Of Personal Power Ability To Co-operate With Others—As A Military Commander Thoroughness In Organization—Stern But Kindly Disciplinarian—Appreciation Of Value Of Time—Use Of Foreign Military Experts—Lessons Of Northern Expedition

IN THE political field, Chiang Kai-shek's achievements have been so remarkable that they have compelled admiration even in circles which were far from well disposed towards him. By sheer ability he has won a commanding place among China's political leaders and now, as a member of the Government and as a leader of the Kuomintang, he has obtained an influence in the affairs of the nation that has extended far beyond the limits of his official duties. Not only is he the recognized leader of the Chinese people, but foreign nations have also come to admit the importance of his position in China.

Imagination in its most striking form has been mainly responsible for Chiang's political success. It is Emerson, who says that "the high functions of the intellect are so allied that some imaginative power usually appears in all eminent minds, even in mathematicians of the first class, but especially in meditative men of an intuitive habit of thought." In fact, the functions of the intellect are so related that it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate them completely from each other. It is the imagination of Chiang Kai-shek, certainly, that has given direction to his energy of character and depth to his loyalty to his principles.

The chief driving force by which Chiang has been impelled has always been his vision of a united China by founding a National Government truly representative of all sections of the people. Comparatively few persons entertained such an aspiration, but it was left to him to bring about the practical unification of China in a spiritual and political sense in less than ten years. He has successfully aroused the people from centuries of lethargy. Now they are no longer content to explain the cause of flood and drought famines as well as the Japanese military occupation of four provinces in the North-east by the intervention of Providence. They are giving greater support to the Government's domestic and foreign policy. They have realized the seriousness of the external and internal difficulties that face the Government. All this has been chiefly due to the example and precept of the Generalissimo.

It is true that the unity of China is still in the process of growth, but the unity is none the less real because it is imperfect. So much emphasis has been laid upon the alleged disunity of China by foreigners in the recent past that it may be well to suggest that a proper sense of perspective is the first requisite to an appreciation of the task that has been accomplished by Chiang and his associates. In the first place, China is a continental country, both in respect to its land area and its volume of population. Secondly, China is separated by diversities of race and language almost as much as Europe. The conclusion to be drawn is that the comparison of China with small countries like Great Britain, France and Italy is really not so valid as that between China on the one hand and all of Europe on the other. When the critics correct their perspective, it will immediately be realized that China does possess a real degree of unity—certainly a unity greater than that of Europe, which is continually hovering on the brink of war. More important still, the unity of China is steadily moving in the direction of that attained even by the smaller countries.

A summing up of Chiang's own philosophy of life shows

that his imagination goes further than the mere unification of China. "The object of life lies in the advancement of the collective life of mankind," he declared on one occasion, "while its meaning is to re-create the continued life in the universe." That is to say that a man, he pointed out, should sacrifice his small *ego* in order to realize the enlarged *ego*. Or, to put it differently, an individual should do his utmost to improve and prolong the life of man as a whole. More than once Chiang has given expression to his aspirations for the human race, and thereby he has raised himself from the status of a citizen of China to that of a citizen of the world.

From a superficial knowledge of Chiang's philosophy of life, some might have concluded that he was unusually ambitious and inordinately greedy for power and glory. To support this viewpoint they might cite a remark he made at Nanchang about being a personality in history. Such an estimate of him certainly does him injustice, betraying a wilful lack of the understanding of his true greatness. First of all, his famous remark should not be torn from its context of time and occasion. When he spoke at Nanchang, he was trying to persuade his hearers to take a long view of passing events, rather than to be concerned with the immediate present. The remark should not be interpreted as a desire on the part of Chiang to lend a theatrical *éclat* to his life by winning the plaudits of future generations. He is far too serious-minded for that, but, regardless of the interpretation that may be placed upon his statement, it serves to illustrate that his imagination does not permit him to live exclusively for the concerns of the immediate present.

An indisputable proof that Chiang is not working for his own glorification is the fact that he has worked out certain principles that he follows so closely as to amount to almost a self-imposed code of conduct by which he regulates his political actions. It may be a surprise to some—particularly those in foreign countries who are accustomed to hear him referred to as a dictator—to learn that he submits himself to the principle of civilian supremacy. A special correspondent,

writing from Canton on April 5, 1926, made the grudging admission: "Chiang actually does submit to the authority of the Political Bureau, and at any rate appears to be careful as to his conduct in this respect."

In 1927, when he was denounced as an autocrat by Hsu Chien, Chiang denied the charge and in reply said: "I am the Chairman of the Political Committee of the Kuomintang. Any of you may ask the members of this committee whether any resolution in the minute books expresses my sole will. You can ask whether or not the resolutions of the committee have been carried out as a result of my personal decision or whether such have been carried out by the free voting method."

Consistently, Chiang has taken a similar position in regard to the efforts of some of his admirers to give him greater power. The issue was raised in 1931 when he was Chairman (*chu-hsi*) of the National Government as to whether he should be made *tsung-tung* (President of the Republic). He gave the weight of his opinion against the need for such an office. Since the question of his personal ambitions had been raised by his political enemies, he took the occasion to explain just what his ambition in life is. He said: "It has been my supreme wish to dedicate my whole life and energy to the cause of the National Revolution. For this, I am also ready to lay down my life. My one and only aim is to preserve peace and national unification, to prevent further civil strife, to make it possible for the people to engage in their peaceful pursuits without molestation, to improve the political conditions and realize national reconstruction to the end that efforts may be concentrated upon the abolition of the unilateral treaties and the realization of the Three People's Principles.

"For the attainment of this, I am ready and willing to be the target of scurrilous attacks, to make any sacrifices, and to stand whatever personal abuse or opprobrium may be hurled against me. Ready as I am to sacrifice my very life, what do I care for personal success or failure, glory or humiliation? I have never aspired and will never aspire to become *tsung-tung* merely for purposes of personal glory. This must be

known to all comrades who are cognizant of my personal wishes. It is therefore hoped that the public will not regard what is really an ordinary question as anything extraordinary."

There have been Chinese—and there still are—who would like to make Chiang a dictator somewhat on the Western model, but these individuals have not been encouraged by Chiang himself. The issue was raised as late as 1934, when certain organs of the Kuomintang in North China urged a reorganization of the Party with Chiang as *tsung-lî* (Supreme Head) which would have given him an authority not greatly different from that of Mussolini as the Duce of the Fascist Party in Italy, or of Hitler as Fuehrer of the Nazis in Germany. The Generalissimo met the issue with a personal statement of which the following is the authorized translation:

"No intelligent person would give credence to this rumour that the Kuomintang is creating a dictatorship. The primary duty of Party members is to obey the Party Constitution and the Constitution cannot be changed at the will of the minority. In view of this fact, this rumour is so ridiculous that it will defeat its own purpose without any denials. I have repeatedly pointed out that the success of the Chinese Revolution does not necessarily depend upon any one system or form of government. Italy and Germany, it is true, accomplished their revolution by dictatorship, but, if, on the strength of this, China were to adopt dictatorship, would the result be any more successful than our former adoption of the Russian committee form of government? We adopted the Russian system and to-day our Revolution is not yet completed. Why? Because success is dependent on the people, and not on the systems or forms. Revolution begins with the heart. Let our leaders unite their efforts and work towards a common goal; thus only can our apparent failure be turned into victory. Dictatorship or committee system, the completion of our Revolution does not depend upon outward form, but on the inner spirit. Furthermore, let us remember that the conditions which obtained in Italy and Germany are

not those in China, and what was successful in those two countries would not necessarily be suitable in China."

During the trouble with the two Kwang provinces in 1936, he announced that he would not stand for the Presidency at the coming elections, which were to be held in November, but which were postponed.

Such being his life object, which is both patriotic and unselfish, it is easy to understand why Chiang allowed his imagination full play and discovered his course as he went along. That is why he has improvised a great deal—all men of imagination usually do—as the events of the moment suggested certain action. It has been said that his New Life Movement originated in the accidental observation of a young student misbehaving himself in the streets. This explanation is unduly simplified, but the incident referred to and the response of his fellow citizens to his allusion to the matter in one of his speeches, undoubtedly had its effect upon his promotion of the movement.

The tour of the North-west by Generalissimo and Madame Chiang was also an improvisation decided upon on the spur of the moment. The inspiration for it came from the favourable and even enthusiastic reception given to them during their visit to the Military Academy at Loyang, and also at Sian, the cradle of the Chinese race. The Generalissimo immediately envisaged a similar response in other North-western provinces, thus supplying to the nation visible evidence of the spirit of unity that prevails in China. He was not disappointed either by their tour of the North-west—which quickly resolved itself into a series of triumphal processions—or by their tour of the South-west at a later date. He is utilizing passing events in order to enable him to move forward in the direction of the final goal set by his imagination.

It is the imaginative quality of his mind that urged him to use the airplane for visiting distant places in China. Even as long ago as 1910 aviation appealed to his imagination. At that time he wrote a book on the value of airplanes for military purposes which, unfortunately, was mislaid before it reached

the publisher. Since his assumption of a national role, he has been unremitting in his endeavours to build up the air arm of the military forces and civil air services. It might almost be said that the unification of China has been accomplished because of the Generalissimo's ability to fly. It has been the most spectacular factor in his rise in popular favour. No other leader in China has done or could have done what he has accomplished. In the remotest parts of China he has come face to face with the officials and the people and has talked over their problems with them. Literally dropping from the skies into the vision of remote peoples, the National Government personified in him became a living and sympathetic reality. His addresses to the people brought home to them what was being accomplished in spiritual rejuvenation and material reconstruction. These unexpected and frequently unheralded visits put the officials on their mettle and crystallized public opinion in China. A spirit of unity was born and warlordism was broken up. Chiang's use of the airplane can be said to have shortened national unification by at least a decade.

At the same time, Chiang does not lose sight of the proper perspective by giving too much weight to his own personal feelings. That is why he is unexcelled as a co-operator with others in the business of administration. With Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min he was the chief political heir of Dr. Sun Yat-sen after the latter's death. He managed to work with both of those leaders, though at times finding himself in opposition to each of them. On the other hand, neither Wang nor Hu seemed to possess the marked talent of Chiang for harmonizing conflicting interests. For instance, these two leaders, though opposing Chiang at times, nevertheless at other periods were able to work loyally with him, while at the same time they never seem to have been able to work with each other in the administration of the Government.

Of these three outstanding leaders, it was Chiang Kai-shek alone who possessed that pragmatic ability that the successful leader must of necessity possess. Up to the time of his death in 1936, Hu Han-min, according to an obituary editorial in the

"North-China Daily News," "never really lost his conservative faith in the traditional culture of old China. This gave him an apparently pontifical aloofness which militated against his successful engagement in the give-and-take of political relationships." This characterization of Hu is noteworthy for the contrast it affords with Chiang, for the latter was endowed exactly with those qualities that Hu lacked.

Chiang also possesses the rare gift--rare at least in China's modern leaders--of making a distinction between political opposition and personal animosity. Even at a period when Wang Ching-wei most bitterly opposed his leadership, Chiang exchanged personal letters with him and eventually Wang resumed a post in the Government as a sincere co-worker. It can fairly be said that Chiang has made toleration towards political opponents a distinguishing feature of his political life. This has been particularly noticeable in the tolerance he manifested towards the vagaries of the politicians in Kwangtung and Kwangsi in 1936 and towards his other former opponents who are now his co-workers in the Government.

It is still too early to make a dogmatic estimate of Chiang Kai-shek as a soldier. For one thing, the military history of his campaigns yet remains to be written. Moreover, China is at present facing a crisis in her international relationships, the possible military results of which are beyond the scope of present knowledge, but there have been clues in plenty that afford at least some insight, if not positive indications, as to his qualities as a military leader of his epoch.

Chiang once said: "You cannot tell anything about an army by looking at its general. You must look into it, and see what kind of men make up the ranks." But the obverse may be true that you can tell something about the kind of general an army has by considering the kind of men that make up its ranks. On this basis we will endeavour to formulate an opinion of Chiang as a military leader.

In June, 1924, Chiang organized the Whampoa Military Academy in the vicinity of Canton, and in less than a year he was able to use his cadets to disarm the Merchants' Volunteer

Corps and defeat Chen Chiung-ming's large force. When they were called upon for active service under arms, these cadets responded magnificently. In 14 months, he had created out of nothing a division of troops which was able to disarm three divisions on September 20, 1925. In all subsequent engagements his troops bore the brunt and invariably walked through every army with which they came in contact, having won a reputation as men who were never afraid to fight against odds. During the Northern Expedition they specially distinguished themselves by the extraordinary bravery that they had displayed on the battlefields at Tingszekiao, in Kiangsi and along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway.

The efficiency of his troops was also shown in the campaign for the suppression of the Feng-Yen rebellion, which has been classed as one of the bloodiest wars ever fought in China. This was no comic-opera affair as Western writers sometimes used to describe old-fashioned warfare in China. The struggle lasted more than six months, and involved a million soldiers. There were heavy casualties, Chiang losing between 20,000 and 30,000 of his best troops killed and wounded at Lanfeng alone.

Again, in the fighting at Shanghai against the Japanese, the 87th and 88th divisions, Chiang's crack troops, sustained a loss of fully one-third killed. Most military leaders consider that troops that will stand up to a loss of 20 per cent. of their effectives without being routed are good. The abortive Fukien rebellion demonstrated the rapidity with which Chiang can move his military machine in putting down revolt. The famous Nineteenth Route Army did well enough against the Japanese, but it acquitted itself poorly when it opposed the Central Government.

Chiang accomplished his results in the Northern Expedition although confronted by the extraordinary difficult problems of communications and the lack of funds. His drive north from Canton for a distance of 700 miles against greatly superior forces deservedly ranks as a great achievement, unsurpassed by anything that has ever been done in Chinese warfare.

After the break with the Communists at Wuhan, he was compelled to reorganize his own finances in order to bring the expedition to a successful conclusion. He managed to carry on notwithstanding these great difficulties.

What were the underlying secrets of his success? One of the most important was the good morale that he inspired among his men. Chiang has always insisted that the spiritual is more important than the material, but that by no means signifies that he neglected the latter. On the contrary, he looks after his men's physical well-being as all good officers do. Their food, clothing and pay receive his special attention and he has rooted out most of the abuses by which the men were victimized in the old days. Knowing that the Generalissimo is genuinely interested in everything that concerns them, even in their personal problems, the rank and file naturally behave well. The soldier who is properly fed, clothed and paid, who knows that he will be looked after when he is ill or wounded, ■ inevitably a better fighter than the soldier who is neglected and robbed by his superiors.

Chiang's thoroughness in matters of army administration and organization—which contributed greatly to the morale of his men—is illustrated by the long memorandum which he submitted to the War Commissary of the Kuomintang in preparation for the Northern Expedition. He discussed military supplies, army payments and methods of raising funds in order to avoid the endless evils and corruptions inherent in each army raising its funds within its own territory, suggested methods of economy and efficiency, including the establishment of factories on government account to supply the needs of the Army and made recommendations regarding centralized training of cadets. There was scarcely a point of army administration and organization that he did not touch upon in the memorandum. (A fuller record of these recommendations has already been given in Chapter VI).

On the spiritual side, Chiang has communicated something of his own revolutionary zeal to his men. They are taught their role in the Kuomintang scheme of things. The Three

Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen are made the focal point in his preaching of the Nationalist gospel. His men are so thoroughly indoctrinated that it is claimed that if any of them were captured they would not fight for their adversaries, but instead would set about converting them. They were instructed at the outset that they are not the soldiers of an individual, but of the Central Kuomintang. In the second place, they were told that their fight was against militarists and imperialists on behalf of the nation and for better conditions among the people and that these things were worth getting even at the cost of their lives. Finally, the rank and file were commanded to love and respect the people wherever they go. Is it any wonder that Chiang's personally-trained units do not behave like those of a typical Chinese warlord or militarist?

That the people have hung out welcome signs to Chiang's troops and presented them with gifts is indicative of the success attained by his new methods of training. It was because of Chiang's prescience that he made the cause of the people his own cause, and thereby made easier the task of military subjugation of his foes. He is keeping in sight at all times his objective and insisting—soldier though he is—upon the principle of civilian supremacy and the rule of the Kuomintang, faulty as that may have been at times, and earning the encomiums not only of his own people, but of foreigners as well, as a true patriot. It is to this last-mentioned quality that Chiang owes much of his success as a soldier; himself a patriot, he has been able to inspire patriotism in others, for in the final analysis it is men—not machines, important as the latter may be—who win battles and decide the fate of nations.

His insistence upon discipline was, and is, still another factor in his success. He had troubles with his cadets in this respect, but he overcame their wayward tendencies largely by the force of his personal example. He usually spoke to them three times a week at Whampoa. The cadets were told time and again that they were being trained both as an army and as a Party cell. Many times he stressed the importance of discipline in the Army, and he told the cadets more than

once that the success of the October Revolution in Russia was largely due to the strictness of discipline in the Red Army. That Chiang insists upon an iron discipline is known to all of his military associates. He, himself, if he notices an ordinary soldier committing a breach of discipline such as annoying the civilian population, will pause in his duties long enough to order the arrest of the offending soldier and his trial.

His readiness to adopt novel plans which would give him advantages over his opponents has also played its part. The fact that his Army was always victorious is attributable to his adoption of a system calling for joint responsibility of all officers from army corps commanders down to company leaders on the battlefields. He also successfully employed the Pieh Tung Tui or special movement force, a combination of intelligence and military police, to enforce discipline, supervise the relations between fighting units and the people and to act as his eyes when the national forces had grown to such an extent that it was no longer possible for him to exercise personal supervision over them.

He showed thorough appreciation of the value of propaganda both among the rank and file of his own military units and among the civilian population with whom his Army comes in contact. He is supposed to have learned this from his Russian advisers. In this respect he certainly differed from the Northern militarists, who were in the habit of relying upon force alone to achieve their results. Indeed, the defeat of Wu Pei-fu is ascribed by some writers as largely due to adroit propaganda, and undoubtedly the advance from Canton northward during the Northern Expedition had been hastened by the propaganda work of Chiang's political agents.

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that Chiang simply talked himself into a position of commanding success over his enemies. The storming of Waichow by his troops in the preliminary campaign which he fought in Kwangtung in order to establish his military base, showed that his units could fight and win battles, despite the favourable position of the enemy and their own severe losses. It was said of Chiang

at the time that he defied the rules, outraged his adversaries, but captured Waichow.

He has been modern enough to make active use of military experts, at first Russian and later largely German, thus throwing overboard the obsolete Chinese conception that it would be inadvisable to seek foreign aid in such vital matters. During his student days in Japan he reached the conclusion that one of the reasons for Japan's rapid acquisition of western technique in various fields, and especially in the military, was the employment of specialists from foreign countries during the Meiji era. He employed Russians, therefore, to help him to train cadets, and when they returned home, he took steps to replace them by Germans whom he had always admired because of their thoroughness. Under the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was not permitted to send military experts to other countries. This difficulty was obviated by engaging Germans as private individuals.

Colonel Max Bauer headed a list of 46 Germans who joined the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the National Armies. These military experts were responsible to him alone. Bauer organized an efficient Military Information Bureau and made a voluminous report to the Generalissimo in which, among other things, he stressed the necessity of fostering a favourable attitude towards China in the Press of foreign countries.

Unfortunately, Bauer died of smallpox in 1929. He was succeeded by General Wetzell as Chief Adviser. After three years he retired and General von Seeckt then occupied the post for a year, his Chief of Staff being General von Falkenhausen, who is still at Nanking. The German military advisers included specialists on infantry, cavalry, artillery and other branches. These experts were, as a rule, stationed at Nanking, though many have travelled to various parts of China. They conduct daily classes, their pupils including generals, colonels and officers of other ranks. There are even special lectures prepared for the Generalissimo himself on such subjects as the importance of transport with reference to

maintaining the morale of an army, on how Germany's lack of rubber in 1918 hastened her defeat because military trucks without rubber tyres ruined the German highways, and on other similar subjects.

There are critics who believe that Chinese cannot accomplish anything really notable in military operations by themselves and who consequently give all the credit of Chiang's successful campaigns to his military advisers. Some of Chiang's admirers, on the other hand, would minimize the services of these experts. The truth lies somewhere between these extreme views. As a matter of fact, Chiang does use his experts, but he does not invariably follow their advice. The Northern Campaign from Canton, for example, was undertaken against the advice of the Russian experts.

No one knows better than the Generalissimo that, while China needs technical assistance from foreign military experts, there is, however, a limitation to their usefulness in actual operations. They are not acquainted with the terrain, the habits and customs of the people, the mental reaction of the soldiers, and many other factors which have to be considered when two forces go into action against each other. Foreign advisers may be good instructors in modern war technique, but it is necessary for the Chinese to give that technique a new application when called for by the peculiar circumstances in which combats take place. The Generalissimo has been personally responsible for all the plans for military operations during the last ten years.

The ability of Chiang as a tactician is generally admitted to be one of many factors which have contributed to his military success. Its full scope will be unfolded only when China's Armies come into a clash with a modern army on a large scale. Hitherto Chiang's domestic opponents have shown little skill in this direction. For instance, during the advance northward from Canton, a frequent expedient of Chiang's Army was to send a small body of men around to the enemy's rear, so that, when the enemy heard firing and noise both in front and in rear, they became alarmed and fled. The

Northern soldiers, under officers of the old school, were not used to firing on two sides at the same time.

He again showed his ability as a tactician when he resumed the Northern Expedition in 1927. After he had advanced into Shantung, his base was threatened by military forces from the cities of Hankow and Wuchang. He immediately dropped back towards the Yangtze in order to protect his home base. The movement of his troops was so speedy that neither the forces at Hankow and Wuchang which contemplated an attack on Nanking nor those of the Northern militarists who had opposed his advance were aware of the tactical withdrawal in time to take advantage of it and turn it to his discomfort.

Throughout the period of internal disturbances, he has on more than one occasion shown himself to be a superb strategist. Hostile combinations against the Central Government have been either broken up or else weakened by his skill in coming to an understanding with opposing military leaders. Again, as mentioned earlier, at the time of the Shanghai War, if his plans had been acted upon, they would have prevented the Japanese from turning the flank of the Chinese Armies defending Shanghai and would have enabled them to make an even better showing against the invaders.

As to Chiang's strategy in the larger phases of military planning, it has been suggested that he has adopted a "nuclear" policy of building up a kind of Prussia or Piedmont in the central provinces of China around which the rest of China can gradually be unified. The Japanese credit Chiang with plans to develop a powerful military base in Szechwan from which he can eventually launch a drive against Japan. At any rate, Chiang has had the foresight to advance or retreat in accordance with the circumstances, but never to allow himself to be caught unprepared for any eventuality that might develop at any moment.

There is no better summary of Chiang's lofty views and his political and military abilities than the one that was given

in ■ report submitted to Moscow by a discriminating foreign observer, Stepanoff, a Soviet military adviser, in 1926. He wrote: "Chiang desired to have the revolutionary work not only influence China, but also the world at large. He has never had personal ambition to have power and money. He wanted money in order to acquire power and power in order to help China and establish a stable government. The difference between Chiang and the Chinese militarists is that he understands the international situation and knows how to make use of it for the benefit of China, which the Chinese militarists do not. He also understands the thoughts of the masses. Ordinary leaders who wish to make use of the masses in the end are overthrown by the masses, but he has secured a different result." Subsequent events have proved the correctness of Stepanoff's estimate of Chiang as the foremost political and military leader in China.

The Biography has now drawn to its close. It is the thrilling story of the rise of Chiang Kai-shek from obscurity to fame. In 1911, when the Revolutionary Ship of State was first launched, he had played but the insignificant part of ■ sailor, but he carefully noted that the ship had been almost wrecked by tempestuous weather and that, after Yuan Shih-kai's death, successive incapable captains had essayed without success to navigate the vessel. The main cause was the division of the crew against itself. Though he attracted little notice at first, he was quietly training himself for the hour when it would become necessary for him to assume full charge.

That hour came. Under the new commander the Ship of State rode on a more even keel. Storms of great severity were encountered, but they were weathered. The commander restored order among the crew—even among that faction which was prepared to scuttle the ship if it was not allowed to steer by the Communist compass. Gradually the weather improved, and the Port of Unity is now in sight.

What of the figure that emerges from these pages? Surely the verdict will be that ■ is that of a great man—great in all the attributes that constitute greatness. As a soldier, as a statesman, as a patriot, he has an unchallenged supremacy in the land of his birth. ■ remains to be seen whether the verdict of history will not give him a more exalted status. Certainly it is more than local pride of nation and race that justifies the question: Where among his world contemporaries can be found a leader with such a brilliant record of achievement as China's Generalissimo?

The greatest leader that the world has ever known has said that fruits of achievement are the only just basis of judgment. On that basis Chiang need not fear the verdict. His footprints have already been indelibly impressed "on the sands of time."

## APPENDIX

### Generalissimo's Monograph On The New Life Movement Translated By Madame Chiang Kai-shek

THE struggle of China to emerge from the Revolution which in 1911 began successfully by overthrowing the Manchu Dynasty has been hampered by the unpreparedness of the people for the responsibilities of public life, and by the age-long influences of apparently sanctified customs.

For hundreds of years the people of China were discouraged from interesting themselves in the affairs of government and were taught, even with the executioner's sword, that the administration of the country was the exclusive concern of the official class.

The people consequently, through the centuries, gradually ceased to have any interest in government and lapsed, as the rulers desired, into complete disregard of national affairs, confining themselves to seeking the welfare of the family and the clan, and knowing nothing, and caring nothing, about the responsibilities of citizenship, the requirements of patriotism, or the urge of loyalty to the country or its flag.

In forced conditions such as these, the habits of the great population of China developed along lines quite contrary to those characterizing the peoples of other countries, with the result that when the political window opened they were, in a sense, blinded by the light that suddenly and unexpectedly poured in upon them. They found themselves without understanding of political or official life, bewildered owing to lack of universal education, and hampered by age-long aloofness and habits that are of little consequence to a small country

which may be confined and self-contained within its own boundaries, but which have a tremendously suffocating effect upon a great country flung, willy-nilly, into the wide-sweeping economic and political currents of the world.

The march of events is inexorable and cannot wait for the sluggards to catch up, and therefore it becomes incumbent upon those who know the problem of China to take strong action to break down the demoralizing influence which centuries of suppression of national sentiment and feelings have had.

A new national consciousness and mass psychology have to be created and developed, and with that intention what is called "The New Life Movement" has been launched.

Peoples of the outer world may not at first be able to understand the necessity for such a movement, but they will do so if they realize that they have grown up with national consciousness fully developed around and about them, whereas the Chinese people have been deliberately forcibly bereft of it, and, therefore, know nothing of those sentiments and impulses that so quickly move the Occidental peoples when matters concerning their country come forward for consideration or action. It is to correct the evil consequences arising from this serious state of affairs that action is now being taken along a psychological and educational line.

### I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW LIFE MOVEMENT.

To correct, or to revolutionize, an age-old habit is a difficult thing, but, by using the simplest, and, therefore, the most efficient means, it is hoped that, in time, the outlook of the people will be entirely changed and they will be able with spirit and competency to meet the requirements of the new time and the new life. The aim of the New Life Movement is, therefore, the social regeneration of China.

It is to this end that their thoughts are now being directed to the ancient high virtues of the nation for guidance, namely, etiquette, justice, integrity and conscientiousness, expressed in *li*, *i*, *lien* and *ch'ih*. These four virtues were highly respected

by the Chinese people in the past, and they are vitally necessary now if the rejuvenation of the nation is to be effected.

China has had a cultural history of some five thousand years with fine standards to guide the daily life of the people, and yet, owing to oppression and disregard, they have disappeared, and rudeness and vulgarity have supervened.

China, with a territory of 1,896,500 square miles, possesses abundant natural resources, and the only reason to account for the present degeneration and lack of development is that public virtues have been neglected.

We have a population of over four hundred millions, yet, because we have neglected to cultivate our virtues, social disorder reigns and most of the people lead a life far below that which they should enjoy.

We have, therefore, to learn that, to correct personal and national failings, we must fall back upon the influence of the old teachings. Rudeness and vulgar manners can be corrected by cultural and artistic training, and degeneration can be overcome by developing good personal character. It is difficult, however, to succeed merely through the ordinary processes of education and governance. If we are determined to reform we must start with the most fundamental question—we must reform our habits first. This, therefore, is why the New Life Movement is regarded as the key to the salvation of our nation.

## II. THE INTERPRETATION OF THE NEW LIFE MOVEMENT.

### A. *What is Life?*

Dr. Sun Yat-sen said: "Life of the people comprises the livelihood of the people, the existence of society, the welfare of the nation, and the life of the masses." Although the people's life is thus divided into four phases, yet livelihood is the general manifestation of the other three. Existence depends upon protection; welfare needs development; and life demands propagation. To satisfy all these needs, we have to resort to activities. And life is nothing more than the continuation of activities.

**B. What is New Life?**

All activities to satisfy the desire for the propagation of life, the protection of human existence, and the development of national welfare, are bound to change with changing conditions. Time does not stand still, and environment changes with time. Therefore, only those who re-adapt themselves to new conditions, day by day, can live properly. When the life of a people is going through this process of re-adaptation, it has to remedy its own defects, and get rid of those elements which become useless. Then we call it new life.

**C. What is the New Life Movement?**

In order to satisfy the requirements of a new life for a people, we have, to a certain extent, to depend upon the Government, especially its system of education, its economic policies, and its measures to insure the protection of all. Whether the policies of a government can be successfully carried out, however, depends greatly upon the customs and habits of the people at the time. When an old order collapses and a new order is about to arise, the new policies are frequently handicapped, if the new system does not base its foundation on the social customs of the time. It is, therefore, necessary to start a movement first, to teach the people to adapt themselves to new conditions, before any ardent support for the new policies can be expected from the people. "Water always flows over a wet surface, while fire goes wherever it is dry." The function of any social movement is to prepare the wet surface for water and the dry place for fire. This accounts for the fact that every nation, during its period of transition, pays more attention to the change of customs and habits than to the new policies themselves. The success of these social movements virtually means the success of the new policies of the Government. This illustrates very well the necessity of our New Life Movement. This movement must start with those well aware of its necessity, and gradually expand to others—from the near to the more distant, and from its simpler phase to the more complex. If a man can cultivate new habits himself, it is possible that the members of his

family will be influenced; and a family can, by turn, influence the whole community. A social movement goes hand in hand with politics and education; it is not dependent.

### III. THE OBJECT OF THE NEW LIFE MOVEMENT.

#### A. *Why is a New Life needed?*

The general psychology of our people to-day can be described in one word—spiritlessness. What manifests itself in behaviour is this: no discrimination between the good and the evil, no difference between what is public and what is private, and no distinction between the fundamental and the expedient. Because there is no discrimination between the good and the evil, consequently right and wrong are confused; because there is no difference between public and private, there lacks proper guidance for taking and giving; and because there is no distinction between the fundamental and expedient, there is misplacement of the first and the last. As a result, officials tend to be dishonest and avaricious; the masses are undisciplined and callous; the adults are ignorant and corrupt; the youth become degraded and intemperate; the rich become extravagant and luxurious; and the poor become mean and disorderly. Naturally, it resulted in the complete disorganization of social order and national life. Consequently, we are not in a position either to prevent or to remedy natural calamities or disasters caused from within or invasions from without. The individual, society, and the whole country are now suffering. It would be impossible even to continue living under such miserable conditions. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary to get rid of these backward conditions and to start to lead a new and rational life.

#### B. *Why is a New Life Movement needed?*

In order to raise the standard of the people's livelihood and to create a new society, it is indispensable to rely both on the Government and on education. Unfortunately, both the Government and education were inefficient in the past, because those who conducted them were not sufficiently sincere. As a result, the law lost its function; technical knowledge had little

practical use; and even machinery did not work efficiently. Why is it that men in the same position worked differently, and that the same technique and same machinery did not bring the same results? Obviously, in order to make the law or the machine work, it does not depend so much upon the law or the machinery themselves as it does upon the personnel. The key lies in the human element. Social movement is the one way which will influence personal character to a large extent in a short time. No other method, political or educational, can be compared with it. Of course, politics and education have their roles to play. It is not our object to explain them here. In such a national crisis, if we are not willing to bind our hands waiting for death, we ought to reconstruct our society with extraordinary means instead of merely sitting down and waiting for the process of natural evolution. In other words, it is a gigantic task for the New Life Movement to wipe out the backward conditions of society by a wild storm and to supply the community with vitality and the right spirit by a gentle breeze.

#### IV. THE CONTENTS OF THE NEW LIFE MOVEMENT.

##### A. *The Principles of the New Life Movement.*

The New Life Movement aims at the promotion of a regular life guided by the four virtues (*li, i, lien* and *ch'ih*). These virtues must be applied to ordinary matters, such as food, clothing, shelter and action. The four virtues are the essential principles for the promotion of morality. From these rules, one learns how to deal with men and matters, how to cultivate oneself, and how to adjust oneself to surroundings. Whoever violates these rules is bound to fail; and a nation which neglects them will not survive.

There are two kinds of sceptics:

First, some hold the view that the four virtues are simply rules of good conduct. No matter how good they may be, no benefit to the nation can be derived from them if the knowledge and technique used by that nation are inferior to others.

Those who hold this view do not seem to understand the difference between matters of primary and secondary importance. From the social and national point of view, only those who are virtuous can best use their knowledge and technique for the salvation of the country. Otherwise, ability may be abused for dishonourable purposes. *Li, i, lien* and *ch'ih* are the principal rules alike for a community, a group, or the entire nation. Those who do not observe these rules will probably utilize their knowledge and ability to the disadvantage of society. Therefore, these virtues may be considered as matters of primary importance upon which the foundation of a nation can be solidly built.

Secondly, there is another group of people who argue that these virtues are merely refined formalities, which have nothing to do with the actual necessities of daily life. For instance, if one is hungry, can these formalities feed him? This is probably due to some misunderstanding of the famous teachings of Kuantze, who said: "When one does not have to worry about his food and clothing, then he cares for personal honour; when the granary is full, then people learn good manners." The sceptic fails to realize that the four virtues teach one how to be a man. If one does not know those, what is the use of having abundance of food and clothing? Moreover, Kuantze did not intend to make a general statement, merely referring to a particular subject at a particular time. When he was making broad statements, he said: "*Li, i, lien* and *ch'ih*, are the four pillars of the nation." When these virtues prevail, even if food and clothing are temporarily insufficient, they can be produced by man-power: or, if the granary is empty, it can be filled through human effort. On the other hand, when these virtues are not observed, there will be robbery and beggary in time of need; and from a social point of view robbery and beggary can never achieve anything. Social order is based on these virtues. When there is order, then everything can be done properly, but when everything is in confusion, very little can be achieved. To-day robbers are usually most numerous in the wealthiest cities of the world.

This is an obvious illustration of confusion caused by non-observance of virtues. The fact that our country has traitors and Communists, as well as corrupt officials, shows that we, too, have neglected the cultivation of virtues, and, if we are to recover, these virtues must be adopted as the principles of a new life.

*B. The Meaning of *Li*, *I*, *Lien* and *Ch'ih*.*

Although *li*, *i*, *lien* and *ch'ih* have always been regarded as the foundations of the nation, yet the changing times and circumstances may require that these principles be given a new interpretation. From the pragmatic point of view to-day, we may interpret the four virtues as follows:

*Li* means regulated attitude (mind as well as heart).

*I* means right conduct (in all things).

*Lien* means clear discrimination (honesty, in personal, public and official life).

*Ch'ih* means real self-consciousness (integrity and honour).

The word *li* means reason. ■ becomes a natural law, when applied to nature; it becomes a rule, when applied to social affairs; and it signifies discipline, when used in reference to national affairs. These three phases of one's life are all regulated by reason. Therefore, *li* can be interpreted as regulated attitude of mind and heart.

The word *i* means proper. Any conduct which is in accordance with natural law, social rule, or national discipline must be considered as proper. When an act is not proper, or when one thinks it proper but does not act accordingly, the act is naturally not right and therefore cannot be called *i*.

The word *lien* means clear. It denotes distinction between right and wrong. What agrees with *li* and *i* is right, and what does not so agree is wrong. To take what we recognize as right and to forego what we recognize as wrong, constitute clear discrimination. This is *lien*.

The word *ch'ih* means consciousness. When one is conscious of the fact that his own actions are not in accordance with *li*, *i* and *lien*, he feels ashamed. When he is conscious

of the fact that others are wrong, he feels disgusted. But the consciousness must be real and thorough so that he will strive to improve the good and endeavour to get rid of the evil. Then we call it *ch'ih*.

From the explanations given above, it is clear that *ch'ih* governs the motive of action, that *lien* gives the guidance for it, that *i* relates to an action actually being carried out, and that *li* regulates the outward form of that particular action. The four are inter-related. They are inter-dependent upon one another in order to make a virtue perfect. Otherwise, *li* without *i* becomes dishonest; *li* without *lien* becomes extravagant; and *li* without *ch'ih* becomes flattering. All these may appear like *li* but really they are not. Similarly, *i* without *li* turns to be offensive; *i* without *lien* lavish and *i* without *ch'ih* fantastic. All these are not really *i*. Again, *lien* without *li* is false; *lien* without *i* is niggard; and *lien* without *ch'ih* is corrupt. They are not *lien*. In like manner, *ch'ih* without *li*, will be chaotic; *ch'ih* without *i*, violent; and *ch'ih* without *lien* ugly. They are no longer *ch'ih*.

It would be a golden opportunity for traitors and sinners if the four virtues were perverted.

#### *C. The Meaning of Food, Clothing, Shelter, and Action.*

There are two necessary elements in our daily life. One refers to the material side for our food, clothing, shelter, and communications, and the other, the manner in which the material is used to serve our daily purposes. The first belongs to the practical side; and the second may be called the manifestation of the spiritual side of human life.

The Chinese word *hsin* may be interpreted broadly or narrowly. Narrowly, it simply means walk; but broadly it means action. All kinds of human behaviour in connection with daily life may be included in this word *hsin*. While Dr. Sun Yat-sen referred to food, clothing, shelter, and communications in "The Three Principles of the People," he used the same word *hsin* to denote communications only (the extended sense of walk). In his "Principles of National Reconstruction," he said: "The Government should co-operate with the people

in developing agriculture in order to provide the people with sufficient food, in developing the textile industry in order to provide them with sufficient clothes, in building all kinds of houses in order to improve their shelter, and in constructing roads and canals in order to provide means of communication for them." He used the same word *hsin* for communications, apparently, in the narrower sense.

But in this monograph, I intend to use the same word, *hsin* both in its broad and in its narrow sense. My own "philosophy of *hsin*" also includes both. This is also true of the previous chapters.

#### *D. The Application of Li, I, Lien and Ch'ih to Food, Clothing, Shelter, and Action.*

What I want to develop now, is how to apply these four virtues to food, clothing, shelter and action.

The means of maintaining our livelihood may be divided into three phases: first, the obtaining of materials; second, the selection of quality; and third, the manner in which these materials are used. Let me put them separately.

1. The obtaining of materials should be governed by the principle of *lien*. Clear discrimination should be exercised between what is ours and what is not. If they do not belong to us, we should not take them. In other words, the materials for our daily life should be acquired through our own labour or through other proper means. Strife should not be encouraged. A parasite is not a good example. Even giving and taking improperly should be avoided. "What really matters is the degradation of personality, but not dying in hunger." The famous saying of a Confucianist can be quoted to illustrate this point.

2. The selection of quality should be governed by the principle of *i*. Do the proper thing in a particular situation. For instance, it is proper for an old man to use silk and to take meat and to have lots of leisure; but a young man should be trained to endure hardship. What is proper in winter is not necessarily proper in summer. What is proper in the North is not necessarily proper in the South. Similarly,

different positions may influence a situation differently. A ruler, or an army commander, must have some authority; while those of a lower rank should not enjoy the same thing, but should respect discipline. Thus, what is proper is influenced by age, season, location, and rank; the selection of quality varies in different situations.

3. The manner in which materials are used should be governed by the principle of *li*, which includes natural law, social rules, and national discipline, as explained in the former chapter.

The inter-relationship of these four virtues has already been fully discussed. When applied to daily life, this is even more true. All virtues should be carefully observed. If one of them is neglected, there is a black spot in our life.

## V. THE PROCEDURE OF THE NEW LIFE MOVEMENT.

### 1. *Organization.*

1. The whole movement should be conducted by the Nanchang Association for the Promotion of the New Life Movement. If a similar movement is started in other provinces, municipalities, or districts, similar associations may be organized, but a district association should be directed by a provincial association.

2. The provincial, municipal, or district associations should be organized and directed by the highest administrative authority of that area. The local Party organization, the bureau of civil or social affairs, the bureau of education, the bureau of public safety, and the local military authorities should each send a representative of high rank to participate in the work of the association. Social groups may also send representatives.

3. Let the farmers be guided by the county officers; workers, by the managers or the responsible persons of the trade unions; merchants, by trustees of the Chambers of Commerce; students, by their teachers; soldiers, by political secretaries or Party representatives in the Army; civil servants,

3. By observing these virtues, it is hoped that social and official disorder will be remedied, and that people will become more military-minded. If a country cannot defend itself, it has every chance to lose its existence. The larger its territory, the more attractive it looks to the invaders. There is only one way for national salvation—that is, to promote the economic stability of the country and develop the patriotic and fighting spirit of the people. Now, the Communists are not yet completely suppressed, and our territory shrinks every day in the face of foreign invasion. In order to pass through this crisis successfully, we have to pacify the interior and resist external aggression. To do this, we have to rely upon force. Our people, therefore, must have military training. As a preliminary, we have to acquire the habits of orderliness, cleanliness, simplicity, frugality, promptness, and exactness. We have to preserve order, emphasize organization, responsibility and discipline, and be ready to die for the country at any moment.

In conclusion, the life of our people will be more refined when we have more artistic training; we will be richer when we are more productive; and we will be much safer when we are more patriotic, better-trained and equipped to defend ourselves. This rational life is founded on *li*, *i*, *lien* and *ch'ih*. The four virtues, in turn, can be applied to food, clothing, shelter, and action. If we achieve this, we will have revolutionized the daily life of our people, and we will have laid the solid foundation for our nation.

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